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1When the People Draw the Lines    League of Women Voters of California
Executive Summary
On November 8, 2008, a historic presidential election drove voter participation to unusu-
ally high levels. Californians cast more than 13.5 million votes for president. Much farther 
down their ballot, a smaller number of voters (just short of 12 million) voted on Prop 11, 
also known as the Voters First Act. By a margin of less than 1 percent,1 voters transformed 
the way the state went about drawing districts for state offices. Instead of the state legis-
lature and governor (and at times, the courts), an independent citizen commission—the 
California Citizens Redistricting Commission—would now accomplish the task. With little 
notice in the tidal wave of the presidential race, Californians had made a major change to 
their state’s constitution.
1Prop 11 received 6,095,033 votes (50.90 percent), with 5,897,655 (49.10 percent) opposed. Although the margin of victory was less than 1 percent, 
the Yes side had almost 200,000 votes more than the No side.
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Executive Summary
Two years later, by a more comfortable margin,2 the 
state’s voters approved Prop 20, to include congressional 
seats in the citizen-led redrawing. On the same ballot, 
voters rejected Prop 27, which would have eliminated 
the entire citizen-driven redistricting process.3 A nar-
row popular mandate for citizen redistricting became a 
solid majority.
Of all the states that have experimented with alter-
natives to redistricting by elected officials, California 
was the most distinctive, dedicated to removing as 
completely as possible the role of incumbent politicians 
in drawing their own district lines.4 Arizona had the 
most comparable state system, but it provided a greater 
role than California for elected officials in selecting 
commissioners.5 
This report analyzes California’s citizen redistrict-
ing process, from design to implementation, presenting 
findings about what worked well and what did not. 
It also offers recommendations for improvement, in 
order to assist future California citizen commissions, 
in addition to any other jurisdiction looking to follow 
California’s lead. 
The League of Women Voters of California pub-
lished this report, with funding from The James 
Irvine Foundation. It draws on the research of four 
consultants,6 examination of public records, including 
transcripts of commission meetings, and interviews 
with participants in the redistricting process. The 
2Prop 20 received 61.3 percent of the vote, with 38.7 percent opposed.
3Prop 27 received 40.5 percent of the vote, with 59.5 percent opposed.
4Justin Levitt, A Guide to Redistricting (New York: Brennan Center for 
Justice, 2010); Bruce Cain, “Redistricting Commissions: A Better Po-
litical Buffer?” Yale Law Journal 121 (2012): 1808–44.
5In November 2000, Arizona voters passed Measure 106 to take the 
power to draw districts away from the legislature and vest it in a citizen 
commission. The Independent Redistricting Commission is composed 
of five members. The first four are nominated from a pool selected by 
the Commission on Appellate Court Appointments. From this pool 
of twenty-five, party leaders in the legislature each select one, so that 
there are two of each party. These four members then select a fifth 
person to be chairperson, choosing from among those in the pool who 
do not belong to either of the two major parties.
6Research consultants for this report were Melina Abdullah, Act-
ing Chair and Associate Professor of Pan-African Studies, Califor-
nia State University, Los Angeles; Mark Drayse, Associate Professor 
of Geography, California State University, Fullerton; Bonnie Glaser, 
Berkeley Law Center for Research and Administration, UC Berke-
ley; and Justin Levitt, Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, 
Los Angeles. The research associate was Nedda Black, graduate of the 
Hastings College of the Law. Anna Sonenshein researched media cov-
erage of the commission.
author conducted interviews with each of the fourteen 
commissioners. Unless otherwise indicated, comments 
attributed to the commissioners are based on these 
interviews. Outside reviewers commented on drafts of 
the report.
The author is solely responsible for the findings 
and recommendations.
Findings
Overall, the California citizen redistricting process was 
a success. 
n	 Those who designed the ballot measures that cre-
ated citizen redistricting overcame great historical 
odds. They were remarkably successful in winning 
voter support and in creating a commission that was 
largely independent of incumbent influence and 
generated a well-received redistricting (chapter 1).
n	 The designers of the redistricting process created a 
detailed and effective set of rules for commissioner 
selection that maximized deliberation, transpar-
ency, and independence (chapters 1, 2).
n	 The James Irvine Foundation contributed nearly 
$3.5 million to facilitate wider outreach to the 
state’s diverse geographic and demographic com-
munities during the selection process by funding a 
number of community organizations to encourage 
applications to the commission and to provide spe-
cial outreach and training (chapters 2, 7). 
n The Bureau of State Audits (BSA),7 a California 
state agency, conducted a broad recruiting cam-
paign that led more than 30,000 citizens to apply 
to become commissioners (chapter 2).
n	 Incumbent elected officials had little influence over 
the selection of commissioners (chapter 2).
n	 The BSA’s selection process, operating in public 
view, yielded a diverse group of commissioners who 
met the requirements of service set out in Prop 11 
(chapter 2).
7The agency has since been renamed the California State Auditor.
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n	 The commission sought and obtained a massive 
amount of public input, including testimony at 
public hearings, emails, draft maps, and other com-
munications (chapter 4). 
n	 The commission completed its work on time, issu-
ing final maps by the mandated date of August 15, 
2011 (chapter 3).
n		 The commission earned majority votes for its fi-
nal maps from all three required groups of com-
missioners: Democrats, Republicans, and those not 
aligned with either major party (chapter 8).
n	 The maps survived strenuous legal challenges in 
state and federal courts with no adverse judicial de-
cisions (chapter 8). 
n	 According to public-opinion polling, voters re-
sponded positively to the work of the commission 
(chapter 8).
n	 In a comparative study of transparency of state gov-
erning processes in which the state received a B- 
overall, the citizen redistricting process received an 
A, with a score of 100 percent8 (chapter 8).
n	 Four independent studies of the commission’s final 
product, including two conducted for this project, 
found generally positive results in achieving the 
main substantive goals of Prop 11,9 in respecting 
Communities of Interest (COIs),10 in following ac-
cepted techniques and processes in mapping,11 and 
in following a decision-making process that gener-
ally met accepted standards for addressing Voting 
Rights Act issues12 (chapters 6–8).
8Center for Public Integrity, accessed August 25, 2012, http://www.
stateintegrity.org/california_survey_redistricting.
9Vladimir Kogan and Eric McGhee, “Redistricting California: An 
Evaluation of the Citizens Commission’s Final Plans,” California Jour-
nal of Politics and Policy 4 (2012): 35–36. 
10Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, “Communities and the Commission,” 
Stanford Law and Policy Review 23 (2012): 19.
11Mark Drayse, research conducted for this report.
12Justin Levitt, research conducted for this report. See also Justin Lev-
itt, “Democracy on the High Wire: Citizen Commission Implemen-
tation of the Voting Rights Act,” U.C. Davis Law Review 46 (2013, 
forthcoming).
n	 A comparative analysis of the budget for a citizen 
commission in Arizona indicates that California’s 
overall spending on the citizen redistricting com-
mission was reasonable (chapter 7).
n	 In the 2012 elections, many incumbents faced sig-
nificant challenges, in part due to redistricting, and 
some chose not to run for reelection. Turnover was 
high, and the new legislature had a large share of 
new members (chapter 8).
Despite the commission’s overall success, there 
were flaws in the redistricting process.
Design
n	 The commission’s organization and operation re-
ceived significantly less attention in time, planning, 
and funding than did the selection of commission-
ers (chapter 2). 
n	 The transition from the BSA’s role in selecting the 
commissioners to the Secretary of State’s role in 
getting the commission up and running was not 
adequately planned (chapter 3). 
n	 The decision to have the first eight commission-
ers select the next six commissioners created 
challenges in forming a unified, cohesive body 
(chapter 3).
Organizational Issues
n	 The commissioners had limited opportunity to de-
sign the expectations and job descriptions of staff 
and consultants. With tight timelines, commis-
sioners increased their own workload in adminis-
trative matters (chapter 3).
n	 Although Prop 11 established a $300 per diem rate 
of compensation for commissioners, the commis-
sioners had to determine important details of the 
system of compensation themselves (chapter 3).
n	 State contracting rules hindered the commission’s 
ability to operate in a timely manner, especially in 
the commission’s early stages (chapter 3).
n	 The actual mapping process was compressed into a 
short timeframe, from late May 2011 through late 
July 2011 (chapter 5).
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n	 Commissioners struggled to weigh public input be-
cause of its sheer volume (chapters 4–5). 
n	 Although the commission was established to last 
ten years, no role was defined for the commission’s 
work beyond drawing the lines and defending law-
suits (chapter 3).
Training
n	 Commissioner training, particularly in the applica-
tion of the Voting Rights Act, was delayed and/or 
inadequate (chapter 3).
n	 Although Props 11 and 20 elevated Communities 
of Interest (COIs) to a high priority in redistrict-
ing, the commission lacked sufficient guidance in 
making decisions about COIs (chapter 5).
Information Access
n	 The commission did not have the opportunity to 
utilize social and economic data that would have 
complemented the census data that were released 
in April 2011 (chapters 4–6). 
n	 The commission lacked timely research in the area 
of polarized voting, an essential aspect of compli-
ance with the Voting Rights Act (chapter 6).
n	 The commission lacked sufficient help in digesting 
and utilizing public input (chapter 4).
n	 Some commissioners and members of the public 
found it difficult to track changes being made in 
the maps (chapter 5).
Budget
n	 The BSA issued a contract for media outreach that, 
though modest in cost relative to the size of Cali-
fornia’s population, consumed a significant portion 
of the overall budget of the redistricting process 
(chapter 2).
n	 The commission lacked a sufficient budget to 
hire an outreach firm to stimulate, collect, and 
organize public input outside the public hearings 
(chapter 4). 
Recommendations
Design
n	 In future redistricting cycles, the greatest share 
of resources and time should be devoted to the 
preparation and deliberations of the commission, 
including how the commissioners are trained, how 
they gather information, and how they deliberate 
(chapter 3).
n	 Jurisdictions considering adopting citizen redis-
tricting should select all commissioners at the same 
time rather than having one set of commissioners 
choose the others (chapter 3).
n	 The next commission should have maximum flex-
ibility in contracting, especially in light of its short 
period of operation (chapter 3).
n	 A system of commissioner compensation should 
be in place before the commission takes office. The 
amount and nature of compensation should be cho-
sen with reference to comparable boards and com-
missions within and outside the state of California. 
The salary or per diem should make it possible for 
people of moderate means to serve (chapter 3).
n	 The same state agency that selects commissioners 
should help organize the commission, providing 
logistical and other support to get the citizen body 
up and running13 (chapter 3).
n	 The next commission should have more time to do 
its work,14 with the commission in place at least five 
months earlier in the process than the 2011 com-
mission was (chapter 7).
n	 The next commission should begin the mapping 
process earlier (chapters 5, 7).
Organization
n	 An organizational support system for the operation 
of the commission should be in place before the 
13The state legislature adopted a recommendation from the commis-
sion to follow this approach.
14This report concurs with the commission’s recommendation for an 
additional six months for its deliberations, an extension that the legis-
lature shortened to four and a half months. Even the approved exten-
sion will be a major help.
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commission convenes. This information should be 
offered by a single governmental agency or outside 
organization with relevant experience (chapter 3).
n	 The State Auditor, or a comparable office known 
for its impartiality and professional skill, such as 
the Legislative Analyst, should conduct the selec-
tion process in the next iteration (chapter 2).
n	 Outreach to potential applicants for commission 
positions should draw on scheduled efforts by the 
U.S. Census Bureau to contact California adults 
(chapter 2).
n	 The commissioners should delegate administrative 
tasks as much as possible to staff and consultants 
(chapter 3).
n	 Commissioners should set the criteria and job 
descriptions for staff and consultants, through a 
public process, and make hiring decisions from 
the widest array of qualified applicants. New staff 
models should be explored, including bipartisan 
teams (chapter 3).
n	 The state should assign a staff person to handle lo-
gistical matters for the commission (chapter 3). 
n	 The commission should cast a wide net for staff 
from both inside and outside the state government 
with experience working with appointed or elected 
citizen bodies (chapter 3).
n	 The line-drawing team and VRA counsel should 
be hired earlier in the process (chapters 3, 5). 
n	 The existing commission should help fill the gap in 
preparation that will precede the selection of state 
agencies and outside institutions to gather research 
and set the stage for the next redistricting process 
(chapter 3). 
Training
n	 The commission should receive extensive training 
as a unified group after all members have been ap-
pointed (chapters 3, 5, 6). 
Information Access
n	 Before the commission convenes, demographic 
and geographic data should be collected to supple-
ment public hearings for the purpose of assessing 
COIs (chapters 3, 5, 6).
n	 Research on historical polarized voting should be 
undertaken before the commission begins the de-
liberation process (chapter 6).
n	 In the next iteration, the commission should im-
prove the tracking of revisions to maps in order 
to give greater opportunities for public input 
(chapter 5).
Budget
n	 The budget for the next commission should in-
clude funds for user-friendly tools and technology 
that give the public thorough access to data and 
proposals and easy opportunities to provide effec-
tive testimony and proposed maps (chapter 4).
n	 The commission budget should include funding 
for a consultant whose main task is to collect and 
analyze public input to the commission (chapter 4).
n	 Commissioner travel costs should be reduced by 
conducting some hearings using distance technol-
ogy and in some cases not requiring all commis-
sioners to attend15 (chapter 4).
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The Voters Ask for a New Process
Prop 11 won a narrow victory in 2008, but in 2010, voters expanded the scope of the measure to include 
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process included building draft maps, visualizations of districts, and a final set of maps, and was incredibly complex.
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Input from the public was a high priority for the commissioners, and they received a staggering  
amount of public response. 
Timeline and Budget
The redistricting process devoted more attention to the selection of commissioners than to the preparation and  
deliberations of the commission, making time pressure a key issue for commissioners. 
Checking the Commissionʹs Work
The citizen redistricting process was largely successful in achieving a  
nonpartisan and transparent process. The final maps survived legal 
challenge, and the commission’s work was regarded positively by a majority 
of the voters. The 2012 election results suggested that the new district  
lines caused significant turnover in elected offices. 
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California’s Bureau of State Audits spent two years adopting new regulations and conducting a major statewide  
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Executive Summary
Design of the Commission (Start: Feb. 2019)
	 Begin regulation process 
	 Hold interested-persons meetings
	 Present draft regulations
	 Seek public comment on draft regulations
	 Revise and adopt regulations
	 Conduct Department of Justice Section 5 preclearance of 
regulations
	 Begin outreach by community organizations to underrepre-
sented groups for participation in the redistricting process
	 Select organization to prepare commission deliberation 
process
Selection of the Commissioners 
(Start: No later than Aug. 15, 2019)
	 Begin commissioner selection process
	Work with census-count committees to advertise open-
ings; embed redistricting message into census outreach
	 Submit Invitation for Public Bidding (IPB) from private 
resources (see sidebar in chapter 4)
	 Begin meeting with organized groups to recruit applicants
	 Identify and implement strategies to reach underrepre-
sented groups
	 Conduct broad and targeted outreach utilizing mainstream 
and ethnic media as well as community organizations
	 Establish Applicant Review Panel
	 Close application period
	 Publicize the names in the applicant pool and provide 
copies of their applications to the Applicant Review Panel 
(March 15, 2020)
	 Conduct initial screening
	 Accept secondary applications
	 Applicant Review Panel presents its subpools of recom-
mended applicants to the Secretary of the Senate and the 
Chief Clerk of the Assembly (by May 15, 2020)
	 Conduct interviews
	 Hire staff for preparing commission and setting up office 
space, telephone, website, and email accounts
	 Select all commissioners by August 15, 2020
	 Seat full commission
Preparation of the Commission, Part 1 (Start: Feb. 15, 2020)
	 Planning organization begins work
	 Begin recruiting polarization scholars
	 Initiate study of racially polarized voting 
	 Background research on staff and consultant needs for 
commission
	 Adopt staff-hiring criteria
	 Develop outreach plan and hire outreach consultant
	 Initiate objective study of COIs
	 Conduct analysis of census data, either by an agency or 
contractor (for COI purposes)
	 Begin collecting demographic data (ACS survey results 
for 2018 are released in September 2019, and results for 
2014–18 are released in December 2019)
	 Find and reserve meeting place for the commission’s 
deliberations
	 Conduct any other organizational tasks that can be pre-
pared in advance of the commission’s seating
Preparation of the Commission, Part 2 (Start: Aug. 16, 2020)
	 Begin training for full commission immediately, including 
VRA and guidance on diversity and intergroup commu-
nication; if necessary, training for original commissioners 
should be repeated for the full group
	 Hire support staff
	 Adopt criteria for hiring consultants (line-drawing contrac-
tor, counsel, VRA counsel, polarization specialists) 
	 Conduct first round of public hearings
Commission Deliberations (Start: Sep. 2020)
	 Take note of ACS data release (ACS survey results for 
2019 are released in September 2020, and results for 
2015–19 are released in December 2020)
	 Begin examination of VRA districts
	 Draw VRA districts
	 Release first-draft maps (no later than May 1, 2021)
	 Solicit public comment on first-draft maps
	 Release second-draft maps (no later than June 15, 2021)
	 Solicit public comment on second-draft maps
	 Change draft maps based on public comment
	 Release final maps (August 2021)
	 Conduct Department of Justice Section 5 preclearance
Post-mapping Phase (Start: August 2021) (End: Jan. 2022)
	 Procedural wind-down, including wrapping up and any 
preparations for next commission
	 Litigation defense related to the final maps
A Timeline for the Next Citizens Redistricting Commission in California, 2019–22*
*This proposed timeline fully incorporates the changes implemented 
by SB 1096, signed into law by Governor Jerry Brown on September 
7, 2012, An Act to Amend Sections 8251, 8252, 8252.5, 8253, and 
8253.6 of the California Government Code, Relating to Redistrict-
ing, 2012 Statutes, Chapter 271.
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CHAPTER 1
Background
After the 2001 California redistricting, which protected incumbents of both parties, pres-
sure grew to reform the redistricting process. For several years, civic organizations 
discussed possible ballot measures with state legislative leaders. By 2007, these efforts 
had reached an impasse, and citizen groups created a ballot measure for the 2008 ballot 
to establish an independent citizens redistricting commission. Previous ballot measures 
to amend redistricting had failed. Although Prop 11 had its greatest voter support among 
Republicans, it won enough Democratic and independent ballots to carry it to a narrow 
victory. In 2010, voters expanded the scope of the measure to include congressional dis-
tricts and rejected an attempt to overturn the citizen-led process.
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Background
Redistricting has long been controversial in California. 
On four previous occasions, voters turned down ballot 
measures intended to create commissions that would 
take the power of redistricting out of the hands of the 
state legislature and governor (and at times, the courts):
n	 Proposition 14, November 1982, to create a com-
mission (defeated 54.5 percent to 45.5 percent)
n	 Proposition 39, November 1984, to create a com-
mission (defeated 55.2 percent to 44.8 percent)
n	 Proposition 119, June 1990, to create a commission 
appointed by retired judges (defeated 63.8 percent 
to 36.2 percent)
n	 Proposition 77, November 2005, to create a com-
mission of retired judges for a mid-decade redis-
tricting (defeated 59.8 percent to 40.2 percent)
Propositions 11 and 20, the successful 2008 and 
2010 measures that transformed California’s redistrict-
ing process, grew out of the controversial redistricting 
that began after the completion of the 2000 Census. 
In the 1990s, disagreement between the Democratic 
legislature and Republican Governor Pete Wilson led 
to the drawing of maps by a court-appointed team. In 
2000, with a Democratic governor and majorities in 
both the state assembly and senate, Democrats seemed 
poised to work their will on legislative districts. 
State law gives voters the authority to overturn a 
redistricting plan by referendum. Before the passage 
of Prop 11, a redistricting plan that received a two-
thirds vote in both branches of the legislature would be 
exempt from referendum. Since neither party was like-
ly to command a two-thirds majority in each branch of 
the legislature, both parties would have to contribute 
some votes to the final plan in order to avoid a refer-
endum.
Democrats reached out to Republicans in the legis-
lature in order to obtain the necessary two-thirds votes 
in each house. They offered Republicans protection for 
their incumbents in return for approval of the overall 
plan. This “incumbent-protection plan”1 was popu-
lar within the legislature and on Capitol Hill but left 
1The final vote for the bipartisan plan (Assembly Bill 632, 2001–2 ses-
sion, Cedillo) was 38–2 in the senate and 62–10 in the assembly.
many good-government groups feeling that the power 
of elected officials had become too entrenched.
Some Republicans believed that their party had 
acquiesced to permanent minority status. Civic groups 
such as California Common Cause and the League of 
Women Voters of California favored alternatives to 
redistricting by elected officials. Some voting-rights 
organizations, especially those in the Latino and Asian 
American communities, feared that the plan saved 
incumbents at the cost of new opportunities for com-
munities of color. Some Democrats feared that by 
protecting all incumbents, the party had failed to iden-
tify opportunities to elect more Democrats. 
Civic groups began to meet and confer about what 
could be done to change the system. The process accel-
erated after the 2003 recall of Governor Gray Davis 
and the election of Arnold Schwarzenegger. Voices of 
Reform, a bipartisan group led by Fred Keeley and Dan 
Schnur, drafted a set of reform principles, a process in 
which California Forward played a key role. 
In 2005, Republican Ted Costa put forward Prop 
77, which would have created a mid-decade redistrict-
ing by a panel of retired judges. The reform community 
split, with California Common Cause in favor and 
the League of Women Voters of California opposed. 
Governor Schwarzenegger made Prop 77 a centerpiece 
of his controversial special election in 2005. The mea-
sure went down to defeat along with the governor’s 
other proposals by a 20-point margin, 60 percent to 
40 percent. Key members of both the Republican and 
Democratic congressional delegations opposed Prop 77 
and raised substantial sums of money to defeat it.
Democratic state assemblymember Alan Lowen-
thal had also been developing bills to reform the 
redistricting process. After the failure of Prop 77 he 
Redistricting has  
long been controversial  
in California.
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accelerated his efforts. California Common Cause and 
other citizen organizations worked with Lowenthal 
in designing his proposed legislation. Lowenthal was 
familiar with the model adopted by Arizona in 2000, 
which at that time represented the most advanced 
citizen-based approach. A number of other legislators 
including Senate President pro tem Don Perata and 
Assembly Speaker Fabian Nuñez also made proposals 
to change the state’s redistricting process. Like Lowen-
thal’s bill, none of those efforts gained enough traction 
among legislators to become law.2
At the same time, civic organizations had been 
talking with legislators trying to develop a bill. A 2006 
survey conducted under the auspices of the Rose Insti-
tute, California Common Cause, and the League of 
Women Voters of California found that 66 percent of 
voters favored citizen redistricting.3 Although many of 
those involved hoped that these conversations would 
lead to a ballot measure, no bills emerged. 
Throughout much of 2007, civic groups focused on 
drafts of legislation in consultation with the Speaker’s 
office. Numerous methods of selecting commissioners 
were considered, but no legislation was forthcoming.4
By August 2007, reformers determined that the 
clock had run out. There were differences over the 
appointment process. Legislative leaders wanted some 
say, even if indirect, in the appointment of commis-
sioners, but reformers believed that the selection of 
commissioners had to be independent of the leg-
islature.5 In any case, no legislation appeared to be 
emerging. Unless advocates moved to the ballot imme-
diately, the window to create a commission for the next 
redistricting cycle would pass. 
The civic organizations therefore drew on the 
progress already made in crafting an initiative consti-
tutional amendment. The measure called for a citizen 
commission insulated from incumbent elected officials 
to draw the lines for state offices but not for congressio-
nal districts. As difficult as it would be for any citizen 
2Interview with Trudy Schafer.
3Lake Research Partners, “Survey Findings on Redistricting Reform in 
California” (presentation prepared for Rose Institute, California Com-
mon Cause, and the League of Women Voters of California, 2006). 
Of course, an actual ballot measure would have a more difficult time.
4Email communication with Kathay Feng.
5Interviews with Trudy Schaffer and Kathay Feng.
Ca. Gov. Code § 8252  
Citizens Redistricting Commission 
Selection Process*
(a) (1) By January 1 in 2010, and in each year ending 
in the number zero thereafter, the State Auditor shall 
initiate an application process, open to all registered 
California voters in a manner that promotes a diverse 
and qualified applicant pool.
(2) The State Auditor shall remove from the applicant 
pool individuals with conflicts of interest including:
(A) Within the 10 years immediately preceding the date 
of application, neither the applicant, nor a member of 
his or her immediate family, may have done any of the 
following:
(i) Been appointed to, elected to, or have been a 
candidate for federal or state office.
(ii) Served as an officer, employee, or paid consultant 
of a political party or of the campaign committee of a 
candidate for elective federal or state office.
(iii) Served as an elected or appointed member of a 
political party central committee.
(iv) Been a registered federal, state, or local lobbyist.
(v) Served as paid congressional, legislative, or Board 
of Equalization staff.
(vi) Contributed two thousand dollars ($2,000) or 
more to any congressional, state, or local candidate 
for elective public office in any year, which shall be 
adjusted every 10 years by the cumulative change in 
the California Consumer Price Index, or its successor.
(B) Staff and consultants to, persons under a contract 
with, and any person with an immediate family 
relationship with the Governor, a Member of the 
Legislature, a member of Congress, or a member of the 
State Board of Equalization, are not eligible to serve 
as commission members. As used in this subdivision, 
a member of a person’s “immediate family” is one 
with whom the person has a bona fide relationship 
established through blood or legal relation, including 
parents, children, siblings, and in-laws.
*Enacted by Proposition 11, the Voters First Act (2008).
12 League of Women Voters of California    When the People Draw the Lines
CHAPTER 1
Background
redistricting to win at the ballot box, reformers did 
not want to provoke opposition from the congressio-
nal delegation. Some Democratic partisans feared that 
a citizen process would represent “unilateral disarma-
ment” in redistricting wars nationwide, as Republican 
legislators were perceived to be drawing congressional 
lines to their liking in states they dominated. 
Under the Arizona redistricting measure, legislative 
leaders made appointments to most of the commission 
positions. In contrast, Prop 11 broke new ground in 
the battle between civic organizations and elected offi-
cials. The measure went into detail about the barriers to 
incumbent influence on commissioners (see sidebar on 
page 9) and limited the legislature to striking a limited 
number of applicants from the pool, with no hand in 
the selection. One observer concluded: “It is hard to 
imagine a more complete effort to squeeze every ounce 
of incumbent influence out of redistricting than the 
[Citizens Redistricting Commission].”6
The campaign for Prop 11 was largely a project of 
the good-government community and some Califor-
nia Republicans, including Governor Schwarzenegger. 
Major financial support for both Prop 11 and the 
subsequent Prop 20, which included congressional 
redistricting, came from a moderate Republican activist, 
Charles Munger. With a few exceptions (including for-
mer governor Gray Davis), Democrats were opposed. 
But with the congressional districts left out in 2008, 
there was only mild opposition from congressional 
Democrats.7 
In order to weed out incumbent influence, Prop 
11 set out detailed requirements regarding conflicts 
of interest. The new law barred anyone who, with-
in 10 years of applying to serve on the commission, 
had held federal or state office, had served in any of a 
variety of capacities within a political party or within 
the state government, had been a registered lobbyist, 
had contributed more than $2,000 to a candidate for 
office, or had a family member holding public office 
(see sidebar on page 9).
6Bruce Cain, “Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?,” 
Yale Law Journal 121 (2012): 1808, 1824.
7Interview with Trudy Schaffer.
Coalition Building
The coalition for redistricting reform included groups 
with differing goals and expectations. Some of the lead-
ing advocates of Prop 11 promoted redistricting reform 
as a way to create competitive districts, thereby allow-
ing moderate legislators of both parties to be elected. 
Governor Schwarzenegger frequently made this argu-
ment. However, neither the design of the measure nor 
its implementation specified competitiveness as a goal. 
The emphasis on Communities of Interest (COIs),8 
established by Prop 11 and enhanced by Prop 20, took 
redistricting in the direction of homogeneous districts. 
Because the major political parties draw support from 
very different socioeconomic blocs, such an emphasis 
would be unlikely to create the sort of heterogeneous 
districts that feature greater competition between the 
two major parties.
According to a preelection poll by the Field Orga-
nization, 41 percent of Democrats, 53 percent of 
Republicans, and 41 percent of nonpartisans and others 
supported Prop 11.9 Fifty-two percent of conservatives 
backed Prop 11, but also 41 percent of liberals, a fairly 
modest difference. Three Survey USA polls in Octo-
ber 2008 found a larger partisan gap. By late October, 
49 percent of Republicans backed the measure, com-
pared to 26 percent of Democrats.10 Large numbers of 
voters in both parties were undecided, even close to 
election day. 
The same SurveyUSA poll showed that only 25 
percent of African Americans and 28 percent of His-
8“Communities of Interest” refers to the goal of designing districts in 
which residents have significant characteristics in common. This crite-
rion is discussed at greater length below.
9Field Poll, October 31, 2008.
10Survey USA Poll, Number 14761 (October 29–31, 2008).
TABLE 1. Votes on Redistricting Measures,  
2008 and 2010 (by percent) 
Yes No
Prop 11 2008 51 49 Establish Commission
Prop 20 2010 61 39 Add Congressional Districts
Prop 27 2010 47 53 Overturn Citizen Redistricting 
Process
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panics supported Prop 11. Some voting-rights groups 
in communities of color were suspicious of the citizens 
redistricting commission reform model, particularly the 
stated goal of maintaining current county and city lines. 
Some minority activists were concerned that the com-
missioners might place loyalty to current county and 
city lines ahead of adherence to the Voting Rights Act 
(VRA), even when the VRA ranked higher as a prior-
ity for the commissioners to consider in drawing maps. 
Rosalind Gold, of the National Association of Latino 
Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO), expressed 
this concern:
Anything that reduces flexibility, such as a 
requirement that city or (county) lines be 
respected, makes it harder to comply with the 
Voting Rights Act.11
Engaging those who have historically been exclud-
ed from the process takes effort. Justin Levitt noted:
In substantial part because of the Voting Rights 
Act, minority legislators now occupy some 
senior legislative positions, and may be suspi-
cious of attempts to remove redistricting power 
from the legislature just as they have arrived in 
positions of substantial influence. Proponents of 
reform should engage minority constituencies 
early in the process, to ensure that propos-
als adequately protect minority rights, and to 
gather support, tacit or explicit, for the need for 
reform.12
Vladimir Kogan and Thad Kousser13 credited the 
measure’s organizers with expanding the previous 
coalition for redistricting reform to include more Dem-
ocrats and minority voters by addressing some of these 
suspicions, including, among other things, requiring 
that commissioners demonstrate “appreciation for Cal-
ifornia’s diverse demographics and geography.” 
11Interview with Rosalind Gold.
12Justin Levitt, A Citizen’s Guide to Redistricting (New York: Brennan 
Center for Justice, 2010), 82.
13Vladimir Kogan and Thad Kousser, “Great Expectations and the 
California Citizens Redistricting Commission,” in Reapportionment 
and Redistricting in the West, ed. Gary F. Moncrief (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2011).
Voters Choose Proposition 11 and 
Proposition 20
Prop 11 passed despite the fact that its support came 
more from Republicans than Democrats in a Novem-
ber 2008 election that was marked by extraordinary 
levels of Democratic turnout. Its passage testifies to 
public skepticism, across party lines, of elected officials 
and the legislature.14 Voting results were still marked by 
divisions along racial and ethnic lines; African Ameri-
can and Latino communities registered the highest 
levels of opposition, whereas white suburban neighbor-
hoods showed the most support.15
Two years later, voters expanded the scope of the 
commission by approving Prop 20. By a wide margin, 
voters defeated a measure on the same ballot to elimi-
nate the commission entirely (Prop 27). Although 
the independent citizen-commission model had been 
approved by a narrow margin in 2008, its base of 
support had expanded two years later (see table 1). 
14The firm that managed the campaign was Goddard Gunster Public 
Affairs, formerly called Goddard Claussen Public Affairs. The firm 
described its strategy on its website: “Goddard Claussen tapped into 
voter dissatisfaction with the legislature and created messaging about 
‘holding legislators accountable’ and ‘ending political gridlock’”; God-
dard Gunster Public Affairs, accessed September 2, 2012, http://www.
goddardgunster.com.
15These racial, ethnic, and geographic divisions can be found in unpub-
lished research on the vote on Prop 11 by census tract conducted by 
Mark Drayse for this report.
6
Proposition 11 listed and 
ranked six criteria for the 
commission to weigh in 
drawing lines.
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Election results show increasing support for redis-
tricting from 2008 to 2010, with voters approving an 
expansion of the redistricting process by a 22-point 
margin in 2010.
Proposition 11 listed and ranked six criteria for the 
commission to weigh in drawing lines, with prominent 
roles for geographical continuity, integrity, and com-
pactness. The redistricting process must comply with 
federal, state, and local laws and the Federal Voting 
Rights Act and, when possible, senate and assembly 
districts are to be nested.
Proposition 20 enhanced the importance of COIs 
in the redistricting process beyond what was included in 
Prop 11, adding more detail about COIs and included 
wording, absent from Prop 11, that suggested keeping 
similar income groups together as much as possible (see 
sidebar on page 13). It also greatly increased the work-
load of the commission, complicated the design of the 
process by adding the drawing of congressional districts 
to the scope of the commission’s work, and shortened 
its deadlines by one month. Although this time con-
straint may have been designed to allow more time to 
defend the maps in court, it tightened an already-chal-
lenging schedule. Without Prop 20, the original design 
of the commission might have faced fewer obstacles to 
timely planning, organization, and deliberation.
Proposition 20, which expanded redistricting to 
include federal congressional districts, emphasized 
communities of interest: groups within a geographi-
cal area sharing common social and economic interests 
but specifically excluding incumbent or political-party 
interests. 
A process originally designed for term-limited 
state offices now also had to deal with fifty-three high-
ly visible congressional seats. Members of Congress, 
incumbents without term limits, might be expected 
to be more resistant to citizen redistricting than term-
limited members of the legislature. 
Proposition 11 drafters faced a key question in 
determining which agency would supervise the pro-
cess of selecting commissioners. After polls showed 
which organizations and professions were most trusted 
for this role, the designers selected the Bureau of State 
Audits (see chapter 2). 
Drafters of Prop 11 incorporated the influence 
of elected officials by allowing each of the “Big Four” 
(Speaker, Assembly Minority Leader, Senate President 
pro tem, and Senate Minority Leader) to strike two 
names from each party subpool (for a total of twenty-
four strikes). The original list of qualified nominees 
was to be sixty in number. The strikes would reduce 
the group to thirty-six. Akin to a litigant’s peremp-
Proposition 11 Commission Criteria
Proposition 11 listed and ranked six criteria for 
the Commission to weigh in drawing lines, with 
a prominent role for maintaining Communities of 
Interest. 
(1) Districts shall comply with the United States 
Constitution. Senate, Assembly, and State Board 
of Equalization districts shall have reasonably 
equal population with other districts for the 
same office, except where deviation is required 
to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act or 
allowable by law.
(2) Districts shall comply with the federal Voting 
Rights Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1971 and following).
(3) Districts shall be geographically contiguous.
(4) The geographic integrity of any city, county, 
city and county, neighborhood, or community of 
interest shall be respected to the extent possible 
without violating the requirements of any of the 
preceding subdivisions. Communities of interest 
shall not include relationships with political parties, 
incumbents, or political candidates.
(5) To the extent practicable, and where this 
does not conflict with the criteria above, districts 
shall be drawn to encourage geographical 
compactness such that nearby areas of population 
are not bypassed for more distant population.
(6) To the extent practicable, and where this does 
not conflict with the criteria above, each Senate 
district shall be comprised of two whole, complete, 
and adjacent Assembly districts.*
*Cal. Const. art. XXI, § 2 (after voter approval of Prop 11).
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tory challenge to potential jurors, the strikes allowed 
legislative leaders to block a choice they considered 
damaging. 
The law required that twenty of the sixty appli-
cants be chosen from neither the Democratic nor the 
Republican party. The measure specifically required 
only nonmembership in either of the top two politi-
cal parties. Thus, members of a third or fourth party, 
independents, and those registered as “decline to state” 
could qualify. Nothing in the statute suggested that 
these commissioners must be “centrist” or “moderate.” 
Conventional wisdom tends to assume that those who 
register outside the two parties occupy the ideological 
middle. In fact, such voters could be to the left of the 
Democrats or to the right of the Republicans.
Although Prop 11 devoted some attention to orga-
nization, text on this topic was significantly less detailed 
and thorough than were the provisions for selecting 
commissioners. Proposition 11 laid out rules for the 
hiring, removal, and contracting of commission staff 
and consultants, including avoiding conflicts of inter-
est. The Secretary of State oversees the process until 
the commission is prepared to take over. The majority 
vote for such decisions must be spread evenly among 
the three political subgroups on the commission (see 
sidebar).
After two years of detailed and careful selection, the 
commissioners would have only from January 12, 2011, 
to August 15, 2011, to organize themselves, select lead-
ership, hire staff and consultants, educate themselves 
on redistricting and the VRA, hold public hearings, 
create maps, and build public confidence. 
Conclusions
After a number of stalled efforts to reform Califor-
nia’s redistricting process, civic groups came together 
to create Prop 11, which took redistricting out of the 
hands of legislators and placed it in the hands of citi-
zens. Unlike a similar redistricting plan in Arizona, the 
California plan placed particular emphasis on removing 
the influence of incumbent legislators. Proposition 11 
increased the importance of COIs and of geographical 
compactness in redistricting.
Though it initially enjoyed more support among 
Republicans and white voters than among Democrats 
and communities of color, Prop 11 set the stage for 
broader support for redistricting reform and Prop 20, 
which expanded the Citizens Redistricting Commis-
sion to include congressional as well as state legislative 
districts, passed by a comfortable margin in 2010. 
Moreover, a proposition to overturn the Citizens Redis-
tricting Commission in the same election was defeated.
Although Prop 11 was carefully thought out in 
many of its details, particularly in regard to the pro-
cess of choosing the commissioners, it provided less 
detail for some other aspects of the commission’s 
activity, particularly in the preparation and activity of 
the commission and in the timeframe allowed for the 
process.
Proposition 20 Defined Communities 
of Interest in Detail 
The geographic integrity of any city, county, 
city and county, local neighborhood, or local 
community of interest shall be respected in a 
manner that minimizes their division to the extent 
possible without violating the requirements of 
any of the preceding subdivisions. A community 
of interest is a contiguous population which 
shares common social and economic interests 
that should be included within a single district for 
purposes of its effective and fair representation. 
Examples of such shared interests are those 
common to an urban area, a rural area, an 
industrial area, or an agricultural area, and those 
common areas in which the people share similar 
living standards, use the same transportation 
facilities, have similar work opportunities, or have 
access to the same media of communication 
relevant to the election process. Communities of 
interest shall not include relationships with political 
parties, incumbents, or political candidates.*
*Cal. Const. art. XXI, § 2, subd. (d)(4) (after voter approval of 
Prop 20). 
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Proposition 11 identified the Bureau of State Audits (BSA) as a state agency with sufficient 
independent standing to lead the selection of commissioners. The BSA undertook a two-
year process that involved the adoption of new regulations and a major statewide outreach 
program. More than 30,000 Californians applied for commission positions. By November 
2010, the BSA had selected the first eight members, who in turn selected the remaining 
six by January 2011. The BSA’s selection process led to a diverse, capable, and deter-
mined commission of fourteen members. Although the selection process was extremely 
thorough, it used up a significant block of time and money, leaving the commission to rush 
its process and to rely on private nonprofit groups for community outreach.
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An Agency to Supervise the  
Selection Process
The designers of Prop 11 had to designate an agency to 
lead the selection process. They considered information 
from opinion surveys in making their decision: judges 
polled surprisingly poorly, and elected officials drew 
the worst ratings. The most positive responses were for 
“independent auditors,” “professors and other academic 
experts on redistricting,” “members of city and county 
ethics commissions,” and the “California Fair Political 
Practices Commission.”1 These results led to the choice 
of the Bureau of State Audits. This small, often-over-
looked state agency was equipped with a well-trained 
staff and had semi-independent status. The agency 
audits state and local agencies and programs at the 
request of the Joint Legislative Audit Committee and 
also conducts statutory audits of the financial condition 
of government agencies.
The position of California State Auditor is set forth 
in the California Government Code:
In order to be free of organizational impair-
ments to independence, the bureau shall be 
independent of the executive branch and legis-
lative control.…The head of the bureau is the 
State Auditor, who shall be appointed by the 
Governor from a list of three qualified individu-
als nominated by the Joint Legislative Audit 
Committee by a vote of at least a majority of the 
committee membership from each house of the 
Legislature.…The State Auditor shall be chosen 
without reference to party affiliation and solely 
on the ground of fitness to perform the duties 
of the office. Prior to selection, the State Audi-
tor shall possess a combination of education and 
experience in auditing and management neces-
sary to perform the duties of the office.2
The BSA turned out to be a sound choice. The 
commissioner-selection process that the agency orga-
nized and ran was orderly, efficient, transparent, and 
1Interview with Kathay Feng. See also Lake Research Partners, “Sur-
vey Findings on Redistricting Reform in California.”
2Cal. Gov. Code § 8543.1–3.
effective. The BSA had little experience with a vis-
ible statewide public role, but proceeding methodically 
and diligently, the agency designed and implemented 
a two-year process that yielded a capable commission. 
Although the law itself called for a one-year process of 
choosing commissioners, the actual selection effort took 
two years, including the development of regulations and 
identification, recruiting, and evaluation of the candi-
dates for commission positions. As would be expected 
for a governmental agency implementing legislation, 
the BSA had to fill in details, such as defining the term 
“impartial” and measuring “diversity.” The agency pro-
posed and sought comment on detailed regulations. 
In the first iteration of proposed regulations, the 
BSA proposed requiring analytical and mapping skills, 
which are not widespread among Californians and 
which could potentially have limited the applicant 
pool to those with advanced technical experience. The 
leadership of the Tri-Minority Caucus3 in the state 
legislature sent a letter to the BSA suggesting that it 
redesign these requirements so that a wider commu-
nity could participate.4 The limitation of commission 
positions to those with such expertise would have dis-
advantaged a host of groups in the state well beyond 
communities of color. As a result of feedback from a 
variety of sources, the BSA did eventually revise these 
requirements so that formal mapping skills would not 
be required. Instead, the agency required a basic famil-
iarity with maps.
The law also required the BSA to gather informa-
tion about possible conflicts of interest. The intrusive 
nature of the application process (requiring disclosure 
of personal and family information for conflict-of-
interest purposes5) may have served as a deterrent and 
limited the number of qualified applicants.6 Most like-
ly, such concerns were relevant to all communities in 
the state. Astrid Garcia, of the National Association 
of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO), 
noted that many potential Latino applicants had seri-
3A caucus of African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans.
4Letter from Tri-Minority Caucus to the BSA, September 11, 2009. 
Correspondence cited in this report can generally be found with its 
author, unless otherwise indicated.
5The BSA decided not to release family information in the public 
documents other than the names of family members, but the decision 
came too late to reach those who had stayed out of the process.
6Interview with Nancy Ramirez.
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ous concerns about privacy.7 Deanna Kitamura, of the 
Asian Pacific American Legal Council, added:
We also found that at least within the Asian-
American Pacific-Islander community, people 
were hesitant to apply because so much of the 
information was going to be public, and peo-
ple were very hesitant to provide any personal 
information.8 
The BSA Begins Outreach
BSA staff members were surprised by their identifica-
tion as the lead agency: “It came out of the blue. We 
had no idea.…It wasn’t necessarily considered the most 
desirable assignment to take on in the Sacramento 
world.”9 The agency began to plan for the task ahead 
as soon as the measure passed. California State Audi-
tor Elaine Howle established a working team under 
the direction of chief counsel Sharon Reilly. The group 
included five professionals, three attorneys, the public-
affairs chief, and project manager Dan Claypool (who 
later became executive director of the commission). 
The BSA had to propose and adopt regulations, estab-
lish the recruitment process, and evaluate applications, 
leading to a final pool of sixty applicants and a random 
draw of the first eight commissioners. 
A working group led by California Forward and 
including California Common Cause, the League of 
Women Voters of California, the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the 
National Association of Latino Elected and Appoint-
ed Officials (NALEO), the Asian Pacific American 
Legal Center (APALC), the Mexican American Legal 
Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), the 
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), 
the Central Coast Alliance United for a Sustainable 
Economy (CAUSE), and the Greenlining Institute 
monitored the agency’s work from the start, sending 
numerous comments and suggestions. California For-
ward’s consultant organized conference calls and helped 
with drafting. This complex and unusual relationship 
7Interview with Astrid Garcia.
8Interview with Deanna Kitamura.
9Interview with Steven Russo.
between a state agency and outside groups led to ques-
tions of boundaries and responsibilities. The BSA staff 
made clear that the agency, not outside groups, would 
be in charge. The BSA staff communicated that “what-
ever the proponents subjectively thought about how 
this was going to work, the decision making would be 
with us, because we felt that there was a reason why the 
voters approved us to be in charge of administering it 
as opposed to having interest groups in charge.”10 Over 
time, the relationship became a cooperative one, as the 
outside groups provided input and BSA staff members 
were generally responsive to suggestions. 
The agency had to reach potential applicants in the 
most effective way possible. Mass mailing to each regis-
tered voter would be prohibitively expensive. However, 
the BSA moved immediately to generate a grassroots 
email campaign that reached out to governments at 
all levels, to departments within the state government, 
and to nonprofit organizations, libraries, universities, 
and civic organizations. The statewide special elec-
tion on May 19, 2009, provided a unique opportunity 
to inform California voters of the application process. 
The BSA placed a half-page notice at the end of the 
Official Voter Information Guide mailed to every Cali-
fornia voter by the Secretary of State.11 The guide went 
to press on March 18, 2009, and was mailed to voters 
between April 9 and April 28, 2009.
Commissioner selection took a little over two years, 
from January of 2009 to February of 2011. The process 
involved establishing regulations for the process, con-
ducting outreach, selecting a panel to review applicants, 
reviewing applications, interviewing candidates, and 
selecting candidates in two stages, allowing the first 
group to select the second (see Table 2).
In early 2009, the BSA sought bids for a media 
contract to publicize the selection process. The first 
Request for Proposal (RFP) was unsuccessful; the agen-
cy believed that the specifications generated proposals 
that were difficult to evaluate and compare. Finally, 
on May 21, 2009, after a revised RFP was issued, the 
BSA awarded the contract to Ogilvy Public Relations 
10Interview with Steven Russo.
11The notice about Prop 11 ran on the second-to-last page, clearly vis-
ible if a reader opened the back cover. It was also listed in the Table of 
Contents under “Information Pages,” along with other items such as 
how to become a poll worker or vote by mail.
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Action or Event Date(s)
Interested Persons Hearings, held in Sacra-
mento (2 meetings), San Diego, Fresno, Los 
Angeles, and San Francisco, to solicit ideas 
for draft regulations. 
Jan. 26–Mar. 3, 
2009
Request for Proposals (RFP) issued for 
Statewide Outreach Plan
Mar. 20–Apr. 15, 
2009
Revised RFP out for Statewide Outreach 
Plan
Apr. 30–May 15, 
2009
BSA issued Notice of Intent to Award to 
Ogilvy Public Relations Worldwide
May 21, 2009
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published 
(with first draft of regulations)
Jul. 31, 2009
Public Hearing on Regulations and end of 
45-day public comment period
Sept. 14, 2009
Notice of Modification to Text of Proposed 
Regulations published
Sept. 28, 2009
Meeting with Outreach Partners,* BSA, and 
Ogilvy in Sacramento and by conference call
Oct. 1, 2009
End of 15-day comment period for revised 
regulations
Oct. 13, 2009
Final Regulations Adopted and Submitted for 
federal Department of Justice (DOJ) preclear-
ance
Oct. 19, 2009
Press Release announcing final regulations Oct. 20, 2009
Wedrawthelines.ca.gov formally launched Nov. 12, 2009
Selection of Applicant Review Panel (ARP) 
by random drawing
Nov. 16, 2009
Online Influencer Roundtable/Blogger Sum-
mit
Dec. 10, 2009
RedistrictingCA Coalition conference in Bur-
bank to kick off outreach
Dec. 15, 2009
Initial Applications accepted online Dec. 15, 2009–
Feb. 16, 2010
Preclearance of first set of regulations Dec. 18, 2009
Supplemental applications accepted online Feb. 17–Apr. 19, 
2010
First ARP meeting (and training of panel 
members via presentations)
Feb. 25, 2010
BSA holds webinars to assist with supple-
mental application
Mar. 18, 26, and 
Apr. 7, 2010
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published 
(with second set of regulations regarding first 
eight commissioners choosing final six com-
missioners and several other items) 
Apr. 16, 2010
Public hearing on (second set of) proposed 
regulations and end of 45-day public com-
ment period.
Jun. 1, 2010
TABLE 2. Selection Process Conducted by the Bureau of State Audits
*The term the BSA used to refer to outside groups that were active in 
providing input to the process and interested in promoting the applica-
tion opportunity.
Action or Event Date(s)
Notice of Modification to Text of Proposed 
Regulations published
Aug. 9, 2010
End of 15-day comment period for revised 
regulations
Aug. 24, 2010
Second set of regulations adopted and filed 
with Office of Administrative Law (OAL)
Sept. 2, 2010
Second set of regulations submitted for 
federal DOJ preclearance
Sept. 10, 2010
Preclearance of second set of regulations
Second ARP meeting Apr. 19, 2010
Third ARP meeting Apr. 30, 2010
Fourth ARP meeting (reduced pool of 
4,546 applicants to 622)
Jun. 11, 2010
Fifth ARP meeting (reduced pool of 622 
applicants to 314)
Jun. 30, 2010
Sixth ARP meeting (reduced pool of 314 
applicants to 162 at start of meeting; 
further reduced to 120 by end of meeting; 
designed and adopted interview questions)
Jul. 19–21, 2010
Seventh ARP meeting during which ARP 
conducted 115 interviews 
Aug. 6–Sept. 13, 
2010
Final (Eighth) ARP meeting (reduced pool 
of 115 applicants to 60)
Sept. 22–23, 2010
Legislature strike process (reduced pool of 
60 applicants to 36)
Sept. 29–Nov. 12, 
2010
Selection of the first 8 commissioners in 
public drawing (out of 36 in pool) 
Nov. 18, 2010
First 8 commissioners sworn in Nov. 30, 2010
Training of first 8 commissioners Nov. 30 and Dec. 1, 
2010
First meeting reconvened and slate of 6 
commissioners selected
Dec. 10, 2010
First meeting reconvened again and ap-
proved slate of final 6 commissioners
Dec. 15, 2010
Hand over process to the Secretary of 
State
Between Dec. 15, 
2010, and Jan. 12, 
2011
First meetings of 14 commissioners Jan. 12–14, 20–21, 
and 26–28, 2011
5 of final 6 commissioners are sworn in Jan. 12, 2011
Elaine Kuo, 1 of first 8 commissioners, 
resigns
Jan. 14, 2011
Maria Blanco is sworn in Jan. 20, 2011
13 commissioners vote to replace Elaine 
Kuo with Angelo Ancheta 
Jan. 28, 2011
Angelo Ancheta sworn in and 14-member 
commission complete
Feb. 10, 2011
Second meeting of commission and first 
meeting of final 14 members
Feb. 10–12, 2011 
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Worldwide. The BSA did not have the funds in hand 
to support this $1.3 million contract, however, and 
requested that the state legislative-oversight committee 
provide support. State funding was not forthcoming,12 
and the agency eventually used its reserve fund for the 
outreach contract. 
A well-regarded company, Ogilvy had previously 
conducted public-information campaigns for state 
agencies, including the Department of Transporta-
tion (“Don’t Trash California”), the State Treasurer 
(“Buy California Bonds”), and the Office of Traffic 
Safety (“2008 Holiday DUI Enforcement Campaign”). 
Under the BSA’s direction, Ogilvy organized a broad 
publicity campaign and negotiated twice the number 
of radio spots per dollar compared to the going rate, 
allowing the BSA to conduct a more cost-effective 
campaign. BSA officials gave interviews to local and 
statewide media, prepared flyers and other documents, 
and assumed far more visibility than was normal for 
this low-profile agency.13 Staff members spoke at public 
events and actively sought out sites for presentations.
In its outreach effort, the BSA had to be conscious 
of the possible impact of Prop 209.14 Would Prop 209 
12Letter from Elaine M. Howle, CPA and State Auditor, to Honorable 
Denise Moreno Ducheny, Chair, Joint Legislative Budget Committee 
(August 11, 2009).
13Interview with Margarita Fernandez.
14Prop 209, also known as the California Civil Rights Initiative, was 
passed in 1996, with 54.55 percent of the vote, and added Section 31 
to Article 1 of the California Constitution. Art. 1, § 31. It reads: “The 
state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, 
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or na-
tional origin in the operation of public employment, public education, 
or public contracting.”
TABLE 3. James Irvine Foundation Grants for 
Commission Selection Process
Organization Grant Amount
APALC $165,000
CAUSE (Central Coast Alliance United 
for a Sustainable Economy)
$65,000 
Los Angeles Urban League $50,000 
NALEO Educational Fund $100,000 
The Greenlining Institute $100,000
California Common Cause* $250,000
allow the BSA to reach out in an active way to racial 
and ethnic minority communities? The BSA inter-
preted Prop 11 to mean that the agency had to seek 
to contact all voters, given that the measure stated that 
the “State Auditor shall initiate an application process, 
open to all registered California voters in a manner that 
promotes a diverse and qualified applicant pool.” This 
principle guided the BSA’s efforts in its outreach.
The James Irvine Foundation, a private nonprofit 
grant-making foundation, supplemented the state’s 
public outreach and education efforts. Believing that 
the success of the redistricting process depended on 
broad and well-informed public participation, Irvine 
supported six nonprofit organizations in developing 
public education materials, conducting outreach, and 
training a diverse cross-section of Californians to apply 
to be members of the commission. Through these 
grants, Irvine sought to assure a fair, transparent, and 
well-informed redistricting process and increase the 
likelihood of establishing a diverse commission. As dis-
cussed further in chapter 4, Irvine made a second round 
of grants to support public involvement in the mapping 
process once the commission was seated.
The Irvine Foundation gave a number of grants, 
most between $50,000 and $165,000, to several groups 
involved in the commissioner-selection process. A 
larger grant awarded to California Common Cause, for 
$250,000, covered both the selection and the delibera-
tion phases (see Table 3).
These efforts were independent of the work of the 
BSA. As part of its outreach, the BSA remained in con-
tact with the Irvine-funded groups along with the wide 
range of other organizations that were following the 
process, such as the Chamber of Commerce. Califor-
nia Common Cause subgranted a portion of its Irvine 
funding to other organizations to support collaborative 
outreach strategies.15 In partnership with these organi-
zations, California Common Cause hosted a conference 
in December 2009 to kick off the applicant-recruitment 
process and two conferences in 2010 to train organi-
zations and individuals seeking to participate in the 
redistricting process. The collaborative group organized 
by California Common Cause also developed public-
15California Common Cause gave grants totaling $92,500 to APALC, 
the Center for Governmental Studies, the Institute for Governmental 
Studies, the LWV, MALDEF, the NAACP, NALEO, and the Rose 
Institute. 
*The grant to California Common Cause supported work during both 
the commissioner selection and deliberation phases.
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education materials concerning how the commission 
would work, how to construct useful testimony, and how 
to participate in deliberations. Finally, the groups estab-
lished a collaborative website, redistrictingca.org, and 
organized social-media campaigns that supplemented 
public information provided by the commission. 
With Ogilvy on board, the BSA arranged a meet-
ing open to all interested organizations. The coalition 
of organizations included a broad array of groups, such 
as the League of Women Voters of California, the 
American Association of Retired Persons, the Cham-
ber of Commerce, and a number of voting-rights 
organizations. The BSA was pursuing a broad rather 
than a targeted media strategy, and some of the groups 
urged more targeted approaches in minority commu-
nities. Civil rights activists concerned about diversity 
in the process, in particular, feared that the BSA’s out-
reach program might not reach minority communities. 
The Application Process
The BSA developed a robust online application process 
using in-house staff and, in the service of transparency, 
providing real-time updates on application numbers 
with demographic breakdowns. Proposition 11 had 
established the following seven-step process for the 
selection of commissioners:16
n	 The BSA must initiate the application process by 
January 1, 2010 (or 2020, 2030, etc.).
n	 The BSA must remove applicants who have con-
flicts of interest, as defined in the Code.17
n	 The BSA must form an Applicant Review Panel 
(ARP) of three qualified independent auditors em-
ployed by the state.
n	 The ARP must then review applications and select 
sixty of the most qualified applicants based on “rel-
evant analytical skills, ability to be impartial, and 
appreciation for California’s diverse demograph-
ics and geography.” The sixty must include twenty 
16Voters First Act, Proposition 11 (2008) (codified at Cal. Gov. Code 
§ 8252).
17See sidebar, supra, Chapter One, Cal. Gov. Code § 8252.
Democrats, twenty Republicans, and twenty regis-
tered with neither of those two parties.
n	 The four leaders of the legislature may strike up to 
two applicants each, from each of the three pools of 
Democrats, Republicans, and others.
n	 The BSA must randomly draw eight names by No-
vember 20, 2010 (2020, 2030, etc.).
n	 Those eight randomly selected commissioners 
must then select the remaining six from the appli-
cant pool, with a requirement to ensure diversity 
including gender, racial, and ethnic factors.
Although the initial application phase attracted 
an impressive number of applicants, the BSA did not 
track how the applicants found out about the applica-
tion process and therefore missed a chance to explicitly 
identify what types of outreach worked. In retrospect, 
the BSA could have added a question to the end of 
the application asking, “How did you learn about the 
Commission and this application?” or sent a follow-up 
email to each applicant asking for that information.
The first round of applicants provided evidence of 
both the success and the limitations of the outreach 
approach adopted by the BSA. More than 30,000 
Californians submitted initial applications to be com-
missioners. Of this group, nearly 25,000 met the basic 
criteria for further consideration. For a process consid-
ered abstract and distant to most voters, the response 
was remarkable. The broad publicity process had cer-
TABLE 4. Commissioner Applications by 
Gender and Ethnicity Compared to Population 
Totals (Percent)
California Registered Voters, Nov 2008
Initial  
Applicants*
60  
Finalists
Male 46.68 67.90 51.67
Female 53.32 32.10 48.33
White 59.01 71.18 33.33
Black 7.42 8.40 13.33
Asian 10.23 4.75 18.30
Latino 21.92 11.02 28.33
Other 1.42 4.65 6.71
*Bureau of State Audits.
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tainly worked far better than anticipated. Nevertheless, 
some conservatives were concerned that civil rights 
organizations were recruiting and “prepping” appli-
cants. As a result of their complaints, the BSA initiated 
a series of webinars and workshops open to all to make 
application assistance widely available.18
Table 4 illustrates the distribution of applicants, 
both in the first round and in the supplemental appli-
cations to follow, compared to a breakdown of voter 
registration. Comparison with voter registration rather 
than population is more useful because commissioners 
were drawn from the pool of the state’s registered voters. 
Initial applications for the commission did not match 
the demographics of the registered voting population: 
women, Asians, and Latinos were underrepresented. 
The finalists, however, moved closer to the proportions 
of the pool of registered voters.
BSA attorneys and staff assistants for each panel 
member supported the Applicant Review Panels. While 
continuing to conduct audits for the state, a BSA staff 
team hosted ARP meetings, organized applicant trav-
el to Sacramento for interviews, analyzed and posted 
data about applicants, and conducted supplemental 
research for the ARP, the first eight commissioners, 
and the public. The ARP members received training 
in the requirements of the Voting Rights Act in order 
to understand the requirements that commissioners 
would face. The team members received this training in 
a timely manner, in contrast to the delay in such train-
ing for the full commission (see chapter 3).
18Interviews with Deborah Howard and Tony Quinn. Quinn com-
plained that some candidates were eliminated because of the search 
for diversity and blamed The James Irvine Foundation for this priority.
Bureau staff conducted investigations to verify 
information provided by applicants.19 Results of these 
investigations were posted on the commission’s web-
site. The extensive and well-organized staff effort 
testified once again to the thoroughness of the design 
of Prop 11, to the preparation of the BSA, and to the 
fact that it was an established state agency with an 
infrastructure that was not available to the commis-
sion itself.
Deliberation and Process of 
Elimination
The ARP deliberated over the applications in a highly 
formal and transparent manner. All of the ARP meet-
ings were held in public, including interviews with 
applicants, which were accessible not only to the public 
but also to legislative staffers who would be advising 
the leadership on their “strikes.” 
The ARP members, however, remained isolated as 
individuals from public pressure. Their contact infor-
mation was withheld from the public, and they stayed 
out of touch with each other while examining applicant 
files. All members were assigned assistants, who were 
directed not to be in contact with one another. 
Each ARP member rated each application on an 
individual basis. These ratings were then shared in a 
public meeting with the other members of the panel. 
All decisions had to be unanimous. Of the 4,546 appli-
cants who submitted full applications, including essays, 
references, and disclosure of financial relationships, the 
panel members voted independently and unanimously, 
prior to group deliberation, to eliminate 3,924, leaving 
622 by June 11, 2010.20
As the pool shrank, every applicant received 
increased scrutiny. BSA staff thoroughly investigated 
applications to identify any potential conflicts or oth-
er issues that might make applicants ineligible. The 
results of these inquiries were made available for public 
comment in writing or at ARP meetings. Combined 
19See memorandum from Steven Benito Russo, Chief of Investigations 
for BSA, to the APR, September 21, 2010, describing the investiga-
tion process.
20Public meeting of the Board of State Auditors Applicant Review 
Panel, June 30, 2010, transcript. 
The ARP deliberated 
over the applications 
in a highly formal and 
transparent manner.
23When the People Draw the Lines    League of Women Voters of California
CHAPTER 2
Selecting the Commissioners
with webcast interviews, this approach created an open 
interview and selection process. The public had numer-
ous opportunities to weigh in, from the development 
of regulations to comments directed to the ARP about 
individual applicants. The BSA posted public com-
ments on the Internet for public access.
The final pool was well qualified, reasonably diverse, 
and seemed to have avoided the egregious conflicts of 
interest that had been feared. There were no obvious 
party coalitions that would either dominate or block 
deliberation. As one observer commented regarding 
the detailed strictures against conflicts of interest, “The 
rules were insane, but they worked.”21 
Although some feared that partisanship repre-
sented the greatest potential obstacle to success in 
choosing the commissioners, the design of the Cali-
fornia process provided some checks and balances. 
Unlike the model in Arizona in 2011, where questions 
about the possible partisan connections of the fifth 
21Interview with Paul Mitchell.
“neutral” member had major consequences because of 
that person’s tie-breaker role, the California plan had 
some advantages. In particular, either party would have 
to control several commissioners in order to become a 
partisan blocking force.22
Meeting the Prop 11 requirement of diversity 
among commissioners, however, posed a challenge. 
Once the eight commissioners were chosen by random 
draw from among the qualified pool, Prop 11 con-
nected their choices for the next six more specifically to 
diversity: “The six appointees shall be chosen to ensure 
the commission reflects this state’s diversity, including, 
but not limited to, racial, ethnic, geographic, and gen-
der diversity. However, it is not intended that formulas 
or specific ratios be applied for this purpose. Applicants 
shall also be chosen based on relevant analytical skills 
and ability to be impartial.”23
The ARP considered diversity among other fac-
tors in its recommendations on applications, in 
22Cain, “Redistricting Commissions.”
23Cal. Gov. Code § 8252 (g).
TABLE 5. The Final 14 Commissioners
Name Party Selected/Random Draw Occupation City
Vincent Barabba Republican Random Draw Business and Marketing Capitola
Cynthia Dai Democrat Random Draw CEO and Professor San Francisco
Stanley Forbes Affiliated with neither 
major party
Random Draw Bookstore Co-Owner Esparto
Connie Galambos 
Malloy
Affiliated with neither 
major party
Random Draw Urban Planning and Policy  
Development
Oakland
Elaine Kuo Democrat Random Draw (Resigned) Researcher Mountain View
Jeanne Raya Democrat Random Draw Lawyer; Risk Management San Gabriel
Jodie Filkins Webber Republican Random Draw Self-Employed Attorney Norco
Peter Yao Republican Random Draw Former Mayor; Engineer Claremont
Gabino Aguirre Democrat Selected Retired Teacher and School 
Principal
Santa Paula
Maria Blanco Democrat Selected Nonprofit Executive Los Angeles
Michelle R. DiGuilio Affiliated with neither 
major party
Selected Community Planning; Homemaker Stockton
Lilbert “Gil” R. Ontai Republican Selected Architect and Lecturer San Diego
M. Andre Parvenu Affiliated with neither 
major party
Selected Geographer and Urban Planner Culver City
Michael Ward Republican Selected Chiropractor and Polygrapher Anaheim
Angelo Ancheta Democrat Other (Selected by the com-
mission to replace Elaine Kuo)
Law Professor San Francisco
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accordance with Prop 11.24 Ward Connerly later filed a 
lawsuit charging that Prop 11 itself violated Article 1, 
§ 31, of the California Constitution because of its 
emphasis on racial, ethnic, and gender diversity in 
the selection of the six final commissioners.25 In an 
amicus brief, California Common Cause, the League 
of Women Voters of California, and the California 
NAACP responded that the courts had not equated 
the consideration of diversity with preferential treat-
ment and that the goal of making the commission a 
representative body was not inconsistent with that of 
prohibiting racial discrimination or preference.26 On 
December 12, 2012, the Superior Court of California, 
in Sacramento, ruled in favor of the State of Califor-
nia and against Ward Connerly. Judge Michael Kenny 
determined that the commissioners were “public offi-
cers,” not public employees, and that therefore Prop 
209 did not apply to the commission.27
The Fourteen
After the legislative leaders made their strikes, the 
BSA conducted a carefully designed random drawing 
that yielded the first eight commissioners. That group 
would be required to select the remaining six commis-
sioners from the existing pool. The final commission 
included members from a range of geographical regions 
and variety of backgrounds.
Conclusions
The BSA effectively carried out a difficult project in 
selecting the first eight commissioners and creating the 
24Public meeting of the Bureau of State Audits Applicant Review Pan-
el, June 30, 2010, transcript.
25Jim Sanders, “State Discriminates in Choosing Redistricting Panel, 
Suit Argues,” CapitolAlert, Sacramento Bee, Mar. 23, 2012; Connerly 
v. California, No. 34-2011-80000966 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento 
County 2011). 
26Brief for California Common Cause, League of Women Voters of 
California, and California NAACP in Support of Demurrer, as Amic-
us Curiae, Connerly v. California, No. 34-2011-80000966 (Cal. Super. 
Ct., Sacramento County 2011).
27Superior Court of California, No. 34-2011-80000966-CU-WM-
GDS. November 21, 2012.
pool from which the remaining six were drawn. In fact, 
the BSA and its Applicant Review Panel operated in a 
manner more typical of traditional citizen commissions 
than the redistricting commission itself. The BSA had 
sufficient time to develop regulations, to train its ARP 
members, to hear from the public, and to reach sound 
conclusions in a reasonable amount of time. 
Although the BSA lacked the full budget its work 
required, and its professional staff worked long hours, 
the agency did have budget reserves sufficient to pay 
for its large media outreach contract. With bud-
get and time likely to be major concerns in the next 
iteration, the time and resources for commissioner 
selection will likely be reduced. Regulations adopted 
at great length by the BSA in the first iteration will be 
in place and open to revision, saving considerable time 
and expense.
In relative terms, a $1.3 million contract to reach a 
state of 17.3 million registered voters is hardly expen-
sive. But in the context of an overall redistricting budget 
of roughly $10 million and with the commission itself 
short of resources, the need for a comparable media 
contract for the next recruitment does not seem com-
pelling. In the next iteration, other means are likely to 
be available to alert voters to the opportunity to apply 
to be on the commission. Outreach to potential appli-
cants for commission positions should, for instance, 
draw on scheduled efforts by the U.S. Census Bureau 
to contact California adults. 
The James Irvine Foundation provided major finan-
cial support to fill a gap in the redistricting process. It 
is possible that the Irvine Foundation and other private 
funders will once again provide support for activities 
that may not receive governmental funding. However, 
there is no guarantee that this will occur, in whole or 
in part. As a result, new ways to partner with other 
governmental and community agencies to promote the 
opportunity to apply will be necessary.
The selection of commissioners stood as the cor-
nerstone of the commission process. The very success 
of that effort testifies to the value of advance planning, 
sufficient time, and staff. Finding fourteen appropriate 
commissioners took the largest share of thought, time, 
and attention, whereas the work of the commission 
itself was compressed, resource limited, and difficult to 
organize (see chapter 3).
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By the time the commission was seated in January 2011, two years had passed. The 
new state law directed the Secretary of State to take over from the BSA in November 
2010 in order to get the commission up and running but provided little direction on how 
to carry out that responsibility. The commissioners had little guidance for their organiza-
tional planning, and they improvised. Key tasks, such as training in the VRA and hiring 
VRA counsel, delayed the process. An ambitious schedule of public hearings drew sig-
nificant public interest but consumed large blocks of commissioner and staff time. The 
major deliberative work of the commission was telescoped into a period of less than two 
months. The next commission needs more preplanning and organizational support in 
carrying out its obligations. 
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The commission had one primary if imposing duty: to 
draw the lines for 177 state and federal election dis-
tricts. It had an extremely short period of time in which 
to carry out that task, a timeline made even tighter and 
more challenging by the passage of Prop 20 shortly 
before the seating of the commission. The commis-
sioners could not easily rely on the previous district 
lines as their main foundation and template because of 
the required focus on Communities of Interest (COIs) 
instead of the traditional incumbent protection. 
It would have taken a phenomenal organizational 
effort, planned well in advance and steadily executed, 
to make this task go smoothly. Such an undertaking, 
given adequate resources and planning, would have 
resembled the effort of the BSA to select commis-
sioners, and even then, given the size of the state, the 
budget limitations, and the number of electoral dis-
tricts, it would have been a mad rush to the finish line. 
The designers worried first about overcoming the 
seemingly impossible odds of winning at the ballot box 
and then about keeping excessive incumbent influence 
out of the commissioner-selection process, promoting 
diversity, and encouraging transparency. Voters shared 
these concerns as well and so did not exert public pres-
sure for greater organizational planning. It was difficult 
to foresee in any case how such a commission would be 
organized and run.
The Role of the Secretary of State
Any citizen commission, especially one with some 
members new to public service, needs help in devel-
oping expectations about staff and consultants. A 
citizen commission can use its support network to 
make its work more efficient and to avoid becom-
ing bogged down in administrative matters. Under 
Prop 11, the Secretary of State was to “provide sup-
port functions to the commission until its staff and 
office [were] fully functional.” However, the civic 
coalition that created Prop 11 provided limited direc-
tion on the nature of that support or how it would 
be implemented. The BSA did not fully elaborate on 
the Secretary of State’s role in its rulemaking pro-
cess. After acknowledging that the function of the 
rulemaking process was “to provide guidance and 
clarity,”1 the BSA provided that “[a]fter the 14 mem-
bers of the commission have been selected, the [BSA] 
will cooperate with the commission and with the Sec-
retary of State in order to facilitate the commission[’s] 
becoming fully functional.”2
The Secretary of State’s office produced a one-time 
report in September 2010, at the behest of the Cali-
fornia state legislature, outlining the agency’s plan for 
fulfilling the Prop 11 mandate.3 The report outlined 
an “action plan” for how the BSA and the Secretary of 
State would coordinate their efforts:
The Secretary of State views November 2010, 
through February 2011, as the critical transi-
tion period for the Commission. The Secretary 
of State plans to work closely with BSA to 
ensure transparency as well as consistency of 
information. To ensure this smooth transition, 
the Secretary of State and BSA have initiated 
monthly meetings to discuss activation issues. 
The key players will be the Secretary of State 
administrative managers and BSA’s legal team.4
1California Regulatory Law Bulletin, 2010-16 CRLB 153.
2Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 60861. (In their Notice of Proposed Regula-
tions, the BSA noted: “The [Voters First] Act provides little guidance 
regarding how the final stage of the application process shall operate 
and how selected applicants will make the transition to a fully func-
tional commission”; 2010-16 CRLB 153 ).
3“Administrative Support Action Plan for the Citizens Redistricting 
Commission, State of California,” September 15, 2010, accessed Sep-
tember 14, 2012, http://www.sos.ca.gov/admin/reports/2010/citizens-
redistricting-action-plan.pdf.
4Ibid.
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The Management Services Division for the Sec-
retary of State assisted the commission in its initial 
organization. The Secretary of State’s team created job 
descriptions for key commission staff and placed them 
on the state website. The agency helped to organize the 
initial commission meetings and provided guidance to 
the commissioners in their early organizational deci-
sions. Although the Secretary of State’s most visible 
period of involvement was between December 2010 
and January 2011, the office had been at work for sev-
eral months developing job descriptions and addressing 
logistical issues for the commission. Staff from the Sec-
retary of State’s office worked with the state controller to 
ensure that the commission staff would be paid and that 
the commission would have a functioning bank account. 
Replacing professional politicians in the redis-
tricting process was the core of the reform. Replacing 
government support staff and providing an institutional 
base is a different matter. Citizen commissioners need 
the tools, the time, and the structure to make up for 
those gaps. Neither the BSA nor the Secretary of State 
had the requisite experience to provide such assistance, 
and in any case, both agencies were justifiably reluc-
tant to intrude on the prerogatives of the commission. 
All parties involved were aware of the importance of 
preserving the commission’s independence. Although 
this care was important to the commission’s success, 
it also left the commission at times without essential 
guidance. As a result, the commissioners found ways to 
organize their own work. 
In hindsight, the plan to hand off authority from 
the BSA, which had embraced its role and spent more 
than a year immersing itself in the process of select-
ing redistricting commissioners, to an agency that 
had been less involved in the redistricting project was 
unlikely to lead to optimal results. The BSA was more 
familiar with the redistricting process and might have 
been in a better position to help the new commission 
get on its feet. 
Ideally, the state agency that selects commission-
ers should help organize the commission, providing 
logistical and other support to get the citizen body up 
and running.5 Any such agency will have to assist the 
5The state legislature adopted a recommendation from the commission 
to follow this approach.
commission, as did the Secretary of State, to deal with 
state administrative procedures that can be extensive 
and cumbersome.
The Position of Executive Director
For any commission, the process of choosing an exec-
utive director is a key administrative decision. The 
executive director links staff and the commission and 
provides essential guidance to the commissioners. 
Under the supervision of the Department of Person-
nel Administration, the Secretary of State’s office took 
the lead in recruiting candidates for the position of 
executive director,6 drafting a job description before the 
commissioners were appointed and circulating it on the 
network normally used to advertise state jobs and on 
the commission website. The job bulletin indicated that 
although applicants had to possess most of the follow-
ing abilities, they were not required to have them all:
Knowledge of the organization and functions 
of California State Government including 
the organization and practices of the Legis-
lature and the Executive Branch; principles, 
practices, and trends of public administration, 
organization, and management; techniques 
of organizing and motivating groups; pro-
gram development and evaluation; methods of 
administrative problem solving; principles and 
practices of policy formulation and develop-
ment; fundamentals of accounting, budgeting, 
and fiscal reporting; personnel management 
techniques; the State’s Equal Employment 
Opportunity Program.7
These requirements made the job less accessible 
to those outside Sacramento.8 The job search did not 
6Interview with Dora Mejia.
7Available at http://www.wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/job_ 
opportunities/executive_director.pdf, accessed September 13, 2012.
8Doug Johnson of the Rose Institute suggested to the commissioners 
in public testimony that the job description should extend beyond Sac-
ramento: “It would be a symbolic step to get away from the Sacramen-
to entities that you’re officially independent of, and it may also widen 
the pool of people who would be interested in being executive director, 
get you people who aren’t already in Sacramento, which by definition 
they are focused on the government as it is, and not so independent.” 
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prioritize experience with guiding citizen commissions 
or elected boards. Retired city managers, chief admin-
istrative officers, heads of government departments, or 
executive directors of boards and commissions at the 
state, county, and local levels would have constituted 
a rich pool of candidates who would have been famil-
iar with how to guide a new commission with a short 
timeline.
After they took office, the commission narrowed 
the pool of applicants by adopting the tightest possible 
conflict-of-interest rule on staff and consultants, even 
though the law only required them to apply these rules 
“to the extent applicable.”9
On January 19, 2011, the commission chose as its 
executive director Dan Claypool, the project manag-
er of the BSA team that had organized the selection 
process. Claypool brought to the commission a wide 
range of experience with state government and obvious 
familiarity with the commissioners through the selec-
tion process. Claypool noted, though, that because of 
his role as a state employee, he had to overcome the 
commissioners’ suspicion of the government.10 He 
hired additional staff in the areas of communications 
and logistics.
Claypool navigated the major challenge of finding 
office space, first in the governor’s office and later in 
a different building. Underperforming computers and 
printers indicated a serious equipment problem; the 
Commission meeting, January 12, 2011, transcript. All transcripts are 
available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/transcripts.html.
9Interview with Dora Mejia; Cal. Gov. Code § 8253 (a)(5).
10Interview with Dan Claypool.
staff had to scrounge for trash cans. Commissioner 
Jeanne Raya felt that the commissioners were “nomads” 
without a real home and recalled that there were long 
delays in providing email and other communications.11
The next commission would benefit from the 
assistance of an official from a state agency who would 
be assigned to the commission to facilitate work with 
the state government and to help organize the com-
mission until an executive director is hired. With the 
assistance of such an official, the commission would 
face less pressure in choosing an executive director, 
who could guide and support the commission’s work in 
light of experience with other commissions or elected 
bodies and could be selected from the broadest range 
of candidates.
The Commission Convenes
In their first formal meeting as a full commission on 
January 12, 2011, the commissioners indicated that 
they would not wait for staff to be hired before making 
important process decisions. They felt that time was 
pressing on them. As one commissioner said, “I am just 
thinking logistically, we have so much work to get done 
right now.…[T]he [c]lock is ticking”12 Commissioner 
Gil Ontai wondered, “How can we get it done?” The 
intense pressure of their timeline led commissioners 
into self-management. They were, at least in their own 
minds, on their own. Commissioner Michael Ward 
remembered, “I was expecting a formal handoff or 
redistricting training. How does a commission work? 
There was no real direction.”
Perhaps because they did not have a say in set-
ting the criteria for key staff, the commissioners were 
determined to control the rest of the process. Though 
this sense of ownership by the commission helped the 
project succeed, it was risky to operate without an orga-
nizational safety net below. 
The commission quickly adopted a proposal to 
create subcommittees, although some commission-
ers expressed doubts about the wisdom of that course. 
11Unless otherwise indicated, all comments by commissioners are from 
the author’s interviews with them.
12Commissioner Cynthia Dai, commission meeting, January 13, 2011, 
transcript.
At the beginning, the 
commissioners seemed 
to see themselves less 
as jurors than as civic 
leaders reaching out to 
the community. 
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Commissioner Ward commented, “It seems to me that 
we’re just burdening ourselves logistically…to form a 
bunch of subcommittees if we’re going to follow the 
same process as we’re doing as a full committee.”13 
Commissioner Maria Blanco asked, “What would the 
finance subcommittee do that can’t be done on the full 
commission?”14 But the majority moved ahead.
Whereas a committee on outreach added consider-
able value in light of the shortage of funds for outreach, 
a committee on administration seemed likely to over-
lap with activities that staff could more appropriately 
handle. The committee on outreach, though appeal-
ing and popular among commission members, was a 
potential diversion from the main task at hand: delib-
eration. One observer noted that at the beginning, the 
commissioners seemed to see themselves less as jurors 
than as civic leaders reaching out to the community.15 
Commissioner Raya remembered it as “a heady time, 
still new and exciting. We had lots of enthusiasm. And 
at the beginning, we were impatient.” 
At the same January 12 meeting, the commission-
ers voted to have rotating chairs. A proposal that failed 
to be adopted would have created a three-part leader-
ship team,16 one member from each major party and 
one unaligned. Those interviewed for this study praised 
the rotating chairs idea as a means of avoiding political 
attacks on the commission and of fostering unity among 
the commissioners. That model, however, also made it 
likely that staff would not have a consistent relationship 
with the commission’s leadership. 
Commissioner Compensation
Proposition 11 provided a $300 per diem payment 
to commissioners for time “engaged in commission 
business.”17 For succeeding commissions, the rate 
of compensation is to be adjusted by the cumulative 
change in the California Consumer Price Index. The 
regulations adopted by the BSA provided further detail, 
13Commission meeting, January 20, 2011, transcript.
14Ibid.
15Interview with Matt Rexroad.
16Motion made by Commissioner Kuo, commission meeting, January 
12, 2011, transcript.
17Cal. Gov. Code, § 8253.5.
$300
Proposition 11 provided a 
$300 per diem payment to 
commissioners for their work.
NOTEWORTHY
specifying that this per diem rate applied to the first 
eight commissioners as they underwent training and 
then as they selected the next six commissioners.18 As 
the first eight commissioners prepared to convene for 
the first time, the BSA’s legal staff presented a memo-
randum explaining these provisions.19
When the full commission convened on January 13, 
2011, the members discussed the details of their com-
pensation plan. Their focus was on two issues: how 
many hours would constitute a full workday and what 
activities would be designated as commission business. 
The commissioners largely drew on their own experi-
ences, especially those who had worked in the private 
sector, to define “billable hours” and “workdays.” Some 
commissioners favored defining a workday as more 
than four hours. Ultimately, the commission decided 
on six hours. If a commissioner worked more than six 
hours in a single day, the compensation would remain 
$300. Any hours above that in one day would still qual-
ify for $300.
The commissioners established a system by which 
they would record and report their hours on commis-
sion business. Some hours would be for commission 
meetings, including public hearings. Others would 
be for “homework” done away from public meetings, 
including reviewing documents. (See chapter 7 for the 
overall amount spent on commissioner compensation.) 
The fourteen commissioners received a wide range of 
18Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, div. 10, ch. 1, sub. 3, § 60857.
19“Guidance for the first eight members of the Citizens Redistricting 
Commission,” signed by Sharon Reilly (Chief Counsel) and Donna 
Neville (Associate Chief Counsel), http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/
downloads/legal_memo.pdf.
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compensation, with the highest amount nearly twice 
the lowest.20
Commissioners expected, correctly, that they would 
have an immense workload. They were also concerned 
that commissioners of moderate means would be unable 
to serve without adequate compensation, especially if 
they were limited in their ability to perform their regu-
lar jobs. 
The redistricting process would be extremely ardu-
ous even under the best of circumstances. With the 
rushed calendar and the pressures of being the first 
citizens redistricting commission with high public 
expectations of accessibility, their time commitment 
would likely make service impossible without signifi-
cant compensation. The commissioners also knew that 
different people would have different needs and con-
straints (e.g., those with young children at home would 
have more constraints on their time). 
The record does not indicate that commissioners 
received advice about how comparable public bod-
ies deal with compensation. A wide range of examples 
can be found, from full-time bodies with salaries based 
on the assumption that the commissioner will hold no 
other employment, to moderate salaries that assume 
part-time but extensive work in a large metropolitan 
area, to commissioners who serve without pay, with 
reimbursement for expenses only, or with small per 
diems for attendance at formal meetings.21 A fixed level 
20Commissioner Michael Ward received the largest amount ($68,400), 
and Commissioner Maria Blanco received the lowest ($35,100). 
Jim Sanders, “California Redistricting Commissioners Paid Varied 
Amounts for Work,” Sacramento Bee, June 13, 2012. Accessed on-
line March 12, 2013, http://www.sacbee.com/2012/06/13/4557715/
redistricting-commissioners-paid.html.
21Examination of county grand juries, state commissions, city councils, 
state legislatures, local boards, and commissions did not reveal any that 
of compensation or per diem based on formal, public 
meetings represent standard models, and the $300 per 
diem provided by Prop 11 fit within that latter model.
The amount and nature of compensation should 
be chosen with reference to comparable boards and 
commissions within and outside the state of Cali-
fornia. Consistent with the general direction of this 
commission, the next commission should have a level 
of compensation that would allow people of moderate 
means the opportunity to serve on a part-time basis. 
From the standpoint of transparency and account-
ability, the plan for compensation should be set in advance 
and not by the commissioners themselves. Furthermore, 
if there is not a salary paid to commissioners, the per 
diem should cover work conducted in public or in closed 
sessions. In order to remain consistent with the law that 
established the commission, a compensation model 
should apply the $300 per diem to formal meetings 
and activities only. These meetings could include public 
hearings, deliberation meetings of the full commission, 
and committee meetings (including closed meetings). 
The records should be kept by state officials who are 
assigned to assist the commission. Although the overall 
level of compensation for the intense deliberation phase 
might be less than the first commission received, this 
plan would allow commissioners to continue to receive 
compensation after the main deliberation phase is over 
and throughout their ten-year term.
Preparing to Work As a Commission
The commissioners had to spend some time becoming 
a unified body. The method of selection had effectively 
created two commissions, the initial eight members 
chosen by random draw and the remaining six chosen 
by the first eight. The first group of commissioners 
met throughout December 2010 to select the next six. 
Commissioners Jodie Filkins Webber and Peter Yao 
noted that although the first eight had developed some 
real camaraderie, it took some time to incorporate the 
other commissioners. 
Jurisdictions considering adopting versions of the 
citizen redistricting should select all commissioners at 
followed the plan that was designed for this commission.
Commissioners 
expected, correctly, 
that they would have an 
immense workload. 
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the same time rather than having one set of commis-
sioners choose the others, in order to produce a more 
unified and cohesive group at the outset. 
The commission held long, thoughtful discussions 
on administrative matters that seemed appropriate for 
staff input. Commissioner Cynthia Dai found it “frus-
trating at times. There was lots of rambling, the blind 
leading the blind.” Meanwhile, the staff had to make 
sure that state regulations allowed the commission to get 
what it needed in order to operate. The staff operated 
under rigid state contracting rules that did not include 
“delegated authority” to make purchases. Commission-
er Dai described the state’s contracting procedures as 
“opaque.” Commissioner Gabino Aguirre recalled that 
getting simple things done required agonizing quasi-
diplomatic processes. The staff had to work diligently 
to get a quick response from state officials in charge of 
contracting. The slow process frustrated staff and com-
missioners in light of the extremely short time span for 
the commission’s work. 
The next commission should therefore have maxi-
mum flexibility in contracting, especially in light of its 
short period of operation. 
Critical decisions that should have been made 
quickly—such as hiring Voting Rights Act (VRA) 
counsel or obtaining VRA training for the full com-
mission—were delayed and then delayed again. The 
transcripts reveal a skilled group of commissioners try-
ing to run their own commission with rotating chairs, 
painfully aware of deadlines slipping and then fac-
ing continuing unresolved problems. Commissioners 
seemed aware that some critical items were drifting but 
did not seem able to find a way to complete them. 
Training in the VRA, a core aspect of the commis-
sion’s work, was delayed. The first eight commissioners 
received initial training in December 2010, but the 
next six did not. The six were encouraged to watch the 
video of the training the first eight received. Commis-
sioner Angelo Ancheta, who joined the commission in 
early February, watched the training online and found 
that “it wasn’t quite where it needed to be, especially 
on the Voting Rights Act.” The full commission finally 
received training, but not until late March. 
Controversy over the hiring of the line-drawing 
consulting firm Q222 added pressure to the commission. 
Two companies, Q2 and the Rose Institute, bid for the 
contract. Like Claypool, Q2 was familiar to the com-
missioners; its managing partner, Karin Mac Donald, 
had briefed the commission in some of its early meet-
ings and directed the Statewide Database.23 A majority 
of the commissioners believed that the Rose Institute 
did not meet the commission’s conflict-of-interest 
standards and found several key items missing or inad-
equate in the organization’s application.24 Although Q2 
had extensive experience drawing district lines for cities 
and other local bodies, the firm did not have statewide 
redistricting experience, and some commissioners were 
concerned that Q2 could not handle the massive Cali-
fornia task alone.
22At the time the commission was formed, Q2 was a partnership be-
tween Karin Mac Donald and Bruce Cain. During the redistricting 
process of the early 1980s, Cain had been a special consultant to the 
Assembly Elections and Reapportionment Committee in charge of 
technical services. After the 1991 redistricting, the California legis-
lature decided to put the Statewide Database at UC Berkeley under 
Cain’s supervision. Although Cain had not drawn either state legisla-
tive or congressional lines since 1982, he severed his partnership with 
Q2 when the firm was under consideration for a contract with the 
commission, to reinforce his pledge of noninvolvement in the 2011 
redistricting.
23“The Statewide Database emerged from a database that was origi-
nally created for California’s State Assembly, to be used in the redis-
tricting of 1981. … In 1993, the California Legislature voted to house 
the database permanently in a nonpartisan environment. The Institute 
of Governmental Studies (IGS) at U.C. Berkeley was selected. … In 
2009, the Statewide Database moved to its new home in an off-campus 
building at Berkeley Law. The information in the Statewide Database 
is a public resource and available free of charge to anyone interested 
in the political and demographic make-up of the State of California,” 
http://statewidedatabase.org/about.html, accessed March 30, 2013.
24An examination of the scoring sheet for the Rose Institute’s proposal 
revealed a significant number of items that reviewers considered unre-
sponsive, including the lack of signatures from key members of the team 
(scoring sheet available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/ 
march_documents/Rose_bid_evaluation_final.pdf, accessed August 
27, 2012).
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Intimations of partisan favoritism ran rampant.25 
Republicans had lobbied the commission in favor of the 
Rose Institute. They felt aggrieved that the commis-
sion’s executive director was a Democrat (although only 
minimally active), that Q2’s principal was an indepen-
dent with ties to a former Democratic consultant, and 
that the commission had not hired a Republican firm as 
VRA counsel. The commission did not have the sup-
port of a majority of the Republican members to select 
the VRA counsel favored by the Democratic and non-
aligned members, an issue that was resolved when the 
Republican-supported firm withdrew. 
Claypool’s role in the BSA selection process and 
his familiarity with state government had made him 
a natural choice for executive director. Similarly, not 
many bidders could meet the needs of the massive map-
drawing job, and Q2 had extensive experience. The 
commission did achieve partisan balance by selecting 
VRA counsel with one Democratic and one Republi-
can principal.26 Commissioner Blanco believed that the 
time constraints made it harder to look for alternate 
pools of expert talent.
Commissioner Ward favored an “in line review” of 
the work of the map-drawing team, a process that would 
bring in another line-drawing consultant to review and 
examine Q2’s work. Ward’s proposal reflected a fear 
that politically biased line drawing would skew the 
process. Although this concern was understandable, a 
25A number of Republicans strongly favored Rose, and some argued 
that the commission applied the conflict-of-interest standards in a 
manner that disadvantaged Rose. Three Republican members of the 
commission opposed removing Rose from consideration.
26After the withdrawal of the competing firm, the commission voted 
unanimously to retain international law firm Gibson, Dunn & Crutch-
er, with Daniel M. Kolkey, a Republican and principal drafter of Prop 
20, and George Brown, a Democrat, as principal attorneys.
doubled-up line-drawing process would have added to 
the immense time pressure on all participants. 
A better plan for the next iteration would be to 
encourage bipartisan teams to apply, balanced by their 
competing political involvements. If the citizen redis-
tricting model continues to work and creates a long-term 
market, firms may redesign their own organizations 
in order to qualify.27 In any case, a line-drawing team 
cannot easily change the outcome of a redistricting 
process. Commissioner Blanco thought in retrospect 
that the commission worried too much about what was 
essentially a technical task. In any case, the decisions 
on drawing the lines would be made by the appointed 
commissioners, not by staff or consultants.
These conflicts over hiring masked some underly-
ing partisan and ideological differences in redistricting 
that do not simply disappear with the removal of incum-
bent elected officials from control of the process. The 
larger disagreements revolve around how to apply the 
VRA and the model of COIs. These are not technical 
issues but political and philosophical ones, and they did 
emerge in the process of mapping in 2011 (see chapters 
5–6).
Organizational decisions had real implications for 
the decision making of the commission. The commis-
sion’s first maps were released on June 10. As indicated 
later in this report, some public reaction to the first set 
of maps was negative, in part because of deficiencies in 
responsiveness to the VRA. With more time and bet-
ter organization, the commissioners would have more 
experience with the VRA and how it could be applied. 
Although there will inevitably be criticism of any draft 
map, the first release would have been less rushed and 
better prepared if more time and additional VRA train-
ing had been provided.
Role for the Commission in Future 
Redistricting
The Voters First Act established a decade-long role 
for the citizens commission: “The term of office of 
27A similar dynamic has developed in public-opinion polling. As news-
papers and other media outlets seek to obtain the services of unbiased 
but politically sophisticated polling firms, they have created and en-
larged the market for teams of Democratic and Republican pollsters.
A better plan for  
the next iteration would 
be to encourage 
bipartisan teams to apply. 
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each member of the commission expires upon the 
appointment of the first member of the succeeding 
commission.”28
In addition to drawing the lines, voters vested 
the commission with the authority to defend lawsuits 
that might be filed against the maps produced by the 
commission. However, this important role was large-
ly completed by the end of 2012. State funding was 
largely eliminated, most staff were laid off, and the 
commission moved into a period of infrequent meet-
ings in late 2012. 
This report proposes that the current commission 
should help lay the groundwork for the next com-
mission’s work. The next commission will need the 
opportunity to chart its own course, to make decisions 
about organization, leadership, and approach. But the 
existing commission should help fill the gap in prepara-
tion that will precede the selection of state agencies and 
outside institutions to gather research and set the stage 
for the redistricting process. 
Specific tasks could include identifying individuals 
and organizations capable of assisting the commission 
on a professional basis; exploring models of profession-
al support, such as bipartisan consulting teams; helping 
begin the process of collecting data that the next com-
mission will need; communicating with the media and 
others about the importance of citizen redistricting; 
and maintaining and expanding the written records 
and oral recollections of participants in the redistrict-
ing process. In the broader sense, the 2011 commission 
should advocate for the independence and organiza-
tional support necessary to make the next commission 
successful.
Conclusions
Ultimately, the commissioners had to decide how to 
deliberate, with limited guidance on how to proceed. 
Even with the major organizational problems noted 
here, they found a way to make reasonable decisions 
in a compressed time frame. They worked hard, with 
long hours of public hearings, committee meetings, and 
deliberations. 
28Cal. Gov. Code § 8252.3.3, § 2(c)(4).
In order to be successful, a citizen commission 
must have a process that allows and encourages staff to 
assist and at times guide the commission in its process. 
Although staff must be careful not to intrude on policy 
decisions, the commission must entrust administrative 
tasks to the staff so that the commissioners can focus on 
their core responsibilities: drawing district boundaries. 
The State Auditor, or a comparable organiza-
tion such as the Legislative Analyst, should conduct 
the selection process in the next iteration; other states 
seeking to adopt the California model should identify 
an agency known for its impartiality and professional 
skill. 
A full support system for the operation of the 
commission must be in place before the commission 
convenes, including guidance on selecting staff and 
consultants, advice on dealing with administrative 
matters, and information about how commissions allo-
cate time and resources. This information should be 
provided by a single governmental agency or outside 
organization with relevant experience.
Compensation should be addressed before the 
commissioners take office. Compensation should be set 
with reference to comparable boards and commissions 
within and outside the state of California. Consistent 
with the general direction of this commission, the next 
commission should have a level of compensation that 
would allow people of moderate means the chance to 
serve.
Commissioners should establish the criteria and 
job descriptions for staff and consultants, through a 
public process, and make hiring decisions from the 
widest array of qualified applicants. New staff models 
should be explored, including bipartisan teams. 
The state should assign a staff person to handle 
logistical matters for the commission. The commis-
sion should cast a wide net for staff from both inside 
and outside the state government and with experience 
working with appointed or elected citizen bodies. The 
commissioners should delegate administrative tasks as 
much as possible to staff and consultants.
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The commissioners made obtaining input from the public a high priority. In addition, they 
were advised that public input was the sole vehicle they could use for drawing lines 
around Communities of Interest (COIs). The commission undertook major efforts to reach 
the public, including hearings and other public events. The scale of input they received 
was staggering. For reasons of budget and time, the commission was unable to pursue a 
consulting contract for public outreach and depended on themselves, the staff, and the 
work of private nonprofit organizations. 
Ph
ot
o 
Co
ur
te
sy
 o
f C
A 
Co
m
m
on
 C
au
se
35When the People Draw the Lines    League of Women Voters of California
CHAPTER 4
Outreach During the Deliberation Process
The citizen commissioners prioritized soliciting, receiv-
ing, and evaluating public input. They focused intensive-
ly on outreach at their first meeting as a full commission 
on January 12, 2011. The committee on outreach drew 
the most volunteers among commission members. Com-
missioner Michelle DiGuilio observed that “everybody 
wanted to be on the outreach committee.”
Voters expected that redistricting would move for-
ward with transparency and significant public input. A 
2007 survey found that “the most popular components 
of the initiative include taking politics out of the process 
and the requirement for more openness.”1 A transpar-
ent process that engaged the public would be a stark 
contrast to previous, insider-dominated line drawings. 
As the scope of the outreach became evident, and 
facing a deadline to complete the redistricting, the 
commissioners considered hiring a professional out-
reach consultant. This outreach group might have 
helped facilitate the “translation” of the commission’s 
work to the public and helped to organize the public 
input into a form that was easily digestible by com-
missioners and by members of the public. Sacramento 
State University’s Center for Collaborative Policy sub-
mitted a proposal to provide a broad range of outreach 
services, with a price tag that exceeded $800,000.2 
Commissioner Cynthia Dai noted that for the cost, 
the proposal added insufficient value beyond what the 
commissioners, staff, and consultants would have had 
to do anyway. 
Commissioners resolved to conduct outreach on 
their own. The commission’s director of communi-
cations, Rob Wilcox, coordinated the commission’s 
media effort. The line-drawing consultant firm Q2’s 
agreement required that the firm’s staff collect public 
input at the hearings for the use of commissioners. 
The commission’s own outreach included speaking 
to the media and addressing public meetings, issu-
ing press releases, holding public hearings, streaming 
1“California Redistricting: A Report on the Survey Conducted by Lake 
Research Partners and the Tarrance Group,” based on a telephone sur-
vey of 800 likely 2008 general election voters conducted between July 
26 and August 2, 2007. The survey found that more than 60 percent of 
the voters attached great importance to an open process as a reason to 
support the ballot measure.
2Staff discussion with commission found in transcript, “Combined 
Meeting of the Technical Advisory Committee and the Outreach Ad-
visory Committee,” April 7, 2011.
Several Days in the Life of a 
Commissioner: April 27–May 2, 2011 
Jodie Filkins Webber, Attorney
April 27
Court appearance in Santa Ana at 8:30 a.m.
Picked up commissioner Cynthia Dai at Long Beach 
Airport at 11 a.m.
Commission business meeting in Long Beach at 1:00 p.m.
Commission public input hearing from 6 p.m. to  
10 p.m. or so
Drove home to Norco (meeting was within 70 miles, so no 
reimbursement for hotel expenses)
April 28
Court appearance in Pomona at 8:30 a.m.
Commission business meeting in Los Angeles at 1 p.m.
Commission public input hearing from 6 p.m. to 11:30 p.m.
Drove home to Norco
April 29
Drove from Norco to my office in Orange
Drove to San Gabriel at 3 p.m.
Commission public input hearing in San Gabriel from  
6 p.m. until?
Drove home to Norco
April 30
Drove to San Fernando for commission business meeting 
at 10:00 a.m.
Commission public input hearing from 2 p.m. to  
6 p.m. or so
Stayed in Pasadena
May 1
Drove from Pasadena to Lancaster
Commission business meeting at 10 a.m.
Commission public input hearing from 2 p.m. to 5 p.m.
Remained in Lancaster
May 2
Took deposition of party in Lancaster (coordinated with 
commission meeting in Lancaster) from 10 a.m.  
to 12 p.m.
Drove to Riverside for redistricting presentation to the 
Western Riverside Council of Governments at 3 p.m.
HOME EARLY before 5 p.m.!
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deliberation meetings live on video, and providing a 
website that included commission records and docu-
ments. The commission had inherited a website that 
was difficult to update, and some time passed before a 
more adaptable model could be implemented.
The commission summarized its overall approach:
All of the Commission’s public meetings were 
live-streamed, captured on video, and placed 
on the Commission’s website for public view-
ing at any time. Stenographers were present 
at the Commission business meetings and 
meetings where instructions were provided to 
Q2 Data and Research, LLC, the company 
retained to implement the Commission’s direc-
tions and to draw the draft districts and final 
maps. Transcripts of meetings were also placed 
on the Commission’s website. Finally, all of the 
completed documents prepared by the Com-
mission and its staff, along with all documents 
presented to the Commission by the public and 
suitable for posting were posted to the Com-
mission’s website for public review. 3
The broadest outreach challenge for the commis-
sion was to obtain useful input from the public. Studies 
of public participation increasingly emphasize the 
delicate balance between obtaining maximum public 
input—especially from those individuals or groups not 
traditionally “wired” into the decision process—and 
absorbing useful information that decision makers 
might not otherwise receive:
Quantitative measures—how many “hits,” visi-
tors, page views, comments, etc.—are seductive. 
They are easy to gather through online analytics  
tools, easy to present in attractive charts and 
tables, and easy to compare over time and across 
versions. Without doubt, such metrics can give 
designers useful information.…But if more 
is not the same as better, then success can’t be 
defined by numbers. 4
3State of California, Citizens Redistricting Commission, Final Report 
on 2011 Redistricting, August 15, 2011, pp. 3–5.
4Cynthia R. Farina, Mary J. Newhart, Josiah Heidt, and Cornell eR-
ulemaking Initiative, “Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging and Nudg-
ing Public Participation that Counts,” Cornell e-Rulemaking Initiative 
The commissioners sought to balance their desire 
to maximize useful public input with their commit-
ment to hear all points of view. If people traveled 
from afar and had to wait a long time to speak, they 
were unlikely to welcome an extensive public educa-
tion session on redistricting. Commissioner DiGuilio 
noted that in early hearings, presentations that delayed 
the start of public testimony annoyed members of the 
public. Lacking a significant outreach budget, the com-
missioners struggled to reach their goal of explaining 
redistricting to a wider public. According to Commis-
sioner Peter Yao, “We did not have any money to do 
any teaching or outreach of our own, so we just had to 
collect input. We were barely able to do it.” 
Because the commissioners faced initial obstacles in 
building their staff and consultant teams and in getting 
the data they needed to start mapping, they decided to 
pursue aggressive outreach during the first few months. 
Although they felt an urgency to get started on the work 
of mapping, Q2 advised them that no real mapping work 
could begin until all the census data were received in 
Publications, paper 3 (2012), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/ceri/3.
TABLE 6. Commissioners’ Public Appearances
Commissioner June 10, 2011, and Prior
June 11– 
August 15, 2011
Vincent Barabba 12 5
Cynthia Dai 14 8
Stanley Forbes 19 6
Connie Galambos 
Malloy 12 4
Jeanne Raya 9 6
Jodie Filkins  
Webber 15 3
Peter Yao 15 4
Gabino Aguirre 7 1
Maria Blanco 8 2
Michelle R. DiGuilio 11 2
Lilbert “Gil” R. Ontai 10 0
M. Andre Parvenu 7 1
Michael Ward 8 0
Angelo Ancheta 8 3
Totals 155 45
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April. The schedule of hearings was front-loaded in part 
to advance the agonizingly slow process of getting the 
deliberations under way. Commissioner Stanley Forbes 
suggested holding roughly one hundred public hearings 
throughout the state before and after the release of draft 
maps. Commissioners backed off from this ambitious 
plan in the face of practical obstacles. 
The commission held twenty-three public input 
hearings around the state before issuing a set of draft 
maps on June 10, 2011. Following a five-day public 
review period, the commission held eleven more pub-
lic input hearings to collect reactions and comments 
about the initial draft maps.5 All commissioners were 
expected to attend these hearings, and Q2 collected 
and catalogued the public input.6 The hearings drew 
large audiences. The level of intensity surprised Com-
missioner Gil Ontai, who recounted that “people came 
hundreds of miles, drove six to eight hours, and there 
were lots of presentations.”
During the peak of the commission’s work, in the 
spring of 2011, commissioners spent long days balanc-
ing commission meetings and public hearings with the 
obligations of their own jobs.
Commissioners were willing to speak to the press 
and at community meetings and made a total of 245 
public appearances from the beginning of the process 
to the end. Commissioners’ public appearances were 
as diverse as they were geographically scattered.7 After 
the release of the first maps on June 10, commissioners 
made the reasonable decision to spend the bulk of their 
time on mapping, and public appearances declined in 
5Ibid.
6Some commissioners carpooled across the state to the public hear-
ings. Commissioner Ontai found these “adventures” to be an impor-
tant bonding experience for the members.
7These appearances included interviews and meetings with radio sta-
tions and newspapers all across the state (e.g., KCBS Radio, KQED 
Public Radio, Indian Voices, Filipino News, India West, the Chico 
Enterprise Press, Oroville Mercury Register, Asian Journal, the San 
Diego Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, and the San Francisco Chronicle); 
speaking at Redistricting Conferences, at board meetings, and be-
fore groups like the Long Beach Republican Women Federated, the 
Western Riverside Council of Governments’ Executive Committee in 
Riverside, and the Black Social Workers Association in Los Angeles; 
serving as panelists at events like the NALEO conference and another 
on ethnic media; and speaking at the opening of the Redistricting As-
sistance Centers in Sacramento, San Diego, and Los Angeles. For a 
full list of the commissioners’ public appearances, see wedrawthelines.
ca.gov/community.html, accessed January 10, 2013.
number. In the lead-up to the release of the first maps 
on June 10, commissioners made a total of 155 pub-
lic appearances; after June 10, though, they decided to 
spend the bulk of their time on mapping, and public 
appearances declined to 45 (see table 6). The criticism 
the commission faced, first about the June 10 maps and 
then about the decision not to release the second-draft 
maps, may have made public appearances less appeal-
ing as well.8 
Most of the commissioners had little experience 
with public criticism. An experienced commissioner, 
Peter Yao, advised Jeanne Raya that criticism is normal 
for commissioners and told her not to worry about it.9 
In releasing the draft maps on June 10, the commis-
sion made its single most important outreach decision. 
No matter how many opportunities people have to speak 
at public meetings, or how many draft maps people or 
groups transmit to a commission, nothing generates 
real public input more than a concrete proposal. Com-
missioners were ambivalent about releasing the maps, 
knowing they contained potential problems that had 
not been resolved. However, they put their reservations 
aside in order to move the process forward.10
8One observer suggested that the negative reaction to the first set of 
maps seemed to make commissioners a bit more reclusive than in the 
earlier days, when they mingled freely with the public in the manner of 
elected officials. (Matt Rexroad, interview).
9Another commissioner, Gabino Aguirre, who had previously absorbed 
public criticism during his service as a city council member, noted that 
other commissioners showed more concern about it than he did.
10Commissioner Maria Blanco was so concerned about some of the 
shortcomings of the maps in the area of voting rights that she consid-
ered voting no. She ultimately voted to release the draft maps in order 
to help the commission stay on track. 
245
Commissioners made a  
total of 245 public 
appearances during the 
course of the process.
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With time short, the commissioners chose not to 
release a second set of draft maps in July but rather to 
conduct a series of “visualizations” one district at a time. 
The visualizations were maps of particular districts that 
the commissioners could adjust one at a time in public 
debate. They were presented at public, televised meet-
ings of the commission held in Sacramento.
The visualizations simply reflected the actual 
decisions made by the commissioners. Members of 
the public could comment in real time, and they sent 
numerous emails during the examination of the visual-
izations. The commissioners had the opportunity to see 
how the characteristics of an individual district could 
change based on different groupings of Communities 
of Interest. 
Opinions about the visualizations varied widely. 
For those in the room, they provided an immediate and 
even dramatic way to understand the impact of chang-
es to district lines. For those watching on television or 
unable to watch at all, the process could be distant and 
confusing.
As Rosalind Gold of NALEO pointed out:
If you’re not there in Sacramento, there’s no 
way to comment on a moving target. So they’re 
making changes, they’re mapping. There was 
not good video streaming or video access to 
those hearings. And plus you had to be watch-
ing the hearings every minute to see what was 
going on with visualization.11
Outreach by Other Organizations
The commission came to rely on outside organizations 
to bolster its public outreach. Voting-rights groups 
were already involved, having monitored the com-
missioner-selection process. Civic organizations such 
as the League of Women Voters of California closely 
followed the deliberations and provided outreach mate-
rials to the public to foster participation.
The James Irvine Foundation gave grants to ten 
organizations to increase public participation in the 
deliberation process. Irvine grantees undertook a num-
11Interview with Rosalind Gold.
ber of efforts designed to help the public provide useful 
input into the commission’s deliberations. For example, 
Irvine grantees did the following:
n	 Developed educational materials used by a wide 
range of organizations.
n	 Conducted outreach to inform the public of oppor-
tunities to participate in the redistricting process.
n	 Trained thousands of Californians to provide pub-
lic comment and map proposals to the commission.
n	 Collected regional public input and incorporated it 
into statewide map proposals shared with the com-
mission. 
n	 Operated six technical-assistance sites and a com-
prehensive website that provided the public with 
in-person and online access to redistricting data 
and mapping software.
n	 Prepared legal briefs examining the effects of recent 
laws and rulings on the state’s redistricting process.
TABLE 7. James Irvine Foundation Grants 
during Deliberation Process
Organization Grant Amount
Advancement Project* $290,000
Asian Pacific American Legal Center of 
Southern California (APALC)
$365,000
Central Coast Alliance United for a  
Sustainable Economy (CAUSE)
$150,000
California Common Cause**
Community Coalition* (for the African 
American Redistricting Collaborative)
$190,000
Mexican American Legal Defense and 
Education Fund (MALDEF)
$150,000
National Association of Latino Elected and 
Appointed Officials (NALEO) Educational 
Fund
$225,000
San Diego Foundation for Change $100,000
The Greenlining Institute $225,000
University of California at Berkeley,  
Statewide Database*
$735,000
*Amount reflects the total of two grants made to this organization. 
**California Common Cause received a grant of $250,000 for work 
during both the commissioner selection and deliberation phases, ac-
counted for in Table 3, page 20 of this report.
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Additionally, Irvine supported the drafting of this 
report in order to inform future redistricting efforts.
The James Irvine Foundation gave a number of 
grants, ranging from $100,000 to $735,000, to various 
groups working to increase public participation in the 
deliberation process.
For reasons of time and money, the commission 
had to rely on outside groups such as the Irvine-funded 
organizations to carry out much of its outreach program. 
And, at least in some cases, the commission used mate-
rials created by the partners as their own handouts to 
the public. Commissioner Angelo Ancheta noted that 
it would have been difficult in any case for the commis-
sion to “create an outreach infrastructure from scratch.” 
The James Irvine Foundation provided grants total-
ing $735,000 to UC Berkeley to establish Redistricting 
Assistance Sites (also called Technical Assistance Sites 
or Centers).12 The sites opened in March 2011. Direct-
ed by the Redistricting Group at the UC Berkeley 
School of Law (affiliated with the Statewide Database) 
and directed by Karin Mac Donald’s Q2, sites opened in 
San Diego, Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Fresno, Sac-
ramento, and Berkeley. The sites made computers and 
redistricting software (Maptitude for Redistricting) avail-
able to the general public to develop map submissions or 
testimony for the commission during its deliberations. 
Each site had one manager who was available to 
assist clients using the workstations either during drop-
in hours or by appointment. Starting on July 12, 2011, 
the public could view the commission map visualiza-
tions in detail at the redistricting sites. Each center was 
12“Sites” and “Centers” are used interchangeably in this report.
12,746
There were 12,746 visits to  
the ReDrawCA website  
in the peak three months  
of the process.
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equipped with two desktop computers with Maptitude 
for Redistricting installed, a laptop for the manager to 
communicate with and use in presentations, and an 
inkjet color printer. 
The managers estimated that between fifteen 
and thirty maps (from one district to full statewide 
plans) developed at each site were submitted to the 
commission. Commission members spoke at some 
Irvine-funded workshops held at the centers, and they 
discussed the centers in press materials, on the website, 
and at multiple hearings.13
The centers experienced waves of traffic before 
deadlines for submission of testimony to the commis-
sion. At the Berkeley center, clients including mappers 
for the California Conservative Action Group (CCAG), 
a local Tea Party group, and the Sierra Club worked on 
full redistricting plans to submit to the commission. 
Another Irvine-supported project, ReDrawCA, 
provided the public with online access to the commis-
sion’s maps and data. Operated by the Advancement 
Project, and supported by grants of $290,000 from The 
James Irvine Foundation, ReDrawCA allowed users to 
access up-to-date versions of the commission maps and 
to draw their own maps. The Advancement Project held 
a number of webinars and open office hours to promote 
ReDrawCA and provide technical training and support. 
The Advancement Project also shared ReDrawCA at 
the majority of the local redistricting hearings and pro-
vided fliers to the commission. The program began on 
April 15, 2011, and over the next three months (in the 
thick of the map-drawing process), there were 12,746 
visits to the ReDrawCA website. The redistricting 
commission also referred people to the ReDrawCA 
website, accounting for 1,216 visitors.14
An examination of the commission website15 indi-
cates numerous examples of maps created through 
either the redistricting centers or ReDrawCA. Some 
of the maps were accompanied by cogent explanations 
of COIs.16
13One of the three “Helpful Links” on the commission website is about 
the centers: http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/links.html, accessed August 
25, 2012.
14Data provided by Caitlin Flint, Advancement Project.
15See “Meeting Handouts,” accessed August 25, 2012, http://wedraw 
thelines.ca.gov/meeting_handouts.html.
16One example is an argument for coastal districts, including maps, 
submitted by the Sierra Club. 
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Although these resources helped some members 
of the public to participate, they were not a sufficient 
replacement for technological tools the commission 
itself could have provided. Because the commission did 
not create and host an online mapping tool on its own 
website, many members of the public likely did not 
know how to access such a tool. Also, some members 
of the public complained that the commission did not 
provide easy and immediate access to data files neces-
sary to provide thorough map proposals, analysis, and 
testimony.
Outside groups and individuals followed the devel-
opment of the commission’s maps with great interest. 
These mappers, though, had difficulty getting per-
mission to access the commission’s data, known as 
“shapefiles,” which were required to build the maps.17 
Shapefiles showed the precise boundaries of the com-
mission’s drafts and with mapping software could be 
overlaid on various levels of data to let the public assess 
the legal compliance and political impact of the maps. 
The legal team that advised the commission raised 
concerns about releasing this information because of 
its possible impact on litigation.18 Eventually, though 
belatedly, portions of the information became available 
to those outside the commission. 
Intense public interest in the work of the com-
mission created a demand for up-to-date maps that 
reflected decisions as they happened. In particular, 
many observers wanted to know what the political 
implications of line-drawing would be. Several web-
17Interview with Paul Mitchell.
18Because these concerns were expressed in closed sessions, it is dif-
ficult to assess the merit of this advice.
sites became popular because, unlike the commission 
itself, they included political data that would allow an 
assessment of who gained and who lost from the pro-
posed lines. One advantage these websites possessed 
was the ability to display “political data” such as party 
registration and voting patterns. In pursuit of Prop 11’s 
mandate to avoid “favoring or discriminating against 
[a] candidate or political party,” the commission decid-
ed not to explore such data.19
A future commission would be well served by 
releasing the technical data that would allow others to 
draw maps, even if those maps include political data 
that the commission itself chooses not to consider. 
Clearly the commission had an unusual relation-
ship with outside organizations. The commission could 
not control the outside groups, which were directly 
accountable to their own constituencies and in some 
cases to The James Irvine Foundation. Neither the 
groups nor the Irvine Foundation could tell the com-
mission what to do, beyond offering advice.20 Generally, 
though, the commissioners considered the work of the 
outside partners to be indispensable, since the commis-
sion was unable, for reasons of time and money, to fund 
its own outreach program.
The budget of the next commission should include 
sufficient funds to provide user-friendly tools and tech-
nology that give the public thorough access to data and 
proposals and easy opportunities to provide effective 
testimony and proposed maps. 
Absorbing Public Input
The work of the commission generated far more 
public interest and input than anyone had imagined. 
Summaries by the commission indicated the follow-
ing inventory of public comments: a total of 34 public 
hearings; more than 70 deliberation meetings; meet-
ings and hearings in 32 cities and 23 counties; more 
than 2,700 speakers at hearings; and written submis-
19Redistricting websites like redistrictingpartners.org (Paul Mitchell) 
or mpimaps.com (Matt Rexroad) received considerable traffic. Re-
DrawCA was able to display maps that included more data than the 
commission maps.
20Some Republicans who followed the process complained that Irvine 
was pushing the commission too far in the pursuit of diversity.
The work of the 
commission generated 
far more public interest 
and input than anyone 
had imagined.
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sions from more than 2,000 organizations and more 
than 20,000 individuals.
A large volume of public input bolstered the com-
mission’s credibility. As with the more than 30,000 
people who initially sought commission positions, the 
level of interest itself became a factor in evaluating the 
commission’s work.
The scale of public input both pleased and chal-
lenged the commissioners. Commissioner Raya said 
that the scope of public comment was both “won-
derful and terrible;…emails were pinging all day.” 
Commissioner Andre Parvenu remembered, “We were 
inundated day and night with email, faxes, maps.” 
Commissioner Ancheta praised the heavy emphasis on 
input but found it difficult to process the information, 
especially as the process moved into mapping. Some 
public hearings went on until late at night, so that com-
missioners could hear all the members of the public 
who attended.
In the early days, the professional standing of the 
commissioners took a blow in the eyes of experienced 
observers in the audience who thought the commis-
sioners did not know who was behind the apparently 
spontaneous comments of presenters. Some suspected 
that public speakers were agents of incumbent elected 
officials. There was nothing in the process to prevent 
a politician from encouraging a friend or ally to seek 
to persuade the commission to take favorable actions 
while masking the source of the input. Others felt that 
“the squeaky wheel got the grease.”21 By the end of 
the process, considerable disagreement arose over the 
extent to which these efforts were successful (see chap-
ter 8). Undoubtedly, some were. However, a number of 
elected officials found themselves in unfamiliar districts 
in which they had difficulty winning.
Commissioners indicated in interviews that they 
were more aware of the nature of these comments than 
was widely assumed. But certainly for some who were 
less familiar with the dynamics of public hearings, it 
was a challenge to weigh the public comments. Com-
missioner Parvenu recalled that for less experienced 
commissioners like himself, evaluating the testimony 
became much easier as time passed.
21Interview with Tony Quinn.
When commissioners did try to publicly demon-
strate that they understood who was speaking, they 
ran into accusations of insensitivity. It was a no-win 
situation. Commissioners were justifiably concerned 
that confrontational questions from commissioners 
could create a chilling effect on members of the public 
who wished to comment. When Commissioner Jodie 
Filkins Webber challenged the testimony of speakers 
from South Los Angeles for apparently being recruited 
by an elected official, she was criticized by other com-
missioners and by members of the public. 
The commission grappled with the challenge of 
absorbing, weighing, and evaluating the immense 
quantity of public input. Commissioners, staff, and 
consultants—already facing an unrealistically tight 
schedule with limited resources—fought an uphill 
battle to keep up with public comment and to pro-
vide current information to the public. They needed to 
absorb the input, but in attempting to do so they risked 
taking valuable time from the task of drawing the lines. 
Q2 staff had been attending public hearings, col-
lecting data on public comment, and trying to keep 
the commissioners informed. A group of Q2 personnel 
separate from the actual mappers had the responsibility 
of compiling public input. 
The COI testimony from the public hearings in 
April and May critically informed the drawing of the 
June 10 first-draft maps. Because commissioners had 
been advised by Q2 that public input was to be the sole 
source of information in defining COIs, they had to 
seek clues in the public comment. The question became 
how to weigh testimony. Although the commissioners 
20,000
Individuals submitted  
more than 20,000  
written comments to  
the commission.
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became extremely conversant with the various commu-
nities of the state, they still struggled with the mountain 
of public testimony collected during those hearings, at 
regular commission meetings, and by e-mail. 
The commission had authorized Q2 to create an 
input database from the start of the process, but that 
task demanded more staff in light of the short timeline 
and the massive volume of public input. On June 9, a 
day before releasing the first-draft maps, the commis-
sion discussed authorizing Q2 to hire additional staff 
to create a database of COI testimony. Commissioner 
DiGuilio noted that “the part of tracking our COI, the 
basis for our decisions…has not been resolved as of 
yet.”22 The exhaustive COI database released on July 
7 ran to 1,431 pages. Commissioners were eventually 
able to search the database by keywords, but the pub-
lic had more difficulty with gaining access to usable 
information.23
With more than 20,000 communications, includ-
ing emails, commissioners found their own ways to 
weigh and evaluate them. One commissioner consid-
ered maps submitted to the commission to be useless 
without knowing the assumptions that went into them. 
Another preferred the emails to the public hearings. 
Commissioner Raya noted that maps from local busi-
ness associations and cities were especially effective. 
22Commission meeting, June 9, 2011, transcript.
23According to Karin Mac Donald, Q2 assigned one team member to 
each meeting to summarize public comment on a spreadsheet. The 
comments received numeric codes. The public hearing database had 
2,365 comments, of which 1,385 addressed COIs. Other public com-
ments were entered into the database. Q2 gave the commissioners an 
Excel file that was searchable as a PDF. The files were not formatted 
for the public to be able to search the database.
Commissioner Vincent Barabba recalled that he 
had an internal “filter” system that helped him make 
sense of the testimony and the other input. His first 
filter was to avoid being too moved by “obvious spe-
cial interests.” After that, he found the most useful 
input to come from some of the best-organized eco-
nomic groups, such as business organizations in the 
San Fernando Valley in Los Angeles, and groups from 
some ethnic communities, such as in Los Angeles’s 
Koreatown. With regard to the maps that came into 
the commission, Barabba considered the Asian Pacif-
ic American Legal Center to be extremely effective, 
because its team clearly understood the mission of the 
commission and the constraints the members faced. 
The value of other maps depended on whether they 
were accompanied by rationales consistent with the 
legal requirements of redistricting.
Commissioner Dai said that she would routinely 
scroll through the emails on her phone, quickly dismiss 
the repetitive ones (“100 that all looked alike”), and 
then read the ones that seemed more individual.
Before the first round of draft maps were released 
on June 10, African American, Latino, and Asian 
American groups had submitted their own maps. Fol-
lowing the controversy over the first set of draft maps, 
the three communities came together to create a set of 
“unity maps” that were useful to the commission in its 
final deliberations.
Commissioners eventually decided to create two-
person committees within each of the seven regions of 
the state to evaluate the public input. Each committee 
would include one person familiar with the region and 
another who was not.
Conclusions
One of the commission’s greatest strengths was its com-
mitment to encouraging and absorbing public input. 
Starting late, with limited resources, the commission 
aggressively sought to generate public comments. The 
commissioners attained an extraordinary degree of out-
reach despite immense time pressure.
However, there were inevitable gaps because the 
commission did not have professional assistance to 
plan and implement their community outreach efforts. 
One of the commission’s 
greatest strengths 
was its commitment 
to encouraging and 
absorbing public input.
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Their main job was to draw the lines in light of pub-
lic input. With resources and time in short supply, the 
commission depended on outside groups for some core 
elements of their outreach. At times, the interested 
public had difficulty connecting to the technical work 
that the commission was conducting.
 The commission struggled to absorb public input 
in the manner that would be most useful to its delibera-
tions—suggestions for COIs within the constitutional 
framework that bound the commission’s decisions.
The next commission would be well advised to 
emulate this commission’s goal of widespread pub-
lic participation. The commission though, must have 
greater assistance to reach its outreach goals. In the 
next iteration of the redistricting process, the bud-
get should include sufficient funding for a consultant 
whose main task is to collect and analyze public input 
to the commission and to provide user-friendly tools 
and technology that give the public thorough access to 
data and proposals and easy opportunities to provide 
effective testimony and proposed maps. Furthermore, 
with more time to deliberate, the next commission can 
work more closely with outside groups from all points 
of view to coordinate online information and other 
methods for the public to access the commission’s work.
As will be seen in the following chapters, demo-
graphic, economic, and other data gathered prior to 
receiving testimony might have relieved the commis-
sion of some of the burden of basing decisions largely 
on public comment, susceptible as it could be to influ-
ence from the political world.
44 League of Women Voters of California    When the People Draw the Lines
CHAPTER 5
Mapping
The commission was scrupulous in attempting to create maps around the mandated 
ranked criteria. Communities of Interest (COIs) were high in the rankings. The mapping 
process was built around a first set of draft maps, a set of visualizations of districts, and a 
final set of maps. The commissioners were advised that public input was the sole means 
of assessing COIs. For that reason and because of the press of time, they did not have 
data that could have helped them weigh the public input regarding the nature of vari-
ous communities. In the next iteration, the commission should have early access to data 
about potential districts that is independent of the public input.
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The commission conducted the bulk of the map-
ping in a two-month period between June 10, when it 
released the first set of maps, and the end of July. The 
districts were to be drawn in perhaps the most geo-
graphically diverse state in the nation. No district could 
be drawn in isolation, and even a small change in the 
boundary of one district could affect several districts 
in a series of population switches and rotations. Before 
the commission submitted the final maps to the pub-
lic on August 15, 2011, the districts had gone through 
multiple revisions.
In the end, despite numerous challenges and 
constraints, the commission addressed the six consti-
tutional criteria, while obtaining considerable public 
input. However, important lessons can be learned from 
this inaugural effort. The mapping process should 
begin earlier. Demographic and other data should be 
used to complement public testimony. A more coherent 
and accessible database of public testimony should be 
created. Time and budget should be allocated to allow 
for more effective tracking of revisions. 
Overview of the Mapping Process
The U.S. Census Bureau released redistricting data for 
California on March 8, 2011. As a result of the late 
hiring of a mapping consultant (on March 19), the 
delay in completing Q2’s contract until April, and the 
scheduling of public input hearings in April and May, 
mapping did not begin until late May. The bulk of the 
mapping took place in a two-month period between 
late May and late July. 
Districts were built starting with the largest units 
(counties or cities) and working down to census blocks 
when cities or counties had to be split. Throughout the 
mapping process, most of the discussion focused on 
counties, cities, and neighborhoods.
Q2 divided California into nine regions distribut-
ed among four mappers, each responsible for drawing 
assembly, senate, and congressional districts in his or her 
region. Q2 summarized the public comments for each 
of the nine regions, from which the commission identi-
fied “design principles” or general mapping directions 
for Q2. Q2 and the commission consulted with VRA 
counsel regarding areas where districts should be drawn 
to protect opportunities for minority communities. 
The commission outlined the process by which Q2 
would create the first maps on May 5.1 The commission 
instructed Q2 to draw congressional districts with equal 
populations (within 1 percent of the ideal population of 
702,905). Assembly and senate districts could deviate 
no more than 5 percent from their ideal populations 
of 465,674 and 931,349, respectively. The commission 
then indicated that compliance with the VRA would 
be the next priority. After that, city and county lines 
would guide the mapping, modified by COIs.
As Q2 drew the maps, commissioners issued direc-
tives. Q2 staff would then present a proposed district to 
the commission and briefly describe why they drew it 
that way. VRA counsel advised the commissioners and 
Q2. Given the high priority of the VRA criterion in 
California redistricting, counsel advised the commis-
sion to draw VRA districts first. These districts became 
important building blocks for the maps. (See chapter 6 
on the Voting Rights Act.)
The first districts slated for drawing were sev-
eral “VRA districts,” including the four Section 5 
counties, and areas with significant minority popula-
tions. Section 5 of the VRA, which is described more 
fully in the next chapter, concerns counties in which 
minority communities have historically suffered dis-
crimination. They are protected from “retrogression” by 
the U.S. Department of Justice, which must approve 
any maps involving these jurisdictions. These districts 
were important building blocks for the district maps. 
Some districts, such as the Merced and Kings Section 
5 districts, were established early in the process and 
influenced the drawing of adjacent districts. For exam-
ple, Commissioner Cynthia Dai described the Merced 
congressional district as “an immovable puzzle piece.”2
Map 1 shows that the June 10 lines were not sub-
stantially changed in the final maps for three of the four 
districts.
In a number of cases, the commission responded to 
public input by creating “hard lines” for Q2 to follow. 
At one point, the commission created visualizations 
of districts that would have crossed the Golden Gate 
Bridge. But after substantial public input, the commis-
1“Principles for Drawing Preliminary Maps,” commission document 
dated May 5, 2011.
2Commission meeting, June 29, 2011, transcript.
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sion decided not to cross the bridge, which affected 
the drawing of districts throughout the Bay Area and 
Northern California. Commissioner Stanley Forbes 
recalled intense public comment from residents of 
Marin County highlighting the COIs that were on 
each side of the bridge. Other hard boundaries includ-
ed the Monterey–San Luis Obispo and Kern–San Luis 
Obispo county borders and the Coachella Valley area 
between Riverside and Imperial counties. 
In general, VRA counsel advised the commission 
to draw minority-majority districts in areas where a 
minority group was concentrated. However, at the same 
time, counsel advised the commission not to create 
districts with high concentrations of an ethnic group 
(more than 65 to 70 percent of the Citizen Voting Age 
Population, or CVAP), because then its representa-
tion would likely be weaker in adjacent districts (an 
approach known as “packing”). The commission even-
tually attempted to create minority districts with about 
50- to 55-percent representation by a minority group, 
although many of the initial draft maps and some final 
maps had higher ethnic concentrations. 
The June 10 Draft Maps
The process of creating the first-draft maps released on 
June 10 was rushed. Although the commissioners knew 
that the June 10 maps represented only a first draft, 
most saw no alternative to releasing them. Something 
had to be put out in public. 
The draft maps generated significant opposition 
from Latino voting-rights organizations, which com-
plained that too few districts had been devised in which 
Latinos would be able to exert influence commensurate 
with their growing population. 
In any case, the June 10 draft maps usefully focused 
public input. With actual maps to which they could 
react, members of the public could offer concrete pro-
posals to keep or amend the proposed lines. 
With a plan on the table and the public showing 
greater interest, the commission entered the critical 
period of its work: drawing of the final maps. The com-
mission and Q2 embarked on an intense period of 
mapping from June 24 to July 28. This four-week period 
constituted the heart of the citizen redistricting process.
CD 3
CD 16
CD 21
CD 20
Legend
10 June Districts
Final Districts
MAP 1: Section 5 Congressional Districts
The pressures of responding to the mountain of 
public testimony and the promise to respect the inter-
ests of diverse entities forced the commissioners to 
make changes to their process. They decided to create 
“working visualizations” rather than the complete set 
of second-draft maps that they had originally prom-
ised to release on July 14.3 This decision reflected the 
late start to the mapping process and the lack of time 
to complete a full set of second-draft maps. Although 
the visualizations allowed the commission to finish its 
work in a timely manner, some members of the pub-
lic complained that this process was difficult to follow 
without being in the room. 
The commissioners also decided to divide the state 
among pairs of commissioners responsible for absorb-
ing the voluminous public testimony for each area. As 
3Unlike the final maps due on August 15, these second-draft maps 
were a promise by the commission not required by law.
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Commissioner Michelle DiGuilio stated at the June 23 
meeting:
We, as commissioners, are still responsible for 
looking at other areas outside our region, what 
we’re trying to do is add one extra layer, which 
is to have in-depth coverage by pairings of 
commissioners.4
Case Study: Los Angeles County 
Congressional Districts
A detailed examination of the drawing of congressional 
districts in metropolitan Los Angeles reveals the chal-
lenges of creating congressional districts in a sprawling 
and diverse urban region consisting of eighty-eight 
incorporated cities and numerous unincorporated com-
munities. Commissioner Forbes believed, in retrospect, 
that the four Section 5 counties posed less complicated 
challenges than Southern California and that begin-
ning public hearings with the complex, multiethnic 
Los Angeles region would have been a better approach. 
San Fernando Valley (CD 29 and CD 30)
The drawing of two congressional districts in the San 
Fernando Valley was marked by substantial consen-
sus. The valley is a geographically distinct part of Los 
Angeles. Physically, it is a large inland basin surrounded 
by mountains. The “Valley” grew rapidly after World 
War II as suburban subdivisions and factories replaced 
farm fields. Since the 1960s, the San Fernando Valley 
has experienced an influx of Latinos into working-class 
districts along the industrial corridors in the eastern 
valley. 
Latinos activists had protested the 2001 redis-
tricting, which created two neighboring congressional 
districts in the valley that protected white incumbents 
(Howard Berman and Brad Sherman) who might oth-
erwise have faced challenges from Latino candidates. 
The citizen commission, charged with drawing lines 
not bound by incumbent self-interest, would be closely 
watched in the valley.
4Commission meeting, June 23, 2011, transcript.
San Fernando Valley East (CD 29) was the first 
district drawn in the region, based on COI testimony, 
and the mandate under Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act to draw districts, where possible, in which minor-
ity communities could have an opportunity to elect 
candidates of their choice. This district was 51 percent 
Latino, and it also reflected the recommendation fre-
quently made in public testimony to use the 405 (San 
Diego) Freeway as a dividing line between the eastern 
and western parts of the valley.5
Beyond building this new district, the commis-
sioners responded to consistent public testimony 
from individuals and organizations to follow the geo-
graphical boundaries of the valley. The commissioners 
maintained COIs and neighborhood-council6 bound-
aries in dividing the East San Fernando Valley (CD 29) 
and West San Fernando Valley (CD 30). For example, 
Mulholland Drive along the crest of the Santa Monica 
Mountains and Hollywood Hills separates CD 30 from 
CD 33 to the south. Commissioners also referred to 
maps submitted by the Valley Industry and Commerce 
Association (VICA) in drawing the district boundaries.
In maps presented by Q2 to the commission on 
June 1, the valley was split among three districts that 
went beyond its borders. In addition to San Fernan-
do Valley East, parts of the valley were included in 
the Antelope–Santa Clarita and San Fernando Valley 
West–East Ventura County districts. The latter district 
extended from the Ventura–Los Angeles county-line 
beach area through the western San Fernando Valley to 
the Hollywood Hills. 
The June 10 maps created a more compact San Fer-
nando Valley West district. This was based on the desire 
of Thousand Oaks residents to keep their city intact 
in at least one level of districts. At the June 7 meet-
ing, where the commission gave final directions to Q2 
for the first-draft maps, Commissioner Dai requested 
that Thousand Oaks be kept whole in a congressional 
district. To accomplish this, the mappers rotated popu-
5“Full Commission Business Meeting,” Norco City Council Cham-
bers, Norco, California, May 5, 2011, transcript.
6In 1999, a charter revision in Los Angeles established a system of ad-
visory neighborhood councils. More than ninety were in place during 
the redistricting process, covering most of the city. The boundaries of 
neighborhood councils were established by those groups that applied 
for neighborhood council status, based on criteria that resembled com-
munities of interest.
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lation among three districts. Thousand Oaks was moved 
entirely into the East Ventura County district, along 
with Agoura Hills and Westlake Village. The West San 
Fernando Valley added the communities of Granada 
Hills and Porter Ranch, plus a portion of the city of 
Santa Clarita. Although this change required splitting 
Santa Clarita, it united West Valley communities and 
respected the desire of valley residents to maintain the 
area’s integrity as much as possible. It also responded to 
the wishes of the Conejo Valley cities (Thousand Oaks, 
Westlake Village, Agoura Hills) to be together. These 
maps solidified the concept of two San Fernando Val-
ley districts, including a majority Latino district in the 
eastern half of the valley. 
In the July 8 maps, the East San Fernando Valley 
district gained Van Nuys, Valley Glen, and North Hol-
lywood and lost the foothill communities of Shadow 
Hills and La Tuna Canyon. With minor boundary 
changes, this revised district would be maintained in 
the final map and remained a majority Latino district.
MAP 2: San Fernando Valley CDs
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The West San Fernando Valley district experienced 
subsequent revisions to compensate for changes made in 
adjacent districts. In the July 8 map, Reseda, the south-
ern part of Santa Clarita, and Calabasas were moved 
to adjacent districts. To add population, the district was 
extended south to include Bel Air and Beverly Hills. 
At the July 9 meeting, some commissioners expressed 
concern that residents in the wealthy Westside neigh-
borhoods might dominate politics in the West San 
Fernando Valley district. They directed Q2 to shift Bev-
erly Hills and Bel Air south to the Westside district.
For the final maps, Mulholland Drive was main-
tained as a dividing line between the San Fernando 
Valley and the Westside of Los Angeles. To compen-
sate for the removal of Beverly Hills and Bel Air, the 
West San Fernando Valley district was extended east 
along the Ventura Boulevard corridor to take in Enci-
no, Valley Glen, and North Hollywood. 
This would be one of the easiest and least contro-
versial areas to map. The San Fernando Valley districts 
respected the boundaries of the valley to a significant 
degree and reflected the ethnic geography of the valley 
by creating a Latino-majority district in the eastern half 
of the valley. These districts are a very good example 
of commissioners following the constitutional criteria 
and ignoring political partisanship and incumbency in 
drawing maps. For example, two Democratic incum-
bents found themselves competing against each other7 
for the new CD 30 seat in 2012. Map 2 shows the bor-
ders of the June 10 districts, compared to the final lines.
Westside Los Angeles, Culver City– 
Crenshaw, and South Bay (Congressional 
Districts 33, 43, and 47) 
South Los Angeles, by contrast, emerged as one of 
the most controversial elements of the congressional 
redistricting. For some years, African Americans had 
represented three congressional districts in South Los 
Angeles, despite nonmajority African American popu-
lations. 
With the African American share of the local 
population in long-term decline, the commission-
ers initially believed that creating at least one African 
7Congressman Brad Sherman defeated Congressman Howard Berman 
for this seat.
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American majority district would be favored by the 
African American community. An early set of maps, 
presented to the commission on May 28, created a Cren-
shaw-Inglewood district that was 59 percent African 
American and 29 percent Latino. This district included 
the city of Inglewood and most of the neighborhoods 
of South Los Angeles. However, some commissioners 
expressed concern that this involved packing African 
Americans into one district. This would make adjacent 
districts less favorable than before to African American 
constituencies. 
These concerns were addressed in the June 10 maps, 
which created three districts in the southwest region 
of Los Angeles County in which African Americans 
represented 21–22 percent of the total population (and 
between 30 and 40 percent of the estimated CVAP). 
As shown in Map 3, these districts included Culver 
City–Crenshaw, Inglewood–South Los Angeles, and 
Hawthorne-Gardena-Compton. In addition, a long 
coastal district connected Santa Monica, the airport 
area, the beach cities, and the Palos Verdes peninsula. 
The West Los Angeles–Downtown district stretched 
from Malibu to Downtown Los Angeles. This elon-
gated district combined disparate neighborhoods, from 
the affluent Beverly Hills and Bel Air to the immi-
grant, working-class neighborhoods Westlake and 
Pico-Union. 
The commission received intense feedback on the 
June 10 maps. Q2 presented a new set of congressional 
districts on July 1. The new West Los Angeles–Down-
town district was now much more compact and oriented 
toward the Westside. The district now included Santa 
Monica, Marina del Rey, and Del Rey from the Palos 
Verdes district, all middle-class white communities. It 
combined most of the Culver City–Crenshaw district, 
including Culver City, Baldwin Hills, Crenshaw, and 
Mid-City, without downtown neighborhoods. The 
densely populated neighborhoods close to Downtown 
Los Angeles, including Hollywood, Koreatown, and 
Pico-Union, were removed. This revision did a better 
job than the earlier version of reflecting the east-west 
social and economic divide in Los Angeles.
To the south, the Inglewood–South Gate district 
was reconfigured in order to keep the airport and air-
port-adjacent communities intact, grouping many of 
the South Bay cities together and keeping Torrance 
mostly intact. The beach cities were connected with the 
Palos Verdes Peninsula, both ports, Wilmington, and 
most of Long Beach. 
Q2 presented another set of revised maps to the 
commission on July 9. The Inglewood-based district was 
again completely revised. The Baldwin Hills–Crenshaw 
and adjacent South Los Angeles districts were added 
and most of Gardena and Torrance, communities with 
small African American populations, were removed. 
This reflected two directions from July 1: to keep the 
airport communities together and to connect Inglewood 
with the Baldwin Hills area. The airport communities 
(e.g. Westchester, El Segundo, and Hawthorne) repre-
sented an economic and political COI. The airport is a 
source of jobs, as well as a focus of neighborhood con-
cerns regarding airport expansion and noise. Inglewood 
and Baldwin Hills are an example of a cultural COI, 
with significant African American populations. 
The July 14 maps returned to the concept of two 
interior districts to the east of the coastal district, as 
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presented in the June 30 maps. The Culver City–Cren-
shaw district included most of Westside Los Angeles, 
Mid-City, and the South Los Angeles neighborhoods 
surrounding Baldwin Hills. An Inglewood-Torrance 
district was based on the Inglewood–South Gate ( July 
1) district, including Inglewood, Hawthorne, Gardena, 
Torrance, and adjacent cities and communities. This 
established the basis for the three Westside–South Bay 
congressional districts. 
Differences within the commission on South Los 
Angeles came to a head at a dramatic July 24 meeting, 
when the concept of three coastal districts was back on 
the table (see Map 4). In this iteration, the northern 
district comprised Westside Los Angeles, Santa Mon-
ica, and Malibu. The central district would include the 
airport, Culver City, Inglewood, and most of South 
Los Angeles. The southern district would cover the 
South Bay cities. The divisions of the Westside and 
South Bay were removed. The Westside Los Angeles 
neighborhoods were united with Santa Monica, Ven-
ice, and Malibu. Torrance stayed whole, and the South 
Bay cities were combined in one district. This decision 
reflected testimony from South Bay cities hoping to be 
united in one district.
The proposal met with strong opposition from 
the African American community. Some commission-
ers argued that the South Bay district combined very 
different COIs—higher-income neighborhoods along 
the coast and lower-income, working-class neighbor-
hoods in the interior. Furthermore, African Americans 
would be packed into one central district, in which they 
represented 51 percent of the CVAP, though African 
Americans had previously had success electing can-
didates of their choice in less concentrated districts. 
Commissioners Andre Parvenu and Connie Galambos 
Malloy stated that they would vote against any map 
including this option; because they were not aligned 
with either party, their opposition would essentially 
block final approval.8 A majority of the commission-
ers shared their concerns, and they decided to keep the 
long coastal district and two interior districts in the 
southwest region of Los Angeles County. 
In the final map (see Map 5) the opportunity for 
8With four members, the nonaligned members had to generate three 
votes for a majority.
African Americans to continue to influence three 
congressional districts was preserved.9 The black com-
munity wanted to maintain three districts in which they 
were a significant minority. Their concerns were satis-
fied by the final maps, which created one coastal district 
and three interior districts where African-Americans 
were a significant minority
The Maps and the Criteria
This examination of the mapping process found that 
the commission was ultimately successful in attempting 
to meet the six constitutional criteria for redistricting. 
The main weakness of the process was that in deter-
mining COIs, the commission relied exclusively on 
9Although all three African American members of Congress ran for 
reelection under the new lines, only two of the three (Maxine Waters 
and Karen Bass) were reelected, while Laura Richardson was defeated 
by Janice Hahn.
MAP 4: Western LA County CDs–July 24 Option
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public testimony, rather than supplementing that sub-
jective data with other types of data not derived from 
public input.
Population Equality (Criterion #1)
Until the Supreme Court intervened in the 1960s, 
congressional districts were drawn without regard for 
population disparity. At one time, the vote of one Cali-
fornian was worth as much as 422 times the vote of 
another.10 A series of court cases beginning in 1962 
brought an end to this practice and gradually moved 
the nation toward “one person, one vote” districting. 
Although the Supreme Court has avoided defining “one 
person, one vote” in a way that imposes too exacting a 
mathematical standard, equal-population districts are 
now regarded as a constitutional mandate.11 States have 
been granted somewhat more latitude than the federal 
government in drawing assembly and senate districts 
and are only required to show “substantial equality of 
population.”12
The redistricting software, Maptitude for Redis-
tricting, facilitates the creation of districts with equal or 
nearly equal populations. The software allowed mappers 
to adjust district boundaries to meet the population-
equality requirement. However, any change made to 
one district affects surrounding districts. This required 
sometimes complex and time-consuming rotations 
of population between districts to achieve population 
equality in all districts.
10Levitt, Citizen’s Guide to Redistricting.
11See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (“the Equal Protec-
tion Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort 
to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal 
population as is practicable. We realize that it is a practical impossi-
bility to arrange legislative districts so that each one has an identical 
number of residents, or citizens, or voters. Mathematical exactness or 
precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement”); and Brown 
v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983) (“We have recognized that 
some deviations from population equality may be necessary to permit 
the States to pursue other legitimate objectives such as ‘maintain[ing] 
the integrity of various political subdivisions’ and ‘provid[ing] for com-
pact districts of contiguous territory.’”).
12Reynolds, 377 U.S., at 579 (“So long as the divergences from a strict 
population standard are based on legitimate considerations incident 
to the effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations from the 
equal-population principle are constitutionally permissible with re-
spect to the apportionment of seats in either or both of the two houses 
of a bicameral state legislature.”).
The commission’s decisions about population 
deviation shifted over time, as indicated in chapter 6. 
Nonetheless, for the final maps, the commission direct-
ed Q2 to draw districts with a total deviation from the 
ideal population of less than 1 percent. In the adopted 
commission maps, the average deviation of assembly 
districts was 0.51 percent, and the average deviation of 
senate districts was 0.45 percent.13
The VRA and Minority Representation  
(Criterion #2)
An evaluation of the VRA process as it applied to the 
commission’s work appears in chapter 6. 
Geographic Contiguity (Criterion #3)
This straightforward criterion meets the basic defini-
tion of a formal region as a bounded territory created 
for a specific purpose. All of the districts are geographi-
cally contiguous.
13CRC Final Report, p. 11.
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Geographic Integrity of Communities of Interest 
(part of Criterion #4)
The most challenging aspect of the redistricting pro-
cess was the COI criterion. No agreed-upon definition 
exists for Communities of Interest (COIs), and the 
commissioners had to create their own framework. 
Much of the commission’s effort focused on gather-
ing public testimony to identify COIs. Proposition 20 
defined a COI as:
a contiguous population which shares common 
social and economic interests that should be 
included within a single district for purposes of 
effective and fair representation.14
By this definition, a COI is geographically contig-
uous.15 This precludes consideration of nongeographic 
communities (women, for example) and of “relation-
ships with political parties, incumbents, or political 
candidates.”16 The community is unified by “shared 
social and economic interests,” examples of which “are 
those common to areas in which the people share similar 
living standards, use the same transportation facilities, 
have similar work opportunities, or have access to the 
same media of communication relevant to the election 
process.”17 Such interests can be determined, in part, 
by using social and economic data. Shared living stan-
dards can be captured by income data, and similar work 
opportunities can be identified with data on education, 
income, and occupation. These data can supplement 
the collection of public input to identify communities.
The commission used a flexible concept of a geo-
graphic community in a number of cases to support 
the creation of a district. For example, the long coastal 
districts in Northern California (Assembly District 
14Cal. Const. art. XXI, § 2, subd. (d)(4) (emphasis added).
15In fact, the California Supreme Court has used the phrase together 
with “geographical integrity”: “and respect for geographical integrity 
and community of interests. … Compactness does not refer to geo-
metric shapes but to the ability of citizens to relate to each other and 
their representatives. …[I]t speaks to relationships that are facilitat-
ed by shared interests and by membership in a political community, 
including a county or city.” Wilson v. Eu, 1 Cal. 4th 707, 719 (Cal. 
1992). The court suggests not that the terms are interchangeable but 
rather that they are inextricably linked, with “community of interest” 
adding a “functional” component to “compactness”; Wilson,1 Cal. 4th 
707, at 761–63.
16Cal. Const. art. XXI, § 2, subd. (d)(4).
17Ibid.
2, Senate District 2, and Congressional District 2), 
and the long mountain districts in the Sierra Nevada 
(Assembly District 5, Senate District 8, and Congres-
sional District 4) were each based on the concept of a 
common community or regional culture related to the 
natural environment. The wine country of Napa and 
Sonoma counties was also recognized as a regional 
community. The commission broke new ground by 
defining LGBT communities, if geographically coher-
ent, as a community of interest.
The population-equality requirement made city 
and county splits inevitable. All cities with populations 
larger than the required district population had to be 
split, some among several districts. The commission 
tried to minimize splits and documented those splits it 
implemented. When available, the commission relied 
on neighborhood boundary lines provided by local gov-
ernments or organizations.18 For example, ninety-five 
neighborhood councils across the city of Los Angeles 
maintain established boundaries that were used in draw-
ing districts.19 In San Francisco, the commission used 
boundaries provided by the Council of Asian Pacific 
Americans for Fair Representation (CAPAFR). The 
split of the city of Fremont used South Bay Coalition 
lines. However, most cities do not have such divisions, 
either formal or informal.
The commission worked hard to define COIs 
through various forms of public input, including public 
hearings. Although this process provided vital informa-
tion for the commission, the subjective data could, in 
the next iteration, be supplemented with other types 
of data. Commissioner Jeanne Raya noted that some 
data beyond the public hearings would have been very 
helpful. Commissioner Michael Ward commented: “I 
had expected to apply objective criteria, and then use 
COI testimony.” However, there was little time and 
few resources available to develop such data, and pro-
ducing it in the middle of the deliberations might have 
derailed the process.
In the January 28, 2011, meeting, Q2’s Karin 
Mac Donald noted that Government Code 8253 (7) 
required the commission to “receive public input” 
before drawing any maps. In the March 24 meeting, 
18In some cases, the official neighborhood boundaries are disputed or 
in conflict.
19See http://done.lacity.org, accessed August 25, 2012.
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the commissioners heard a presentation on VRA and 
COI issues by Ana Henderson of the UC Berkeley 
Warren Institute of Law and Social Policy. In discuss-
ing COIs, Henderson told the commission that “the 
best source of information about community of interest 
is people who live in and work with communities.…
This is the criterion where the commission most needs 
to hear from the public.”20
For future commissions, with more time to plan 
in advance, additional data might reduce some of the 
burden of analyzing public testimony. For example, 
the American Community Survey of the U.S. Census 
provides estimates of social and economic informa-
tion. Commissioner Vincent Barabba, former head of 
the U.S. Census, noted that though such data would 
be preliminary, it could allow the commission to begin 
drafting geographic parameters for future mapping. 
Although these data portray broader areas than the 
block level necessary for actual mapping, they can be 
useful as a foundation. If past practice is continued, 
data gathered mid- and late decade will be useful to the 
commission. 
Three- and five-year census data are based on roll-
ing samples and cover broader areas than necessary for 
mapping, which could allow the commission to begin 
provisional drafting before the full census data is avail-
able (see sidebar). 
Additional data would also allow the commission 
to avoid the appearance or reality of being manipulated 
by elected officials and candidates, who might well send 
surrogates to make a case for communities of interest 
that mask a political agenda.
Determination of COIs ultimately required judg-
ment calls by the commission. For example, the city 
of Davis is a university town located west of Sacra-
mento. The June 10 maps placed Davis in the same 
area as Sacramento, based on perceptions of common 
interest. Members of the Davis community protested 
that they preferred to be included with surrounding 
areas other than Sacramento. Commissioner Forbes, a 
community leader in Davis, said that he favored the 
connection to Sacramento but that he and the commis-
sion deferred to what they perceived to be community 
sentiment. Although there was significant testimony 
20Commission meeting, March 24, 2011, transcript.
by local elected officials in Davis in support of keeping 
Davis and Sacramento separate, incumbent members 
of the assembly and senate also had a direct stake in 
the outcome. The June 10 maps would have placed 
three Democratic members of the assembly in the same 
district. The result was a victory both for local elected 
officials and community activists and for the legislators 
and their supporters who feared a major restructuring 
of their Sacramento- and Davis-based districts.21
Geographic Compactness (Criterion #5)
According to article XXI of the California Constitu-
tion, electoral districts “need to encourage geographical 
compactness” and not bypass nearby populations for 
populations further away, as long as this does not con-
flict with higher-level criteria.22 Any districts that are 
not compact need to be justified based on the higher-
level criteria. In their September 16, 2011, submission 
to the Supreme Court of California defending the com-
mission’s redistricting plan, the commission’s attorneys 
argued that courts and states have rejected “a purely 
geometric conception of compactness.”23 Districts are 
21Jim Sanders, “Davis-Sacramento Marriage Is Off in New Political 
Maps,” Modesto Bee, July 14, 2011. Accessed online March 10, 2013, 
http://www.modbee.com/2011/07/14/1774196_davis-sacramento-
marriage-is-off.html.
22Cal. Const. art. XXI, § 2, subd. (d)(5). 
23From the “Consolidated Preliminary Opposition to Petitions for 
Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition,” p. 44, Vandermost v. Bowen, 53 
Cal. 4th 421 (Cal. 2012), quoting Wilson, 1 Cal. 4th 707, at 719 (here, 
the court is quoting and endorsing the rationale of the special masters, 
as captured in their comprehensive “Report and Recommendations,” 
set forth in appendix 1 to the opinion). 
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considered compact if they are functionally integrated 
and residents have shared interests. 
Although compactness is a lower-priority cri-
terion, together with contiguity it is the most visual 
characteristic of a district. At a glance, districts that do 
not appear compact raise suspicions of gerrymander-
ing—the creation of spatially contiguous but utterly 
convoluted districts for political purposes. As a result, 
the commission hoped to create compact districts to 
the extent feasible. Commissioners would often refer to 
the “eye test” when reviewing draft districts and make 
sure that any oddly shaped districts could be justified 
based on the higher-level criteria. The “eye test” may 
be common, and appealing to commissioners, but it 
does not fulfill the requirements of the state constitu-
tion. The constitutional test depends on where people 
actually live. Often, city boundaries meander, and cities 
look like gerrymanders themselves; districts that follow 
city lines may, for example, have arms that stick out or 
other strange features.
For example, the following congressional districts 
are elongated: CD 2 (North Coast), CD 4 (Sierra 
Nevada), CD 8 (Eastern Sierra and San Bernardino 
County), CD 21 (Kings County), and CD 33 (Coastal 
Los Angeles). In most of these districts, the elongat-
ed shape reflects a COI: the coastal communities of 
Northern California (CD2), the Sierra Nevada and 
Tahoe Basin (CD 4), the Santa Monica Mountains and 
coastal communities of metropolitan Los Angeles (CD 
33), and the sparsely populated desert and basin com-
munities in Inyo, Mono, and San Bernardino counties 
(CD 8). The “Kern curl” drawn in each district incorpo-
rating Kings County was necessary in order to capture 
population in Bakersfield and maintain the benchmark 
minority voting populations in any Kings County dis-
trict, as required by VRA Section 5. 
City boundaries 
meander and cities 
look like gerrymanders 
themselves.
Nesting (Criterion #6)
The California Constitution states that to the extent 
possible, the eighty assembly districts should be nest-
ed in the forty senate districts, which in turn should 
be nested in the four Board of Equalization districts. 
Nesting is the lowest-order criterion for a good reason: 
it is very difficult to combine districts without violating 
higher-order criteria based on the VRA, respecting city 
and county boundaries, and representing COIs.
At the June 1 meeting, Q2 illustrated this dilemma 
for the commission by presenting a perfectly nested 
senate district map, based on the draft assembly dis-
tricts. Q2 pointed out that the Section 5 districts (those 
including Kings, Merced, Monterey, and Yuba coun-
ties) could not be perfectly nested without running afoul 
of the VRA requirement to maintain minority voting 
strength. However, in each case two assembly districts 
could be nested, after which the boundaries could be 
adjusted to meet Section 5 requirements. The same 
procedure was used for Section 2 districts, where the 
commission wanted to maintain ethnic voting strength. 
Q2 described the procedure as “blending”—nesting 
two assembly districts, then adjusting the boundaries 
to better satisfy the higher-order criteria, thus creating 
partially nested districts. Of course, drawing a blended 
district forced each surrounding district to be blended 
as well, greatly reducing the number of senate dis-
tricts that could be created from the perfect nesting of 
two assembly districts. The end result largely, though 
incompletely, satisfied the nesting criterion. Although 
only three senate districts were created by the complete 
nesting of two assembly districts, all forty senate dis-
tricts were between 65- and 100-percent nested.24 
Conclusions
The mapping process was compressed into a tight 
four-month timeframe. Had the mapping team been 
hired in January, they would have had at least two more 
months to collect public testimony and supplemental 
data in preparation for the map drawing, which began 
24CRC Final Report, p. 25.
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in March with the release of census data.25 In the next 
redistricting process, the mapping team and VRA 
counsel should be hired earlier. Better yet, the line-
drawing consultants could be hired in 2020, allowing 
ample time for the collection and evaluation of social 
and economic data, the collection of public testimony, 
and the drawing of draft maps.
The sheer volume of COI testimony made it diffi-
cult to determine its validity, catalogue it, and prioritize 
its use in the redistricting process. Public testimony 
should be gathered and collated in a more effective way. 
The commission needs to develop a systematic method 
for identifying the specific COI testimony relied upon 
in the creation of each district. In addition, before the 
commission convenes, demographic and geographic 
data should be collected to supplement public hear-
ings for the purpose of assessing COIs. Such materials, 
including information about industry and commerce, 
and urbanization and suburbanization, are available 
before the release of the full census.
Prior to the mapping process, the commission 
should collect a systematic series of data sets and maps 
for key socioeconomic variables for the population, 
including educational attainment, income, industry, 
and occupation. These could be based on the five-year 
American Community Survey samples conducted prior 
to the decennial census (e.g., 2005–9), although census 
data can be used as they are made available. Spatial sta-
tistics can be used to identify areas based on different 
socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., income, education, 
industry, etc.). This data would complement public tes-
timony gathered for the identification of COIs. Also, 
information should be collected from local and regional 
agencies (e.g., planning, water, energy) to support the 
determination of communities with shared interests.
Other boundary files are useful for the mapping 
process. These include neighborhood boundaries (such 
as the neighborhood-council borders in the city of 
Los Angeles), service districts, watersheds, councils of 
government, and so on. Before the mapping process 
begins, the commission and its mapping team should 
collect these supplementary boundary files to assist in 
determining the need for city and county splits.
25Pub. L. 94-171, 89 Stat. 1023 (1975) (codified as amended at 13 
U.S.C. § 141[c]).
The selection of the mapping consultant and the 
relationship between the commission and the map-
ping team are critical to the success of the redistricting 
process. In 2011, the commission hired an experienced 
and responsive team. Q2 followed commission direc-
tions to draw and revise maps. They were skilled in 
using the redistricting software, creating districts based 
on the parameters given by the commission, present-
ing options to the commission, and outlining possible 
impacts of a given change on adjacent districts.
Q2’s associated staff members also spent a great 
deal of time and energy staffing public input hearings, 
summarizing public input, and creating a database of 
public testimony. Q2’s four mappers were stretched 
to their limits in June and July, putting in long hours 
at night and over the weekends. Although this is part 
and parcel of the intense, compressed redistricting pro-
cess, a better-funded mapping team could employ one 
or two additional mappers to spread the workload. In 
addition, a separate consulting team should be respon-
sible for collecting and organizing public input.
Some commissioners preferred to see a map show-
ing the changes made in a revised district, instead of 
comparing two sets of maps. With more resources, 
the mapping team could devote staff to preparing map 
revisions showing the changes made between drafts. 
It would be helpful to create reports for each subre-
gion or county (e.g., southwest Los Angeles County 
or Orange County), showing the series of district maps 
created through successive revisions and documenting 
the specific reasons why a given district was built or 
revised. Though large numbers of maps would tax even 
a larger line-drawing team, a technical report for each 
district—outlining design principles, decisions, public 
input, and revisions—would be helpful.
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Compliance with the federal Voting Rights Act (VRA) was one of the commission’s highest 
constitutional obligations, and delayed VRA training for commissioners placed them at 
a disadvantage. Despite these obstacles, the commission ultimately followed a process 
that respected the VRA. At times there was a lack of clarity about whether to use voting-
age population or citizen voting-age population. With greater access to a broader range 
of data at an earlier stage, the next commission should be able to continue to respond 
effectively to the VRA.
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The Federal Voting Rights Act 
The landmark 1965 federal Voting Rights Act is a 
powerful defense against tactics that effectively disen-
franchise minority groups. Drawing from the language 
of the Fifteenth Amendment, the VRA prohibits all 
states and “political subdivisions” from applying any 
“voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or stan-
dard, practice, or procedure…in a manner which results 
in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of 
the United States to vote on account of race or color.”1 
Under the VRA, a violation is established if, “based 
on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the 
political processes leading to nomination or election in 
the State or political subdivision are not equally open to 
participation by members” of a protected class. Liability 
exists under the VRA when the members of a protected 
class “have less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to participate in the political process and to 
elect representatives of their choice.” The VRA pro-
tects opportunities for racial and language minorities 
to achieve equitable political power where conditions 
would otherwise threaten that ability. 
Two provisions of the VRA are relevant to redis-
tricting: Sections 2 and 5. The U.S. Supreme Court 
set out the standard for the evaluation of Section 2 
claims in Thornburg v. Gingles.2 Under the Gingles test, 
a violation of the VRA will only be found if (1) the 
voting-eligible minority group is “sufficiently large” to 
constitute more than half of the number required for 
an appropriately sized district; (2) the minority group 
is sufficiently “geographically compact” that it would 
naturally fall within a single district; (3) the minority 
group is “politically cohesive,” such that its interests are 
united and distinctive; and (4) racially polarized bloc 
voting demonstrably impedes the minority group’s abil-
1Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965) (Pub. L. 89-110, 
Aug. 6, 1965, 79 Stat. 437). California also has its own state Voting 
Rights Act (CVRA), passed in 2002, which provides additional pro-
tection for minority groups whose votes are effectively diluted through 
the political process but who are too geographically dispersed to fall 
under the protection of the federal VRA. The CVRA applies specifi-
cally to at-large (local) elections, and, for that reason, it was not a con-
sideration in the commission’s redistricting process. Cal. Elec. Code 
§§ 14025–32.
2Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); see also Bartlett v. Strick-
land, 556 U.S. 1 (2009).
ity to have their preferred candidate prevail. Once these 
threshold factors are met, the court will then evaluate 
the “totality of circumstances” surrounding the claim. 
Here, the court will consider everything from the racial 
content of political campaigns to the minority group’s 
particular history of facing official discrimination.3 
Section 5 of the VRA provides special protection 
for certain “covered jurisdictions.” Covered jurisdic-
tions were identified in the period between 1964 and 
1972, based on a specific formula that took into 
account the use of voting “test[s] or device[s],” along 
with voter registration and participation, as a percent-
age of the voting-age population (VAP).4 Some states 
are covered in their entirety under Section 5.5 At the 
time of the California redistricting, four California 
counties were covered under Section 5: Kings, Merced, 
Monterey, and Yuba.6 In three of the four Section 5 
counties in California, their inclusion has to do with a 
historical circumstance: the presence of military bases 
that distorted the minority composition of the voting 
population.7 
In those covered jurisdictions, a state may not 
implement any voting-related change without first 
obtaining “either judicial or administrative approval of 
the change, to ensure that it does not have the purpose 
or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on 
account of race, color, or language minority.”8 A Sec-
tion 5 analysis involves a determination of whether the 
3Gingles, 478 U.S., at 36 (these additional factors were adopted by 
the court from the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the 1982 
amendments to the Voting Rights Act and are known as the “Senate 
Factors”; S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong. (1982).
4U.S. Department of Justice, accessed September 2, 2012, http://www.
justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/about.php.
5Covered states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. As a covered state, 
the entire Arizona redistricting process had to be evaluated under Sec-
tion 5.
6Monterey and Yuba counties have been covered since 1968; Kings and 
Merced counties have been included since 1972; U.S. Department of 
Justice, accessed September 2, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/
vot/sec_5/covered.php. As of July 31, 2012, after years of litigation 
and campaigning, Merced is no longer under Section 5 scrutiny; see 
Capitol Alert, Sacramento Bee, July 31, 2012, http://blogs.sacbee.com/
capitolalertlatest/2012/07/merced-county-released-from-voting-
rights-act-scrutiny.html.
7The largely minority military population in these counties was includ-
ed in the census and therefore in the VAP, even though they typically 
register and vote in their home states.
8Vandermost, 53 Cal. 4th 421, at 479.
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proposed change will lead to a “retrogression in the 
[existing] position of racial [or language] minorities 
with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral 
franchise.”9 Section 5 holds up a jurisdiction’s existing 
plan as a “benchmark,” against which any proposed 
change must be measured. The authority for Section 
5 clearance is vested primarily in the U.S. Department 
of Justice.10
Redistricting in light of the VRA has been chal-
lenged in court, with opponents arguing that the practice 
of drawing district lines with race as the predominant 
consideration violates the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.11 However, the Supreme 
Court has consistently rejected that argument, holding 
that where the state is able to provide strong evidence 
that the Gingles conditions exist, the state has suffi-
ciently compelling reason to allow racial considerations 
to predominate in the drawing of district lines—as long 
as they do so no more than is “reasonably necessary” to 
comply with the VRA.12 The court’s interpretation is 
consistent with the VRA’s fundamental purpose: rec-
tifying electoral practices and procedures that result in 
the “denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen to 
vote on account of race or color.”13 
9Vandermost, 53 Cal. 4th 421, at 481.
10Or in a three-judge court of the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia.
11See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
12Vera, 517 U.S., at 977.
13Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Compliance with Sections 2 and 5 requires care-
ful attention to both minority demographics and 
political data. This presented a real challenge to the 
commissioners, who chose to interpret their mandate 
to neither favor nor discriminate on political grounds 
to keep them “blind” to the political consequences of 
map drawing. The VRA required the commission to 
consider whether racial polarization in voting created 
conditions that affected the ability of minority groups 
to elect members of their choice to office. In other 
words, the commissioners ignored political data in the 
case of incumbents or political parties, but at the same 
time were required by the VRA to have at least some 
understanding of how voting behavior restricts oppor-
tunities for minority influence.
The Commission and Its Process 
The commission consisted of individuals with the 
ability to negotiate these straits carefully. Commission-
ers were professionally accomplished, educated, and 
thoughtful; several had particularly relevant experience, 
including backgrounds in the social sciences and in city, 
community, and regional planning. 
The commissioners evaluated and retained legal 
counsel and mapping consultants with substantial 
expertise but did not defer blindly to them. Meeting 
transcripts indicate that the commissioners carefully 
probed the issues relevant to VRA compliance. Com-
missioners received and gave consideration to 
voting-rights groups, some of which received funding 
from The James Irvine Foundation (an example being 
the Asian Pacific American Legal Center).
Commissioners offered sophisticated pushback to 
the advice of counsel and consultants, testing not only 
the definitions of terms and the reliability of data but 
also the degree of ambiguity inherent in the law and 
the extent to which their consultants’ advice revealed 
preferences but not requirements. At times, discus-
sion between VRA counsel and some commissioners 
became charged. According to Commissioner Maria 
Blanco, some commissioners disagreed strongly with 
the early advice given by their VRA counsel, feeling 
that it relied too heavily on the lesser criterion of “com-
pactness.”
Compliance with 
Sections 2 and 5 requires 
careful attention to both 
minority demographics 
and political data.
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Training and Data Delays
Even with their level of experience and education, the 
commission would have benefited from earlier training 
in the nuances of the VRA, which would have leveled 
the field between those commissioners who knew the 
VRA well and those who did not. The need for such 
training was recognized early on but was long deferred. 
The first group of eight commissioners received some 
VRA training, and the next six members were encour-
aged to view the video record of the training. The first 
meaningful training for the full commission occurred 
on March 24. The training reviewed the relevant legal 
requirements, as the commission requested, but did not 
suggest how the commission should structure its work 
so as to ensure compliance—neither the data the com-
mission should seek nor the process it should pursue. 
The first hints of such advice had to wait until April 28, 
more than a month later. 
Several factors appeared to delay any detailed train-
ing. The commission tentatively scheduled an initial 
training session for February 25, but the presenter was 
unavailable. The plan to delegate the training to VRA 
counsel meant that the time required to hire counsel 
delayed training as well. Ultimately, the commission 
had to wait until late April to get its first formal 
instruction on how it should go about ensuring VRA 
compliance. Perhaps not surprisingly, the June 10 maps 
were criticized for inadequate attention to the VRA.
The commission also ran into delays in acquir-
ing related data. Estimated demographic data from 
the census were available in late 2010 and early 2011; 
though not perfect, this data would have allowed the 
commission to focus in a preliminary way on areas of 
particular concern and thus would have allowed them 
to start their work earlier. 
Polarized voting analysis refers to studies of the 
impact of group voting patterns on the opportunities 
for minority communities to elect candidates of their 
choice. Such research is vital to ensuring that district 
maps comply with the VRA. Election data—particu-
larly local voting patterns by race and ethnicity, gleaned 
from careful statistical analysis of precinct-by-precinct 
election results over multiple cycles—are required to 
assess VRA compliance. Without understanding local 
voting patterns, it is very difficult to tell whether minor-
ity communities’ practical ability to elect candidates of 
choice has been impaired for VRA purposes. Without 
such information, it is equally difficult to tell whether 
new district lines preserve or restore such opportunity. 
The census does not provide this information, and the 
Statewide Database, which otherwise served as Cali-
fornia’s central repository of redistricting information, 
collected only portions of the required information.14 
Polarized voting analysis was not obtained until 
very late in the process. The commissioners understood 
that they should begin gathering polarized voting data 
from “day one.” Yet the contracting process for a con-
sultant to collect and analyze this data began only on 
April 27. The consultant began work by June 16, even 
before the contract was completely finalized, but this 
was still an exceptionally late start. Not until June 24 
did the commission start getting hints of the results 
of the analysis; the results in Los Angeles—neces-
sarily incomplete due to the rush of time—were not 
formalized until July 13, at which point just sixteen 
days remained in the map-drawing process, making it 
exceedingly difficult to change course if necessary or to 
test the near-final drafts to ensure that they complied 
with the VRA. Even if the commission had contracted 
immediately for this research, extending it to the full 
statewide range would have been difficult due to time 
and funding limitations.
The absence of this data created difficulties in ensur-
ing compliance with the VRA. Drawing districts where 
race or ethnicity outweighs all other considerations is 
constitutional only as long as doing so is “reasonably 
necessary” to achieve VRA compliance. In order to pre-
cisely assess potential VRA liability, the commission 
needed voting data, such as historical minority support 
for preferred candidates in various regions of the state 
and the extent to which majority preferences regularly 
coalesced against those candidates.
Similarly, voting data are essential to an accurate 
determination of whether the proposed new districts 
would effectively restore minority influence to VRA-
14The Statewide Database collected some statewide voting data for 
use in polarization studies but lacked the most critical information—
namely, data from legislative primaries (which is most useful in a state 
like California with polarized partisan pockets) and data from local 
elections. More important, the database was not equipped to analyze 
the raw data to assess the degree of racial polarization.
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compliant conditions. In the absence of this data, the 
commissioners did what they could. For example, they 
began in the right place by asking their mapping con-
sultant to begin in counties covered by Section 5 of 
the VRA, with instructions to provide summaries of 
available options. The commissioners then asked the 
consultant to identify sizable and geographically com-
pact minority groups that could potentially implicate 
Section 2 of the VRA. 
Without the data to accurately assess the VRA 
factors, the commission attempted to draw districts in 
pockets with large minority populations around nonra-
cial criteria, acknowledging race and ethnicity but not 
allowing either to drive the district boundaries. When 
such districts actually provide minority communities 
with an effective opportunity to elect candidates of 
choice, there is no concern with such a practice. But 
when such districts do not do so, and voting patterns 
implicate the VRA, compliance requires an adjustment.
To be clear, these serious process difficulties do not 
mean that the commission produced noncompliant 
final maps. In general, the commissioners recognized, 
quite early, that drafts would change substantially with 
better data, and they strove to accommodate changes 
that were recognized as necessary; but the process was 
made unnecessarily difficult by the delay in receiving 
the data. 
The commission attempted to substitute public 
input from local communities for data that had not yet 
arrived. The commission carefully considered local tes-
timony, for example, concerning the electoral success of 
the African American community in Los Angeles and 
the functional compactness of the Latino community 
in Anaheim and Santa Ana. However, when the rel-
evant data finally started to come in and VRA liability 
became apparent, data proxies were appropriately dis-
carded. 
The commission also struggled with how to use 
the data it did receive. In determining whether districts 
actually provided minority communities with “effective 
exercise of the electoral franchise,” the commission at 
times focused, based in part on counsel’s advice, on the 
demographics of the voting-age population. Demo-
graphics reveal how many adults can be found in the 
district but without attention to citizenship (especially 
in a state like California, with many noncitizens) may 
give a limited view of the political potential of repre-
sentation. 
In contrast, the Department of Justice, in its guide 
to redistricting under the VRA, stresses registration 
rates and turnout.15 Such electoral factors would have 
been especially helpful in illuminating VRA liability 
in those districts in which minority communities were 
teetering at the threshold of 50 percent of the district’s 
Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP).16
In order to ensure compliance with the VRA, future 
commissions must focus on ensuring effective exercise 
of the franchise by minority populations. This requires 
an emphasis on eligible citizens (Citizen Voting Age 
Population) rather than merely voting-age population 
(VAP). The commission will require analysis of polar-
ization, registration rates, and past turnout in order 
to gauge whether particular districts actually afford a 
pragmatic “opportunity” or “ability” to elect candidates 
of choice.
Finally, the issue of population disparity was knot-
ty. Electoral districts must be equal in population. And 
yet some “disparity” from perfect equality is inevita-
ble. As described above, the Supreme Court has held 
that states have somewhat more flexibility in drawing 
15Department of Justice, Guidance Concerning Redistricting under Sec-
tion 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 76 FR 7470-01 (2011) (although the 
specific focus of this guide is on Section 5 compliance, the analysis is 
also helpful for Section 2 purposes). 
16By the same token, it is possible that past voting data would indicate 
that districts below the 50-percent threshold do offer a meaningful 
opportunity to elect candidates of choice. The point is not that the 
resulting districts did not comply with the VRA but rather that the 
commission could not be sure whether they complied or not.
2%
The commission eventually 
approved a standard 
permitting a total deviation of 
no more than 2%.
NOTEWORTHY
61When the People Draw the Lines    League of Women Voters of California
CHAPTER 6
The Voting Rights Act
assembly and senate districts and are only required to 
show “substantial equality of population” compared to 
the requirements for drawing congressional districts.
Flexibility in how far districts can deviate from 
perfect population equality means ambiguity for those 
tasked with drawing the lines. The commission strug-
gled to adopt a consistent standard. VRA counsel first 
recommended that districts deviate no more than 2 
percent, even when drawing for purposes of the VRA.17 
On the same day, the commission left itself a more flex-
ible standard for preliminary drafts: as little deviation 
as possible, but up to ±5 percent deviation from the ide-
al, with an explanation of any deviation over 2 percent. 
On May 27, the commission revised its standards with 
respect to preliminary drafts: as little deviation as pos-
sible for the preliminary drafts, up to a total of 5 percent 
deviation. However, the same day, it adopted a much 
more restrictive standard for the final maps: no more 
than 1 percent total deviation, including districts drawn 
for purposes of the VRA. On June 16, it asked Q2 to 
flag deviations over 1 percent that would aid compli-
ance with the VRA. But two weeks later, it rejected the 
attempt to effectuate any deviation over 1 percent total. 
Finally, on July 3, the commission approved a standard 
permitting a total deviation of no more than 2 percent, 
with greater deviation permitted where required to 
comply with the VRA.
Technically, this final standard should in no way 
have impaired compliance with the VRA, because 
exceptions to the restrictive general standard are 
expressly authorized where the VRA makes the excep-
tions necessary. However, for the entire critical drafting 
17Commission Meeting, April 28, 2011, transcript.
period of June, the commission operated under a dif-
ferent standard: no more than 1 percent total deviation, 
VRA obligation or not. Commissioners communicated 
this standard firmly to the mapping consultants. And 
despite the commission’s belated request to flag dis-
tricts for which greater population deviations would aid 
compliance with the VRA, it is not clear that any such 
deviations were identified. (It is, of course, possible that 
no such configurations existed.) 
Conclusions 
 
The commission’s work begins with the commissioners. 
The commissioners were adept at technical and legal 
analysis and were savvy consumers of technical and 
legal advice, with the will and ability to push back when 
appropriate. They also benefitted from having several 
individuals among them with experience and expertise 
in applying the VRA to redistricting problems. 
Despite the problems associated with late training 
and the lack of timely data, the commission effectively 
pursued a process that gave appropriate attention to 
the VRA. Although the courts are the ultimate arbiters 
regarding whether the final maps were in legal compli-
ance, the evidence of the commission’s work and the 
lack of successful legal challenges suggests that the 
commission was successful.
The late arrival of electoral data, and the limited 
analysis of that data due to its late assembly, became 
significant impediments. In addition to data present-
ly collected by the Statewide Database, a designated 
organization or team should collect the data needed for 
a full racially polarized voting analysis well before the 
commission assembles. 
At the very least, substantial portions of the data 
collection can be completed in the years before the 
commission takes office. Because of its significant 
research potential, this project might attract outside 
support from private foundations and other agencies 
that support demographic and electoral study. 
Many of the process concerns above come back to 
extreme time pressure. Some of that pressure can be alle-
viated if a body prepares logistically for the commission 
before it forms, so that commissioners need not build 
an agency from the ground up once they are appointed. 
Many of the process 
concerns above  
come back to extreme 
time pressure.
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There are also other means to save time. A first 
effort to gather citizen input concerning COIs can 
be moved earlier in the process. Data can be collected 
and analyzed earlier. Commissioners can also begin 
drawing tentative districts eligible for VRA protection 
earlier, using estimated data released by the census for 
the prior year. As a result of the imprecision of these 
estimates, districts built upon them will have to be 
revised; however, commissioners can develop familiar-
ity with the trickiest issues by using preliminary data to 
flesh out options. Doing so carries the risk that com-
missioners will become attached to configurations that 
will have to change once better data arrives. But with 
constant reminders about the tentative status of the 
initial options, this “practice” should help reveal diffi-
culties that this commission discovered only belatedly, 
as well as tradeoffs that this commission never had the 
chance to consider fully in the pressure of late July.
VRA training was on this commission’s wish list for 
months before it was carried out. Future commissions 
should ensure that they receive such training much 
earlier. Moreover, future commissions should ask for a 
step-by-step recommendation for how they should go 
about redistricting, including incremental data to be 
gathered, decisions to be made, and the realistic dura-
tion of each step along the way. Many groups around 
the state have experience drawing legally compliant dis-
tricts—and, of course, this commission could now itself 
produce an enormously helpful step-by-step guide.
This commission was wise to begin in areas with 
substantial minority populations, out of concern for 
VRA compliance. And it is reasonable to begin in those 
areas by testing to see whether race-neutral principles 
provide political opportunity for minority groups—as 
long as there is a firm, shared commitment to override 
those race-neutral principles if it becomes clear that the 
VRA requires such action. Districts must be drawn and 
reviewed for VRA compliance early, before the formu-
lation of adjacent districts and well before the release of 
any districts as drafts to the public. 
Assuming no change in the California Constitution, 
future commissions should adopt this commission’s 
final approach to population disparity in regard to the 
VRA. That does not mean adopting the same final 
deviations in the districts produced; rather, it means 
having the same commitment to looking beyond any 
artificial threshold in order to ensure compliance with 
the VRA. Future commissions must be sure to care-
fully investigate deviations beyond the norm, in order 
to make sure that an artificial threshold does not fore-
close avenues of compliance not otherwise apparent in 
an unduly restrictive regime.
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The bulk of the redistricting calendar and a major share of the budget went toward the 
selection process. The recommendations in this report suggest a different timeline for the 
next iteration of citizens redistricting. The process should begin earlier and there should 
be considerably more attention and budget devoted to preparing the commission for its 
task of deliberation. Though the overall budget for the 2010–12 redistricting was reason-
able, adjustments should be made to increase resources for commission outreach and 
for preparation of the commission. Less money and time are needed to recruit applicants 
for commission positions. 
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Timeline
The commission process devoted considerably more 
attention to the selection of commissioners than to the 
preparation and deliberations of the commission. As a 
result, commissioners felt compelled to take a greater 
role in the operations of the commission than they 
might otherwise have done. 
The timeline for the first iteration devoted the 
most calendar time to selection of commissioners. The 
BSA began its efforts on commissioner selection in 
January 2009, and the first commissioners were seat-
ed in December 2010. The first ten months of that 
nearly two-year period involved the development of 
regulations for the selection process. The Secretary of 
State’s office entered the picture in the spring of 2010, 
but its public work in helping the commission get off 
the ground organizationally occupied less than two 
months. The commission’s core deliberations occupied 
eight months, substantially less than half the time spent 
on commissioner selection.
This report proposes a timeline for the next com-
mission that reduces the time devoted to commissioner 
selection, increases the time allocated to commission 
preparation, allows for the collection of data on COIs 
separate from public hearings, and extends the commis-
sion’s deliberation period. The next commission should 
have more time to do its work,1 with the commission in 
place at least five months earlier in the process than was 
the 2011 commission. The proposed timeline divides 
the phases nearly evenly and allows more time for the 
commission’s deliberations.
Budget Priorities
Proposition 11 required the state of California to pro-
vide funds for the citizen redistricting process “sufficient 
to meet the estimated expenses…in implementing the 
redistricting process required by this act for a three-year 
period, including, but not limited to, adequate funding 
for a statewide outreach program to solicit broad public 
participation in the redistricting process.” 
1This report concurs with the commission’s recommendation for an 
additional six months for its deliberations, an extension that the legis-
lature shortened to four and a half months. Even the approved exten-
sion will be a major help.
Components by Phase Percent  
of State  
Funding
Selection of Commissioners 4,028,726 38.6
Transition Process to  
Commission
125,000 1.2
Commission Cost  
(Deliberation)
2,966,274 28.4
Commission Cost  
(Post-deliberation)†
3,329,728 31.9‡
Total State Funding 10,449,728
Selected Commission Cost Items
Line Drawers (Q2) 592,466
Legal
Gibson Dunn & Crutcher 1,098,697
Morrison & Foerster§ 705,394
Meeting Costs 307,712
Commissioner  
Compensation
718,200
Commissioner Travel 264,176
TABLE 8: Proposed Timeline Breakdown for 
2021 Redistricting Process
Months
Selection of Commissioners 12
Preparation of Commission 13
Commission Deliberations* 13
Post-mapping Wind-down 12
Totals 50
*From seating of the commission in August 2020 until completion of 
the final maps in August 2021.
*See http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting_handouts_062 
012/handouts_20120607_crc_finalcosts_draft.pdf, accessed August 
25, 2012.
**This amount includes the grants listed in the report along with two 
grants to UC Berkeley to prepare memoranda to inform the commis-
sion on VRA matters.
†This amount includes litigation costs.
‡Percentages do not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.
§Morrison & Foerster was brought in by the commission to work with 
Gibson Dunn & Crutcher on the litigation.
Declaration of Cost Estimates by the Commission*
State Funding $10,449,728
The James Irvine Foundation 3,466,560**
TABLE 9. Budget for Redistricting Process
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Design of the Commission (Start: Feb. 2019)
	 Begin regulation process 
	 Hold interested-persons meetings
	 Present draft regulations
	 Seek public comment on draft regulations
	 Revise and adopt regulations
	 Conduct Department of Justice Section 5 preclearance of 
regulations
	 Begin outreach by community organizations to underrepre-
sented groups for participation in the redistricting process
	 Select organization to prepare commission deliberation 
process
Selection of the Commissioners 
(Start: No later than Aug. 15, 2019)
	 Begin commissioner selection process
	Work with census-count committees to advertise open-
ings; embed redistricting message into census outreach
	 Submit Invitation for Public Bidding (IPB) from private 
resources (see sidebar in chapter 4)
	 Begin meeting with organized groups to recruit applicants
	 Identify and implement strategies to reach underrepre-
sented groups
	 Conduct broad and targeted outreach utilizing mainstream 
and ethnic media as well as community organizations
	 Establish Applicant Review Panel
	 Close application period
	 Publicize the names in the applicant pool and provide 
copies of their applications to the Applicant Review Panel 
(March 15, 2020)
	 Conduct initial screening
	 Accept secondary applications
	 Applicant Review Panel presents its subpools of recom-
mended applicants to the Secretary of the Senate and the 
Chief Clerk of the Assembly (by May 15, 2020)
	 Conduct interviews
	 Hire staff for preparing commission and setting up office 
space, telephone, website, and email accounts
	 Select all commissioners by August 15, 2020
	 Seat full commission
Preparation of the Commission, Part 1 (Start: Feb. 15, 2020)
	 Planning organization begins work
	 Begin recruiting polarization scholars
	 Initiate study of racially polarized voting 
	 Background research on staff and consultant needs for 
commission
	 Adopt staff-hiring criteria
	 Develop outreach plan and hire outreach consultant
	 Initiate objective study of COIs
	 Conduct analysis of census data, either by an agency or 
contractor (for COI purposes)
	 Begin collecting demographic data (ACS survey results 
for 2018 are released in September 2019, and results for 
2014–18 are released in December 2019)
	 Find and reserve meeting place for the commission’s 
deliberations
	 Conduct any other organizational tasks that can be pre-
pared in advance of the commission’s seating
Preparation of the Commission, Part 2 (Start: Aug. 16, 2020)
	 Begin training for full commission immediately, including 
VRA and guidance on diversity and intergroup commu-
nication; if necessary, training for original commissioners 
should be repeated for the full group
	 Hire support staff
	 Adopt criteria for hiring consultants (line-drawing contrac-
tor, counsel, VRA counsel, polarization specialists) 
	 Conduct first round of public hearings
Commission Deliberations (Start: Sep. 2020)
	 Take note of ACS data release (ACS survey results for 
2019 are released in September 2020, and results for 
2015–19 are released in December 2020)
	 Begin examination of VRA districts
	 Draw VRA districts
	 Release first-draft maps (no later than May 1, 2021)
	 Solicit public comment on first-draft maps
	 Release second-draft maps (no later than June 15, 2021)
	 Solicit public comment on second-draft maps
	 Change draft maps based on public comment
	 Release final maps (August 2021)
	 Conduct Department of Justice Section 5 preclearance
Post-mapping Phase (Start: August 2021) (End: Jan. 2022)
	 Procedural wind-down, including wrapping up and any 
preparations for next commission
	 Litigation defense related to the final maps
A Timeline for the Next Citizens Redistricting Commission in California, 2019–22*
*This proposed timeline fully incorporates the changes implemented 
by SB 1096, signed into law by Governor Jerry Brown on September 7, 
2012, An Act to Amend Sections 8251, 8252, 8252.5, 8253, and 
8253.6 of the California Government Code, Relating to Redistrict-
ing, 2012 Statutes, Chapter 271.
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Section 8253.6 of the state constitution (as amend-
ed by Prop 11) requires that the appropriation must be 
equal to or larger than two baseline amounts: $3 million 
“or the amount expended…in the immediately preced-
ing redistricting process…adjusted by the cumulative 
change in the California Consumer Price Index.” The 
budget estimate of $3 million proved far too low, espe-
cially once the voters added congressional redistricting 
to the commission’s charge. The number had been cho-
sen to match the Legislative Analyst’s estimate of costs 
for the unsuccessful 2005 redistricting ballot measure.2 
The law mandates that the budget level for the 
subsequent redistricting be built on the foundation of 
actual expenditures on the previous round. In order 
to ascertain the projected amount for the next round 
of redistricting, the cost of the 2011 model provides a 
baseline. Thus there are serious budget implications to 
any assessment of the real cost of the 2011 process. 
Upon completion of its work, the commission 
determined that the state’s final cost for the redistrict-
ing process had been more than $10 million. The state 
government largely provided the funds required to com-
plete the commission’s work, based on a series of budget 
requests put together by the commission staff. The com-
mission noted that The James Irvine Foundation sup-
port for outreach amounted to more than $3 million.3
A comparison to Arizona’s citizen redistricting 
process suggests that the overall budget of the Cali-
fornia process was reasonable, although this report 
suggests that the priorities within that budget should 
be changed for the next iteration. 
In Arizona, the Independent Redistricting Com-
mission (IRC) was formed following the passage of a 
ballot measure (Prop 106) in 2000. The Arizona Con-
stitution as amended by Prop 106 requires that “the 
legislature shall make the necessary appropriations by 
a majority vote” for redistricting expenses.4 The leg-
islature appropriated $6 million for the commission 
2Email communication from Kathay Feng.
3Though the commission’s report indicates that the outreach work 
conducted by The James Irvine Foundation was “required by the Con-
stitution,” this does not mean that the foundation had to perform it. It 
does suggest that the budgets for future commissions should include 
some of the functions mentioned in the constitution that the founda-
tion performed.
4Arizona Fiscal Year 2012 Appropriations Report, p. 136, http://www.
azleg.gov/jlbc/12app/irc.pdf.
in fiscal year 2001. The commission then received an 
additional $4,203,000 from the general fund in fiscal 
year 2004 to cover the costs of ten years of litigation.5 
The total appropriation was $10,203,000.6 The IRC 
spent slowly in its first year and then accelerated. Its 
heaviest expenditures came in fiscal years 2002–4. Over 
the course of its nine-year cycle, the commission spent 
$9,554,100. Spending for California’s and Arizona’s 
redistricting was comparable, but given California’s 
significantly larger size, the cost was far lower when 
measured as cost per congressional district.
For the 2011 Arizona redistricting process, the 
state provided somewhat less funding than the preced-
ing round had received. For fiscal year 2011, the state 
included only $500,000 in the budget, considering that 
the first year would have less activity than the previous 
cycle. For fiscal year 2012, a sum of $3,000,000 was 
authorized.7 Partisan conflict over redistricting was sub-
stantially greater in 2011 than in the 2001 redistricting 
5Ibid., p. 215.
6Information on the Arizona redistricting budget was generously pro-
vided by Raymond F. Blandine, Commission Executive Director, and 
Kristina Gomez, Deputy Executive Director.
7Arizona Fiscal Year 2012 Appropriations Report, p. 136.
TABLE 10. Spending on First-time Independent 
Commissions in California and Arizona
California 
(2009–12)
Arizona 
(2001–10)
Government $10,449,728 $10,203,000 
(authorized)
Private (The James Irvine  
Foundation)*
$3,466,560 no private  
funding
Total $13,763,053 $9,554,100 
(spent)
Population (2010) 37,253,956 6,392,017
Congressional Seats 
(2012)
53 9
Spending Per Congressio-
nal Seat (public)
$152,953 $1,061,567
*The James Irvine Foundation made grants totaling $3,548,325 
regarding redistricting. Of this amount, $388,325 was for research 
and evaluation regarding redistricting. For this study, I have sub-
tracted the latter amount because it was not for duties related to 
the operation of the commission. The majority of the funds were to 
supplement the outreach program of the BSA and the commission, 
obligations included in Prop 11.
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cycle. Disputes arose over the funding of the commis-
sion, and money had to be allocated for legal defense 
against lawsuits by the state attorney general regarding 
open-meeting laws. In March 2012, the Arizona com-
mission threatened to take legal action against the state 
if it did not provide the funding required to defend the 
commission against challenges to its chairperson by the 
governor and the legislature.8
The composition of expenditures differed between 
the two states. For example, Arizona provided no com-
pensation for commissioners other than reimbursement 
for direct expenses. For the second iteration in Arizona, 
the line-drawing contract was larger than that allocat-
ed to Q2 in California, despite the much-larger scope 
of the mapping process in California. Arizona’s line-
drawing firm, Strategic Telemetry, received $682,450 
for work in a one-year period from July 2011 through 
June 2012. Since commissioners were appointed in 
Arizona from a list of nominees, rather than through 
the extensive process of vetting as in California, the 
front-end costs of selecting commissioners were some-
what lower.
Preparing the Next Round’s Budget
The 2011 California redistricting process had to be 
invented from scratch; budget decisions were made in 
light of the requirements of Prop 11 and the extreme 
press of time on the commission itself. With the ben-
efits of hindsight and foresight, planners can realign 
some expenditures for the next iteration. Though the 
state constitution now sets the level of state support as 
equal to that of the previous redistricting, adjusted by 
the cost of living, the next California commission will 
certainly need a careful justification of all expenditures. 
The 2011 commission proposed that the next round 
of redistricting budget for the four and a half addition-
al months that the legislature granted in response to 
the commission request for an extra six months. The 
commission estimated that this extra time would cost 
8Christopher Conover, “Senate Gives Redistricting Commission One 
Dollar,” Arizona Public Media, March 7, 2012, https://www.azpm.
org/p/indepth/2012/3/7/93-senate-gives-redistricting-commission-
one-dollar/.
$1,017,103.9 A careful examination of the needs of the 
next commission may lead to adjustments in that esti-
mate if the scope of work is spread out over a longer 
period of time.
Because the State Auditor already has regulations 
in place, less time and expense should be devoted to 
the selection process. A BSA contract for a general 
outreach effort for commissioner selection is not neces-
sary. The language of Prop 11 seems to suggest that the 
outreach priority should be with the commission itself: 
“adequate funding for a statewide outreach program to 
solicit broad public participation in the redistricting pro-
cess” (emphasis added). 
The next time around, organized groups are likely 
to generate a great deal of the publicity, encouraging 
people to apply for commissioner positions. In addition, 
with time to plan in advance, the state can publicize the 
availability of positions through voting materials sent 
to all registered voters in scheduled elections. The out-
reach conducted by the U.S. Census may be helpful as 
well. In this way, some funds can be reserved for the 
commission’s own outreach and to replace some of The 
James Irvine Foundation funds dedicated to the 2011 
process.
More money should be allocated to obtaining data 
that can assist the commission, including data on COIs 
and polarized voting analyses. 
The commissioners arguably worked nearly full 
time from February through August. A better-orga-
nized deliberation process, with greater use of staff, 
might require fewer commissioner meetings, especially 
of committees, and less involvement by commissioners 
in administrative matters. The same level of commis-
sioner compensation spread over ten years would allow 
the commissioners to assist the next citizen body with-
out suffering undue financial hardship.
Commissioner travel costs can be reduced by con-
ducting hearings differently, for example, by using 
distance technology and not requiring all commis-
sioners to attend all hearings. (Arizona used a similar 
model of commissioner division of labor.)10 This plan 
might also reduce the overall cost of public meetings. 
9See http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting_handouts_062 
012/handouts_20120607_crc_finalcosts_draft.pdf, accessed August 
25, 2012. 
10Interview with Jennifer Steen, Arizona State University.
68 League of Women Voters of California    When the People Draw the Lines
CHAPTER 7
Timeline and Budget
Clearly there are difficulties with this approach if it 
reduces the ability of the commission to maintain close 
contact with the public. However, new technologies are 
likely to help bridge the gap between commissioners 
and the public.
Conclusions
Time pressure was a key issue in the 2011 redistricting 
process. Too much time went to the commissioner-
selection process. In the next round, more time should 
be devoted to preparing the commission for their delib-
erations and to the deliberation process itself. Because 
the first commission established certain aspects of the 
process, and the BSA now has regulations for commis-
sioner selection in place, this should not be difficult to 
implement. 
Likewise, less of the budget, especially for outreach, 
should be devoted to recruiting and selection of com-
missioners, and more should go to the commission’s 
work. 
Though the 2011 commission cost far more than 
the initial $3 million assessment, comparison with 
Arizona’s redistricting process suggests that commis-
sion costs were reasonable. Addressing the types of 
staffing issues cited earlier in this report, and relying 
more on technology, might reduce the number of meet-
ings needed and the travel required for commissioners, 
thereby bringing certain costs down.
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The California citizen redistricting process was largely successful in meeting the man-
dated goals of a nonpartisan and transparent process, with a level of incumbent influence 
that was considerably lower than in previous redistricting efforts. The final maps survived 
legal challenge, and the commission’s work was regarded positively by a majority of the 
voters. In 2012, the first test of the commission’s maps provided evidence that the new 
district lines caused significant turnover in elected offices. However, to succeed in the 
next iteration, the commission will have to have more time, be better supported and orga-
nized, and obtain access to a wider range of demographic and economic data.
Ca
lifo
rn
ia 
Ci
tiz
en
s R
ed
ist
ric
tin
g 
Co
m
m
iss
ion
70 League of Women Voters of California    When the People Draw the Lines
CHAPTER 8
Assessments and Looking to the Future
Overall, the California citizen redistricting process was 
a success. Although there were flaws in the design and 
execution of the plan, future efforts can build on the 
foundation it created and implemented. Those who 
developed the new redistricting program first won 
an uphill election and then saw their program imple-
mented. They had devoted great attention to detailing 
how commissioners were selected, and the care paid off. 
The process of selecting commissioners was conducted 
in public view, with clear guidelines and with careful 
direction from the State Auditor. The decision to lodge 
the selection process in the hands of a nonpartisan office 
somewhat shielded from political control turned out to 
be wise one. An aggressive campaign, both by the audi-
tor and by outside organizations, led more than 30,000 
Californians to apply to become commissioners.
Detailed criteria reduced some of the potential 
for conflicts of interest within the commissioner pool. 
Incumbent elected officials had little influence over 
the selection of commissioners, except for the ability 
to eliminate names near the end of the process. The 
“striking” provision was a useful tool to make certain 
that problematic commissioners did not make it past 
the BSA’s filters.
The selected commissioners were a diverse group, 
some with extensive experience in public life and oth-
ers new to such challenges. There were problems in 
dividing the selection process into two phases, one to 
select the first eight and one to allow the first group 
to choose the last six. The commission’s formation in 
two separate parts added to the time required to cre-
ate a cohesive group and VRA training was truncated 
between the two sets of commissioners. But when they 
came together for their first formal meetings in January 
2011, the commissioners were enthusiastic and ener-
getic about the task ahead.
Although the commissioners believed strongly in 
public input, they were surprised and at times over-
whelmed by the volume of public comment that they 
received. Attendance at public hearings was greater 
than expected, and the massive amount of email they 
received represented a challenge for each commissioner.
Despite a calendar that was highly unrealistic given 
the scope of the task, the commission completed its work 
on time, issuing a first set of draft maps on June 10 and 
its final maps by the mandated date of August 15, 2011.
The work of the commission earned majority votes 
from all three required groups of commissioners: Dem-
ocrats, Republicans, and those not aligned with either 
major party. The commission was required by law to 
have votes on substantive matters with separate majori-
ties of the five Republicans, the five Democrats, and the 
four nonaligned commissioners. Two Republican com-
missioners voted against all or part of the final product. 
Republican Commissioner Michael Ward voted no 
on all the maps, indicating that his objections were 
to a process he considered partisan and insufficiently 
transparent. He indicated, however, that he opposed 
a subsequent ballot measure sponsored by Republican 
activists seeking to invalidate the state senate maps. 
Another Republican commissioner, Jodie Filkins Web-
ber, voted against only the congressional maps.
The maps survived strenuous legal challenges in 
state and federal courts with no adverse judicial deci-
sions. In a unanimous 7–0 decision upholding the state 
senate maps, the California Supreme Court noted, 
“Not only do the Commission-certified Senate districts 
appear to comply with all of the constitutionally-man-
dated criteria set forth in California Constitution, 
article XXI, the Commission-certified Senate districts 
also are a product of what generally appears to have 
been an open, transparent and nonpartisan redistricting 
process as called for by the current provisions of article 
XXI.”1 The United States District Court also dismissed 
a legal challenge to the commission’s maps.
Voters responded positively to the work of the com-
mission. The Field Organization tested public opinion 
1Vandermost, 53 Cal. 4th 421, 484 (2012).
2 to 1
Among voters familiar with the 
commission’s work, approval 
outweighed disapproval by 
nearly 2 to 1.
NOTEWORTHY
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on a measure targeted for the November 2012 ballot to 
overturn the state senate maps. One-third of Califor-
nia’s voters were familiar with the commission’s work, 
and of those who were aware, approval outweighed 
disapproval by nearly 2 to 1. Among all voters, only 
29 percent supported overturning the state-senate lines 
drawn by the commission.2 
The commission’s open process was a significant 
improvement over previous California redistricting 
efforts, which were dominated by insiders and opaque 
to the public. In a comparative study of transparency of 
state governing processes in which the state received a 
B- overall, the citizen redistricting process received an 
A, with a score of 100 percent.3 
This study mainly focuses on the process of design-
ing and implementing the redistricting commission. 
Others have explored the mapping process in greater 
detail, comparing the results to the criteria embod-
ied in the state constitution by Props 11 and 20. Two 
independent studies conducted for this report4 demon-
strated that the commission was effective in following 
accepted techniques and processes in mapping (see 
chapter 5) and in following a decision-making process 
that generally met accepted standards for address-
ing VRA issues (see chapter 6). A study conducted by 
Nicholas Stephanopoulus found that the final maps 
generally respected COIs.5
Vladimir Kogan and Eric McGhee concluded that 
the commission achieved the main substantive goals of 
Prop 11.6 Specifically, they determined that the com-
mission had made a significant improvement over the 
2001 redistricting plan according to Prop 11’s criteria. 
Furthermore, they found important improvements 
between the June 10 and August maps, in areas such as 
minority access to representation. Kogan and McGhee 
also found that “the 2011 commission plans represented 
a modest improvement on the 2001 legislative redis-
tricting in terms of preserving the integrity of existing 
2Field Poll, Release #2389, September 22, 2011.
3Center for Public Integrity, accessed August 25, 2012, http://www.
stateintegrity.org/california_survey_redistricting. 
4Conducted by Mark Drayse and Justin Levitt, respectively.
5Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, “Communities and the Commission,” 
Stanford Law and Policy Review 23 (2012): 19.
6Vladimir Kogan and Eric McGhee, “Redistricting California: An 
Evaluation of the Citizens Commission’s Final Plans,” California Jour-
nal of Politics and Policy 4 (2012): 35–36. 
communities.” The commission drew more compact 
districts than had the legislature ten years before. The 
commission reached a nearly perfect level of nesting in 
its June maps, but adjustments to achieve other man-
dated goals reduced nesting somewhat; nevertheless, it 
remained at a higher level than in 2001.
The 2012 Elections and  
Citizen Redistricting
In 2012, the work of the commission received a signifi-
cant, real-world test, with primary and general elections 
for Congress and for the state legislature. The simul-
taneous presence of a second reform—the top-two 
primary—complicates assessments of the indepen-
dent impact of the citizen redistricting process.7 A 
study commissioned by the Public Policy Institute of 
California (PPIC) examined the impact of both elec-
toral reforms.8 Though the top-two primary created 
the most remarkable changes, the authors concluded 
that “the new districts also altered the electoral land-
scape, leading many incumbents to pass on reelection, 
forcing others to introduce themselves to unfamil-
iar voters, and increasing the number of competitive 
races overall.” When a redistricting process is not built 
around the electoral interests of incumbents, the pos-
sibility of competitive races increases simply because 
incumbency reduces competition: “The state now has 
38 new assemblymembers, 9 new state senators, and 14 
new members of Congress.”9
Overall, the citizen redistricting achieved a goal that 
was not in the law itself but that was consistent with 
its spirit: shaking up the incumbent-centered world of 
California politics. Though Democrats scored big wins 
in the November elections, the road was tougher for 
incumbents of both parties. Some incumbents chose 
not to run for reelection under the new district lines 
7The top-two primary system, adopted by California voters in 2010, 
replaced the traditional party primaries with open primaries. The top 
two candidates were to face off in the general election, even if they 
were of the same party and even if one candidate received a majority of 
all votes cast in the primary election.
8Eric McGhee and Daniel Krimm, California’s New Electoral Reforms: 
The Fall Election (Public Policy Institute of California, 2012).
9Ibid.
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or were forced to run in districts where their political 
bases were considerably weaker.
Democratic Congressman Henry Waxman faced 
reelection in an altered district that was less Democrat-
ic, and he ended up with one of the toughest battles of 
his career. 
Another Democratic Congressman, Howard Ber-
man, the leader of past Democratic redistricting efforts 
in California, was forced into a largely unfamiliar 
district in which he lost by a large margin to his Demo-
cratic colleague Brad Sherman.
A study by the Brennan Center for Justice found 
that the California maps reduced safe congressional seats 
by nine. The study noted that Elton Gallegy, a Repub-
lican member of Congress, retired rather than run in a 
district that moved from formerly Republican to Demo-
cratic. In a neighboring district formerly considered safe, 
Democrat Lois Capps found herself in a competitive 
race against a Republican, Abel Maldonado.10
Among other changes, the new maps created the 
state’s first Asian American majority electoral district, 
the 49th assembly district in the West San Gabriel 
Valley.
In December, 2011, the New York–based inves-
tigative organization ProPublica released a report11 
charging that California’s congressional Democrats had 
formed a secret working group of members and con-
sultants that managed to subvert the process in order 
to keep their incumbents safe. Though ProPublica has 
a reputation for sound investigative journalism, there 
were significant problems with its redistricting report. 
Among these were errors of fact suggesting that the 
authors were not well informed about the commission, 
including the report’s assertion (corrected in a later ver-
sion) that the commissioners worked without pay and 
the uncorrected comment that the commission held no 
10Sundeep Iyer and Keesha Gaskins, Redistricting and Congressional 
Control: A First Look (Brennan Center for Justice, New York University 
School of Law, 2012).
11Olga Pierce and Jeff Larson, “How Democrats Fooled California’s 
Redistricting Commission,” December 21, 2011, accessed September 
3, 2012, http://www.propublica.org/article/how-democrats-fooled-
californias-redistricting-commission. See also Olga Pierce et al., “An-
swering Your Questions on Our California Redistricting Story,” De-
cember 23, 2011, accessed September 3, 2012, http://www.propublica.
org/article/answering-your-questions-on-our-california-redistricting-
story.
public hearings after the release of the June 10 maps.12
Although the authors made a strong case that con-
gressional Democrats tried to influence the process, 
the report presented less compelling evidence that 
congressional Democrats as a whole had successfully 
influenced the commission. Undoubtedly, there were 
some Democrats and some Republicans who managed 
to win advantages in the process by using “stand-ins” 
purporting to represent community sentiment but who 
in reality acted to protect their political interests. But 
the authors of the widely circulated article ignored 
substantial evidence that broader demographic and 
electoral trends explained much of the Democratic suc-
cess in the 2012 elections.
An analysis of partisan outcomes suggested that 
Democrats did indeed make improvements in their posi-
tion in congressional seats that were greater than those 
they gained in the assembly and senate.13 However, the 
same study argued that the reason for this difference 
was that in 2001 the incumbent-protection plan disad-
vantaged Democratic prospects in congressional races 
in order to protect incumbents to a much greater degree 
than in assembly and senate races. The 2011 congres-
sional maps were considerably more competitive than 
in 2001 but in a manner that allowed Democratic gains 
based on growth in populations favorable to Democrats 
to be more useful to party candidates. 
Looking to the Future
Though California’s first effort at citizen-led redistrict-
ing followed a process that was at times rough around 
the edges, it more than met the Voters First Act’s goals 
of transparency and fairness. Those who designed the 
12Online responses by the authors to questions raised by the public 
about the report revealed other problems. In one follow-up response, 
the authors suggested that the commission had favored one Democrat-
ic congressman, Brad Sherman, over another, Howard Berman, be-
cause Sherman had hired a firm associated with a Democratic political 
consultant. The problem with this interpretation is that virtually the 
entire Democratic congressional delegation had endorsed Berman over 
Sherman. If the Democratic congressional delegation were gaming the 
system for an ally, it would have been for Berman, not Sherman. While 
Sherman might well have worked hard and successfully to get the best 
possible district for himself, this would not have been the preferred 
outcome for the bulk of the Democratic delegation.
13Kogan and McGhee, “Redistricting California,” 35–36.
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citizen redistricting process were real pioneers, both 
in winning an electoral victory that had eluded previ-
ous reform efforts and in creating and monitoring the 
process their campaign had created. Citizens seeking 
to adopt similar reforms in their states or communi-
ties would be well served to learn from this experience, 
from what worked and from what needs improvement.
The commission received the benefit of the doubt 
as a rookie operation with a widely popular goal of 
enhancing citizen control over a redistricting process 
long dominated by elected officials. The commission’s 
massive outreach demonstrated a remarkable appetite 
for public comment. Its sincere pursuit of transparency, 
though not always perfect, earned it more leeway with 
the public.
But in ten years, the citizen redistricting process 
will not benefit from first-time status. Its work will be 
more carefully watched and criticized. Political forces 
that were baffled, angered, quietly involved, or gen-
erally thrown on the defensive will be much better 
prepared to exercise influence. Even with its flaws, the 
ProPublica report highlighted what might be a more 
realistic fear for the next redistricting: that one or both 
major political parties or leading politicians in either 
party may find ways to bend the commission to its will.
There is reason for concern about the next round. 
In Arizona, the first citizen redistricting proceeded 
in relative peace. Lawsuits were filed and fought, but 
the process stayed relatively free of political pyrotech-
nics. The second iteration in 2011 proved far more 
contentious. When the commission hired a mapping-
consulting firm, the state attorney general sued on the 
grounds that the commission had violated open-meet-
ing laws. The tie-breaking chairperson was impeached 
by the legislature and then reinstated by a state court.14
In Los Angeles, a new city charter in 1999 created 
an advisory citizen commission for the city’s redistrict-
ing. Whereas it had a calm first run in 2001, its tenure 
a decade later was marked by allegations of political 
interference from key political leaders and by serious 
14According to Bruce Cain, “Entering the 2011 redistricting, there 
were two possibilities: that the AIRC would build on its reasonable 
success in 2001, or that with experience and knowledge of the process 
under their belt, the parties and political players would game the sys-
tem more effectively. The answer, unfortunately, turned out to be the 
latter”; Cain, “Redistricting Commissions,” 125.
community conflict over how the lines were drawn.15
Reforms to enhance citizen power over redistrict-
ing will confront a more organized environment the 
second time around. Interest groups will have an incen-
tive to become involved early and often. Organized 
public input is likely to be far more sophisticated and 
widespread. Gamesmanship and artful lobbying among 
candidates, the political parties, interest groups, and 
others are likely to mark the next round. The political 
parties will have plenty of time to plan. This shift will 
have to be anticipated, recognized, and built into the 
process. 
There will likely be much greater interest in who 
becomes a commissioner, not just as a type of lottery for 
individuals but as a proxy for groups. With the impor-
tance of COIs, cities and counties will want to ensure 
that they have a sympathetic voice on the commission. 
The original design of the commission assumed that 
commissioners would be independent, even as mem-
bers of a political party. If either or both major political 
parties groom successful candidates for commission 
positions, they could create a voting faction on the 
commission. Either major party may succeed in creat-
ing a blocking minority of three votes that could hold 
substantive decisions hostage.
To successfully confront what will likely be a more 
sophisticated, better prepared, and more organized set of 
interested parties, the commission will need to be equally 
prepared and organized. There will be something lost as 
well as gained in this transition. The first commission 
had a pioneering spirit, as the commissioners essen-
15David Zahniser, “Wesson Denies Newly Drawn Council Districts 
Are Payback,” Los Angeles Times, Feb. 17, 2012, http://articles.latimes.
com/2012/feb/17/local/la-me-city-redistricting-20120217.
Those who designed 
the citizen redistricting 
process were real 
pioneers.
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tially invented their paths to final maps by creating an 
agency from scratch. The strong personal bond among 
the commissioners and their high level of morale in 
tough circumstances will not easily be reproduced the 
next time. But though the experience will be different 
for the next group, it can be equally successful if it is 
built on sound planning and careful execution. The 
next commission will be less freewheeling and more 
structured. But it will also be better able to anticipate 
and interpret the myriad political and organizational 
challenges thrown its way. 
Protection against political interference in the next 
cycle will require a data-driven, professional, well-
managed process that moves in a stepwise manner from 
selection of commissioners, to training and planning, 
to public hearings, to drawing of maps, and, finally, to 
adjustments of maps. 
No matter how well armed a citizens commission 
is with “objective” data, however, redistricting has many 
subjective elements open to partisan or ideological dis-
agreement. Nothing in redistricting is free of these 
debates, from the interpretation of the VRA to the val-
ue of keeping municipal and county boundaries intact. 
If the next commissioners know that every decision—
from hiring staff and consultants to choosing where 
and how to run meetings—may activate such political 
disagreements, they will be prepared not to eliminate 
all political differences but to reduce the undue influ-
ence of incumbency in redistricting and the appearance 
of bias in the process.
In order for Californians to view citizen redistrict-
ing as an effective mechanism, the process will need to 
prove itself again after the 2020 Census. Commission-
ers will need to maintain independence and ownership 
but simultaneously draw from a stronger base of profes-
sional support. The designers of the citizen redistricting 
process assumed that a long and careful search would 
result in the selection of independent commission-
ers free of the influence of incumbent politicians or 
political parties. In large part, the outcome of this first 
citizen redistricting process validated this assumption. 
However, this faith will not suffice for a long-term, 
institutionalized model of citizen redistricting.
Compare this to the design of a citizen jury. A 
network of institutional forces assists and guides the 
jurors so that they can devote their attention to hear-
ing the evidence and deliberating toward a verdict. No 
such luxury awaited California’s first crop of redistrict-
ing commissioners. Upon their arrival, commissioners 
found little in place to guide their work. The eight 
commissioners selected by random draw had to choose 
the next six. They also had to select an executive direc-
tor, VRA counsel, and a line-drawing consultant. 
Decisions had already been made before they took 
office that constrained their choices. And the time-
line was witheringly tight, as the full commission took 
office on January 12, 2011, and final maps were due on 
August 15, 2011. (The designers of Prop 11 had given 
them until September, but Prop 20, passed in 2010, 
tightened the deadline to August.) Highly motivated 
commissioners, staff, and consultants worked over-
time to make the process work. They made mistakes 
and then fixed them, fell behind and then caught up by 
dint of extra hours and goodwill. Without significant 
correction to these aspects of the process, the citizen 
redistricting model will be in trouble in ten years. 
The citizen redistricting process delivered much 
more than might have been expected from a group 
of civic activists contending at the ballot and amateur 
citizens with a short timeline, a limited budget, and 
insufficient training. At times, the process seemed in 
serious trouble; and yet, at the end of the day, the com-
mission largely succeeded in its mandated goals. The 
lessons of their experience will need to be adapted for 
those who next accept the obligation to draw the lines.
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